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l)INDIVIDUAL MOBILE COMMUNICATION SERVICES AND TARIFFS
Individual services and tariffs existed briefly in the beginning of telecommunications
history 150 years ago but have faded away over time. Service provisioning evolved into
the current supplier-centric situation which has many limitations and disadvantages. This
thesis re-embraces the user-centric service provisioning and tariffing philosophy and
applies it to the current mobile communication services setting, which differs significantly
in scale and scope from the historical practices. A design methodology and tool for the
determination of individualized mobile services and tariffs is provided, and its benefits to
both the user and the supplier are evaluated. 
The design has three aspects. The first involves the construction of a conceptual
framework consisting of the behavioral models of the user and the supplier (firm) and a
game theoretical negotiation mechanism to determine individual services and tariffs.
Second is the operationalization of the conceptual framework in a computational design
with methods, computational models, negotiation algorithms, risk metrics and a prototype
implementation. Third is the extension of the individual services and tariffs concept to a
community setting via a proposed community business model.
Two evaluations are performed. In the first evaluation, for the firm-based design, a
user survey is conducted and computational cases which address value-added mobile
services and generic mobile service bundles are developed. The numerical analyses show
that the users always achieve gains in utility. The benefits to the supplier include
adjustable risk-profit equilibrium points, increased network traffic and reduced churn. In
the second evaluation, for the community-based design, two case studies on communities
are conducted. The results demonstrate that the proposed business model of community-
based individual service provisioning and tariffing can meet the demands of their
members precisely and address both affordability and sustainability issues.
Last, a specific engineering implementation and integration of the individualized
service and tariff design tools into the existing infrastructure of the communication
services suppliers is proposed. Further research issues are pointed out.
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Executive Summary 
 
Individual services and tariffs existed in the beginning of telecommunications history 150 
years ago but soon faded away, largely under the pressure of single national operators. The 
industry prospered under economies of scale, and service provisioning and tariffs evolved 
into the current supplier-centric situation, which has many limitations for and 
disadvantages to the users and ultimately the suppliers. This thesis re-embraces the user-
centric service provisioning and tariffing philosophy and applies it to the current mobile 
communication services setting, which differs significantly from the historical setting in 
terms of the scale and scope of services.  
 
The research challenge lies in determining at the same time the individual user-specific 
services and tariffs, and in doing so in a sustainable way for users and suppliers alike, 
given the diversity of demands and the complexity in mobile communication service 
provisioning. Therefore it is essential to determine quantitatively, the benefits to the users 
and the suppliers, and the profit-risk-provisioning costs profile in the case of the suppliers, 
so that they are motivated to adopt individual services and tariffs. For a long time 
monopolist suppliers have been arguing that the customization costs would be too high, 
while in fact their marketing, CRM and churn costs are higher. 
 
We construct a conceptual framework for individual mobile services and tariffs which 
serves as a theoretical foundation for a later computational design. This framework 
consists of behavioral models of the user and the supplier (firm) and a game theoretical 
negotiation mechanism to determine the individual services and tariffs. The user is 
modeled as having “bounded rationality” and “social concerns”. We address the bounded 
rationality by introducing a simplified service perceptual space as the user’s optimization 
and decision space when the mobile service has many attributes (e.g. ≥ 7) to be 
individualized. The service perceptual space is made up of user-perceived service 
attributes which are non-technical and well understood by the users. In addition, we apply 
satisficing decision rules to the user during the decision making process. Moreover, we 
employ a simple distance-based utility function which can reflect some irrational aspects 
of the user’s social dimension. In turn, the supplier is characterized as seeking a maximum 
profit with a minimum risk. We use an engineering and business-based service design 
space as the supplier’s decision space because he can grasp all the technical design 
attributes and also because he eventually needs to implement/provide the service. The 
supplier’s decision rules are set in such a way that he may lose in some individual 
contracts when compared to the initial non-negotiable offers to the public at large; but by 
pooling the different individualized contracts together, he can achieve the highest possible 
economic utility with a minimum risk at corporate level. The user and the supplier 
negotiate to have individual services and tariffs, and the user has a dominant influence in 
the negotiation. The bilateral negotiation process is modeled by a user-led recursive 
Stackelberg game. 
 
We operationalize the conceptual framework with a computational design and a tool. The 
design allows the computation of a negotiation result when the user simply states his 
wishes, e.g. service specifications, budget and contract length in the beginning; it also 
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provides business performance indicators to help the supplier to set decision parameters 
and criteria. We provide methods to determine the mapping relationship between the 
service perceptual space and the service design space because, although the user’s and 
supplier’s minds operate in different space, they still need to communicate. We construct a 
realistic supplier’s operational model which is rather complex and has many 
discontinuities and non-linearities. This operator model includes switching between 
wireless access technologies, traffic transmission and switching/routing, network 
management, content access and provisioning as well as value-added expertise; it is built 
as an incremental model able to quantify the consequences of the individual user’s 
requests. We develop three negotiation game algorithms. The first two algorithms are 
designed for the negotiation games of a complicated value-added mobile service; the first 
algorithm uses continuous decision variables while the second uses realistic discretized 
variables. The third algorithm is designed for the negotiation game for common generic 
mobile service bundles, as supplied currently. In this game setting, the user’s mind 
operates in the same service design space as that of the supplier. We provide risk metrics 
(VaR and extreme VaR) to quantify the supplier’s risks under both normal and extreme 
market conditions. We present a systematic method to compute the VaRs for the supplier 
at the individual contract level by using Monte Carlo simulation. This includes methods to 
characterize and simulate users’ service demands that are used as inputs to the Monte 
Carlo simulation. The expected profit at individual contract level and the rate of deals can 
also be estimated. Based on these business performance indicators, the supplier can adjust 
parameters in his constraints and decide rules when negotiating with a group of users to 
achieve his goal of a maximum profit with a minimum risk. We provide a proof-of-concept 
software implementation of the computational design as a design tool.  
 
As a first quantitative evaluation of the design methodology and tool, we create a “mobile 
singing classroom (mSinging)” case, which is a rather complicated value-added mobile 
service that combines wireless bandwidth needs, wireless data traffic, content and 
additional professional services. Thus the user’s mind would operate in the service 
perceptual space. Using the design tool, we study the Stackelberg equilibria in the 
negotiation games and compare them to the initial starting points, which are the public 
services and tariffs offered by the supplier. 
 
As a second quantitative evaluation of the design methodology and tool, we study a large-
scale case of applying the individual service and tariffs concept to a common state-of-the-
business standard mobile service bundle, involving voice, SMS, and data download. This 
is still individualization, because the user sets his contract length and budget, not like in 
the current commercial schemes offered by mobile operators. In this case, the user and the 
supplier would use the same service design space. 
 
The results from the above computational cases show that the users, as the leaders of the 
negotiation games, always achieve gains: the average increases in user utility are 163% 
and 37%, in the mSinging and the generic mobile service bundle cases respectively. The 
supplier gains in some games and loses in others from individual users. But by taking a 
user portfolio approach and pooling the different users together, he can still achieve a gain 
on average with a reasonable risk. The supplier’s average improvement in overall profit is 
9% and 142% for the mSinging and the generic mobile service bundle cases respectively. 
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In both cases, the calculated VaRs have positive values, which mean that at the selected 
confidence level (i.e. 95%), the supplier can expect a profit from a randomly selected 
individual contract. The profit levels are indicated by the calculated VaRs respectively. 
Our results also demonstrate that “a maximum profit with a minimum risk” situation may 
not be achievable. The supplier can, however, by changing the decision parameters and 
decision criteria, control his risk-profit equilibrium points. 
 
We extend our research into a community setting, where the main focus is on establishing 
a business model for community-based individual services. The difference lies in the fact 
that the community members may then take over some of the supplier duties and serve as 
content creators or service creators. The evaluations of the business model design are 
based on two case studies: one is on a wireless game community and the other is on a rural 
agricultural community; both bear the embryonic form of community-based individual 
services and tariffs. The case studies demonstrate that community-based individual service 
creation, provisioning and tariffing can meet precisely the demands of its members and can 
address both the affordability and sustainability issues. 
 
We conduct an experimental demand analysis of individual services and tariffs in general 
through a global end-user survey. There are 13 questions in the survey, each of which 
serves a different purpose. Furthermore the questions are chosen in such a way that by 
nesting them, some estimates of key implicit indicators could be computed. Cooperation 
was established with the International Telecommunications Users Group (INTUG) to 
distribute the survey questionnaire. The key messages from the survey are: equal numbers 
of users prefer individual services and tariffs, as compared to a flat rate; cost reduction and 
service simplicity are the main drivers for users of individual services and tariffs; user 
behavior will change and drive up the network traffic. The main implications from the 
survey for the users are that price per bit drops by almost half to the users’ advantage after 
the service is individualized; for the supplier, the network traffic will increase by 31% and 
churn rate will be significantly reduced. Furthermore, there is an extra revenue and cost 
reduction opportunity in service configuration and tariff negotiation.  
 
We suggest an engineering implementation of the design tool and propose a systematic 
integration of it into existing communication network infrastructure using existing 
technologies. In addition, we recommend different user involvement styles, from offline to 
online in the individual service design and tariff negotiation implementation, to 
accommodate different user requirements and above all different operator interactions and 
CRM strategies. 
 
In summary, theoretically, the research contributes to the field of service mass 
customization by establishing a conceptual framework based on behavioral models. 
Furthermore the research provides a novel methodology for the computational design of 
individualized mobile communication services and tariffs by integrating methods and 
approaches in different disciplines.  
 
Practically, the design tool can be used and integrated into the existing infrastructure by 
mobile communication services providers (e.g. an operator) in both the negotiations of 
generic mobile service bundles and complicated value-added services. The former is at the 
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core of the current mobile service business, and the latter represents the trend of 
development in the near future. In addition, the proposed business model can be readily 
picked up by any community which intends to provide such services and tariffs. 
 
Further research could include: quantifying specific churn rates for users of individual 
services and tariffs once they are offered; constructing community behavioral and 
computational models; incorporating emotional aspects into the user’s behavioral and 
computational model; characterizing and simulating user demands using multivariate 
extreme value theory; and identifying regulatory implications and social impacts of 
individual services and tariffs.  
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Guide to the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Fig. 0 provides a navigation map from chapter to 
chapter in terms of concepts, designs and evaluations, and how they are related to each 
other.   
 
Chapter 1 presents the research motivation, and provides general definitions and 
characterizations of individual services and tariffs as well as other related concepts.   
 
Chapter 2 surveys the existing literature in related areas, such as mobile service properties, 
existing tariff models, and service mass customization. The focus of this chapter is on 
identifying user and supplier behavior characteristics that serve as the building-blocks of a 
conceptual framework in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework for the design of individual services and 
tariffs. The framework consists of behavioral models of users and suppliers (firms) and a 
game theoretical negotiation mechanism to determine the individual services and tariffs. 
The notions of service perceptual space and service design space are introduced, which 
capture the different capabilities of the user and the supplier in service design and decision 
making. A user-led recursive Stackelberg game is introduced to model the negotiation 
process in which the user has a dominant influence.   
 
Chapter 4 operationalizes the conceptual framework with a computational design and 
evaluates the design with numerical cases. The computational design consists of 
computational models (including utility function, constraints and decision rules), 
negotiation algorithms, and a set of methods to capture and characterize user demands: see 
Fig. 0 for their relationships with the building-blocks of the conceptual framework. Three 
numerical cases are developed to provide quantitative evaluations of the design. The first 
two cases relate to the individualization of a value-added mobile service (mSinging), but 
with different complexities. The third case relates to the individualization of a generic 
mobile service bundle. Throughout this chapter, the analyses are carried out on individual 
negotiation games. We compare the computed Stackelberg equilibria in the negotiation 
games with the initial public services and tariffs, for the users and the supplier 
respectively. The results show that the users, as the leaders of the Stackelberg game, 
always achieve gains; while the supplier achieves gains in some games and losses in the 
others. Given the results, it is natural to ask if the supplier can benefit from individual 
services and tariffs, to what extent and how. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses the aforementioned supplier’s concerns with computed business 
performance indicators, which include expected profit, market share and risks. Although 
the supplier may lose on some users, by taking a user portfolio approach and pooling the 
different users together, the supplier can still achieve gains on average at a reasonable risk 
level. Risks in profit are quantified using Value at Risk (VaR) and extreme VaR, under 
normal and extreme market situations respectively. In addition, we identify application 
areas for extreme value theory in the context of individual services and tariffs. The 
computations of business performance indicators are based on Monte Carlo simulations. 
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We propose methods to characterize and simulate user demands to serve as the inputs to 
the Monte Carlo method. We demonstrate, using the numerical cases developed in Chapter 
4, that the suppliers can adjust their risk-profit equilibrium points by changing the decision 
parameters. 
 
The content in Chapters 4 and 5 contains the core computational design of firm-supplied 
individual services and tariffs, which is highlighted by the dashed-line box in Fig. 0. 
 
Chapter 6 extends the concept of individual services and tariffs to a community-based 
setting. We provide a business model and demonstrate its feasibility by two case studies: 
one is a wireless game community and the other is a rural agricultural community. Both 
cases bear the embryonic form of the community-based individual services and tariffs.  
 
Chapter 7 discusses management and implementation issues, and aims to bring the 
concepts and design in the previous chapters into realization. An experimental demand 
analysis for individual services and tariffs is carried out via a global user survey. Each 
question in the survey serves a different purpose and, by nesting them, some estimates of 
key implicit indicators can be computed. We also investigate the engineering 
implementation of the design tool and propose a systematic implementation of individual 
services and tariffs inside existing technologies and communications network 
infrastructures.  
 
Chapter 8 provides overall conclusions and identifies the contributions of this research. 
Future research directions are suggested.   
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Chapter 1 
Research motivation 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
INDIVIDUAL services and tariffs1 existed at the dawn of the telecommunications history. 
After the telephone handset was patented by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876, for quite 
some years, and in some markets, it served mainly high-level civil servants and privileged 
people (e.g. trade, news); and was the symbol of wealth and social rank:  
 
A wire was at once strung to Windsor Castle. Others were ordered by the 
Daily News, the Persian Ambassador, and five or six lords and baronets. 
Then came an order which raised the hopes of the telephone men to the 
highest heaven, from the banking house of J. S. Morgan & Co. It was the first 
recognition from the "seats of the mighty" in the business and financial 
world. (Casson, 1910, p.90) 
 
Users were not designated by a number, but by their names; picking up the phone would 
get you the operator, who would then ring and connect the desired party by a polite support 
staff protocol. As a luxury service at that time, the demand for telephony was limited. The 
supply of telephone services was in general characterized by geographically limited pure 
monopolies, and the capacity in each country was dominated by two or three local 
companies able to invest in interconnections.  
 
Due to the limited supply and demand, tariffs were negotiated between the privileged 
individuals and the telephone companies in a bilateral way. From the very beginning, even 
for a limited set of services, charging patterns diverged between flat rates and individual 
usage-based rates. The number of call attempts, physical destination and the duration were 
manually recorded – but the pricing of the calls was a matter of agreement between the 
telephone company sales person and the service customer (who was then not a subscriber): 
usage, rank, fame, location were all taken into account, and the settlement was made by 
bank note or cash. In some countries, an annual contract fee was charged, while others 
started with flat rates for a fixed number of calls (not even based on duration or distance).  
Fig. 1-1 shows a copy of the original tariff specifications of the Copenhagen Telephone 
Company KTAS in 1884 (translation is in Table 1-1). The basic tariffs were a function of 
the distance to the main switch (mostly because copper wire had to be installed), while the 
tariffs for additional connections were negotiable depending on the individuals. Note that 
the net domestic product at factor cost per capita in Denmark in 1884 was 653 “1884-
Kroner” (Johansen, 1985, p. 408), while the cheapest option from the telephone company 
cost 150 Kroner/year. This means that the ratio of telephone costs to average disposable 
income was 25 %: only rich people could afford this, and thus always wanted to negotiate. 
 
                                                          
1 A precise definition of individual services and tariffs is given in Section 1.2: a motivation 
discussion is presented first, based on the history of telecommunications 
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Fig. 1-1: KTAS Kjobenhavns telephone - selskab 1884 
 
Table 1-1: Copenhagen telephone company KTAS tariffs 1884 
  
Payment covers all phone calls and the maintenance costs of the network and the phone. 
Tariff is a function of the distance to the main switch, users which are 30 km away pay 
twice. Basic tariffs are: 
1. Inner city of Copenhagen  …  Kroner 150 
2. Copenhagen suburb           …  Kroner 175 
3. Great Copenhagen area  I  …  Kroner 200 
4. Great Copenhagen area II  …  Kroner 300 
Payment should be made in advance on a yearly basis for a full subscription. Cancellation 
of service should be made ¼ year in advance. When a subscription is made, for a second or 
further connections for the same person or company, the additional connections will have 
15-25% discount on the above tariffs, depending on the individuals. In the summer, for a 
payment of 100 Kroner, the subscriber can have an additional connection in one of the 
three designated areas.  
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Individual services and tariffs faded out when the telecommunications industry began to 
thrive in the early 20th century. Because manual recording was tedious and the goal was to 
provide access to services to everyone, services were standardized and service 
provisioning was automated by electromechanical technologies. As a result, users started 
to pay the same price for each pair of source-destination (Fischer, 1992). 
 
Today, individual tariffs exist for many other types of services, in industries such as 
airlines, travel and hotels, where prices are associated with booking lead time, booking 
history,  restrictions the individual users are willing to accept, etc. In some cases, 
individuals can bid their prices for the services that have been chosen (e.g. the “name your 
own price®” service offered by priceline.com, and equivalents in weekly sales on airlines).  
 
In the telecommunications industry, customer-specific tariffs exist widely at the 
enterprise/group level for large companies. The tariffs depend mainly on the aggregated 
amount which the customer intends to buy. At the individual level, despite the fact that the 
number of mobile users exceeds two billion people worldwide, personalized services and 
tariffs are still very limited.  
 
Most tariff models in use today in telecommunications (fixed and mobile) have been 
derived from those of physical goods, assuming limited capacity in either bandwidth or 
transmission capacity and linked to installation costs like cable length in the 19th century. 
This worked well when there were limited types of so-called generic standardized services, 
such as voice or fax.  
 
From the technology perspective, due to the advent of fiber optical transmission and the 
advances in radio coding/modulation/multiple-antenna/multiple access techniques (Liu, 
2006), both the backbone and the wireless access networks capacities have been greatly 
improved. Furthermore, services are no longer limited to voice. The gradual deployment of 
the third generation (3G) and Beyond 3G mobile networks (B3G) enables many value-
added services (e.g. location-based services, mobile TV), while SMS revenues and profit 
levels were already very important in the previous 2G networks. In addition to the cellular 
networks, various mobile and wireless networks (e.g. PAN, WLAN, WAN, digital 
broadcast networks) are being developed and deployed. These networks are based on 
various technologies (e.g. Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, WiMAX, DVB-H) and serve different 
purposes. With the movement toward all IP networks (Lin & Pang, 2005) and the 
development of multiradio mobile devices (Björkqvist, 2006), users can access the services 
offered by different networks at the same time, or access the same service or application 
across alternative networks seamlessly. At the same time, users’ mobile devices are turned 
into mobile computers that have build-in audio, video capabilities, high storage capacity 
and processing power (Ojanperä, 2006). The result is that the users can access myriads of 
services and contents/applications through one single mobile device.         
 
From the social perspective, on both the supply side and the demand side, the “power” of 
individuals is rising. The deregulation, privatization and liberalization movements around 
the globe in the past two decades have changed the industry from a rigid, monopolistic one 
to a more competitive one (Noam, 1983; Xu & Pitt, 2002; Geddes, 2000). The market is 
moving toward a “contestable market” which is characterized by having no entry barriers 
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(Willig, 1980). The lowered level of entry barriers is reflected in service creation and 
provision, which are no longer confined to large companies and operators 1. The free 
software/open source movement provides the tools, the increased educational level of 
whole society provides distributed brainpower, and the communication networks reaching 
every corner serve to bring everyone and everything together. Small companies and 
individuals are playing increasingly important roles in creating and providing 
telecommunication services.  
 
As a consequence of these developments, there is an explosion of services, which will not 
only put a burden on the communications infrastructure, but also overload the user. Both 
the wireless spectrum of the supplier, and the attention and money from the users are 
scarce resources that need to be used efficiently. It is high time that individual services and 
tariffs, which are tailor-made to satisfy idiosyncratic demands while in the meantime, cut 
out unnecessary services, be extended to individual users and not just limited to certain 
privileged corporate customers. This is a critical departure from today’s thinking about 
telecommunication services and their tariffs.   
 
Fig. 1-2 summarizes the current situation and our research target of mobile service 
provisioning and tariffing. At present, the supplier-centric design of mobile services and 
tariffs considers primarily the requirements of the supplier (e.g. access network capacity, 
billing system capacity, sales channels, etc). The result is the limited standardized services 
and standardized tariffs which do not satisfy many user demands. This research seeks to 
reach a situation where the mobile communication services and tariffs are designed in a 
user-centric way, i.e. a user’s specific requirements are considered in the design. The result 
would be individual user-specific mobile services and tariffs.  
standardized services 
and tariffs
Supplier’s requirements taken into account 0
Current situation:
Supplier-centric
Target situation:
User-centric
Individual services 
and tariffs
 
Fig. 1-2: Current and targeted situations of mobile service provisioning and tariffing 
                                                          
1 Due to the fact that infrastructure investment and control are very costly and “sticky”, 
new entrants may need to share the pre-existing network infrastructure with incumbent 
operators, or may end up by doing so. 
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1.2 Concepts and definitions  
 
In this section, we first explain the rationale behind selecting mobile services as our 
research focus; next we provide a definition of individual services and tariffs by 
identifying usage and industry trends and conducting a review of the relevant literature 
(see also Sections 2.4 and 2.5); and other relevant concepts and definitions that will be 
used throughout the research are also provided.  
  
We focus on mobile (communication) services for two primary reasons. First, the sheer 
number of mobile users worldwide outnumbered fixed-line users in 2002 and surpassed 
two billion in mid-2005 (ITU, 2005). This number is still increasing rapidly, and in some 
countries the number of mobile phones per capita is larger than 1. The demands from such 
a user population on the quantity and diversity of mobile services are huge. Second, mobile 
devices are widely deemed indispensable to, integral to and intimate in a person’s daily life 
(Fortunati, 2002; Vincent, 2005). The highly personal nature of mobile devices allows 
mobile services to be highly individualized. 
 
There are numerous definitions of wireless and mobile services. The International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) categorizes wireless and mobile services according to 
different technologies and purposes (e.g. terrestrial mobile services, amateur and amateur-
satellite services, aeronautical mobile services, etc). Within a specific technology system, 
wireless and mobile services are defined and standardized. This is a rather limited 
categorization, since there have been successful research and field tests in offering the 
same service across heterogeneous wireless and mobile systems (Kappler, Poyhonen, 
Johnsson, & Schmid, 2007). In a broader sense, we define wireless and mobile 
(communication) services as those that are provided via wireless user equipment, through 
ubiquitous connections to facilitate communications anytime, anywhere, between human 
beings, between humans and machines, and between machines. Needless to say, the 
concept of “wireless service” has a broader scope than “mobile service” because the 
former can include, for example, fixed wireless services whose mobility is limited. In this 
thesis, we use the term “wireless service” to emphasize that, at access level, the service 
uses wireless technologies. We use “mobile service” to emphasize the mobility of the 
service.     
 
In order to define individual services and tariffs, the opposite is defined first. Public 
services and tariffs in telecommunications refer to the regulatory-protected ability of an 
identified user to obtain, from a service provider, by a bilateral contract, a standard service, 
at a standardized price. Public service is then the communication service supplied in the 
manner stated above, following a request by the user. Public tariff is then the standardized 
tariff paid by the user for the standardized service. Public services and tariffs are common 
practice with current incumbent telecommunication operators: they are often offered in the 
form of “service bundles”.  
 
According to a recent marketing “tradition” dating from the late 1980s, the notion of 
mobile service bundle and bundle tariff refer to offering to customers a finite set of 
generic mobile services (e.g. voice, SMS) in one “package”, each for a given tariff 
repeating itself in monthly intervals over the contract duration. Each such bundle may have 
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certain parameters which the user can set for an additional price. Each service within a 
bundle has a usage ceiling: changes in these thresholds force a change in the bundle tariff 
or an incrementally higher price over that within the bundle; sometimes unlimited usage of 
a certain service is offered within a specific time period. Often, an operator provides a 
subsidized mobile terminal as part of the contract. There is no transparency at all as to how 
the whole contract has been designed. There is no interaction, other than explanations of 
the contract clauses, between an operator’s salesperson and the user when signing the 
contract. A user has to choose one service bundle with its corresponding tariffs by 
predicting his needs and usages of the services in the future, or reject the offer and receive 
no service. This limited segmentation often leaves a significant number of demands from 
the users unsatisfied. 
 
Individual services and tariffs in telecommunications refer to the regulatory-protected 
ability of an identified user to obtain from a service provider, through a bilateral specific 
contract, a combination of services and related content, at a specific price (called a tariff 
chosen by the user) corresponding to a user request specified with a service demand profile 
and a certain duration. Individual service is the communication service supplied in the way 
stated above, with a request and specification by the user. Individual tariff is the price paid 
by the user for such an individual service. 
 
Per this definition, individual services do not in essence include pre-paid services and 
individual tariffs do not include tariffs offered by traffic or service aggregators or resellers. 
The notion of individual services and tariffs therefore is also different from a bundle, 
because in the latter, the user has no influence on the possible services or service 
characteristics, and he cannot specify changing usage over time. It will be explained in 
Section 4.9 how even a public generic service can be priced by the user according to an 
individual tariff different from an operator-supplied bundle. 
 
The users of individual services are the recipients1 of services; if there is a subscription, 
the user can also be called a subscriber.  
 
The service provider/supplier is defined in a broad sense as the entity that provides access, 
content, applications and human resources, as well as support, or a combination of these to 
users. 
 
What need to be clarified and differentiated are the concepts of personalization and mass 
customization and their relations to individual services. In the context of mobile 
communication services, personalization means configuring some service parameters by a 
user on the basis of configuration options specified by the supplier. Mass customization 
means to co-design a service, with attributes and characteristics that meet an individual’s 
specific requests within a larger class of capabilities offered by the supplier. In both 
activities, solutions are found within a complete fixed solution space. The difference is that 
mass customization has a much higher flexibility in meeting the user’s service demand. It 
is also stated that “the costs associated with mass customization allow for price levels that 
                                                          
1 The recipients of the services can be human beings or machines. In this research, we focus 
on human beings as users.  
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do not imply a switch in upper market segment” (Piller, 2004). In this thesis, we use the 
notion “individualized mobile service” to represent the user-specific mobile services, 
which can be a result of a personalization or a mass customization activity. This thesis, 
however, does not cover the old-established approaches of personalization with only 
discrete choices driven by the supplier. In Chapter 4, we present methods to determine the 
service-specific fixed solution space, and any negotiated agreement within it will lead to 
individual services and tariffs. We also demonstrate in Chapter 4 that parts of the fixed 
solution space can lead to service characteristics which have continuous values, while 
other parts of the solution space lead to service characteristics which can only have 
discrete values options.  
 
1.3 Research objectives and research questions 
 
During a preliminary study to formulate the concepts and definitions of individual mobile 
services and tariffs, we identified many closely-related research dimensions, including: 
“the degree of freedom of mobile service pricing”, “the granularity of service providers”, 
“affordability”, “risk to users and suppliers”, “social effects”, “migration of the system” 
and “policy, regulation and law” (for details, see Appendix I). These issues were too broad 
to tackle during a PhD study. However, there is a fundamental element in these research 
dimensions: they are all dependent on the existence of individualized services and tariffs. 
Given this, we set the objectives of this research as follows: 
    
1. To provide a design methodology and tools to realize individual mobile services 
and tariffs; 
 
2. To provide a decision basis for the users and the suppliers of mobile services to 
adopt individual services and tariffs. 
 
Given the research objectives, we formulate our research questions to be: 
 
1. How can individual-specific mobile services and their corresponding tariffs be 
determined and built? 
 
2. What are the benefits of individual mobile services and tariffs to the user and the 
supplier respectively? 
 
The first research question is of a design nature: it requires the design of a service and 
tariff determination model, which can jointly take into account the requirements and 
constraints from both the users and the supplier. Furthermore, the design should also 
provide risk assessment instruments to the supplier, as individual tariffs will inevitably 
introduce more uncertainty to the market share and profit than a commodity contract. In 
addition, the design should be technically feasible to implement as an add-on to the 
existing communications systems. While such mass customization was long considered 
impossible or unaffordable for manufactured goods, the very sophistication and flexibility 
of the control systems managing communication networks may turn mass customization of 
communication services into a reality. As much economics research has focused on the 
primary and secondary sectors, too little visibility has been granted to the communications 
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and knowledge economies’ own tools to show that such mass-customized communication 
services are in fact possible (Pau, 2003). 
 
The second research question demands evaluations of the concept and the design of 
individual mobile services and tariffs. By identifying the costs and benefits, we provide a 
concrete decision basis for the user and the supplier to adopt individual mobile services 
and tariffs.  
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
1.4.1 Combining behavioral and design sciences 
 
The research perspective of design science has its roots in engineering and in “the sciences 
of artificial” (Simon, 1996). Ontologically, the design perspective assumes there is a 
single, stable physical reality, which sets the foundation of the design. Meanwhile, there 
are also socially and technologically created realities, which constrain and shape the design 
(Gregg, Kulkarni, & Vinzé, 2001). Epistemologically, knowledge is obtained through the 
design process: an objectively constrained construction within a context (Gregg et al., 
2001). With regard to the nature of the supporting methodology, Glegg (1973) makes a 
simple comparison between designers and other scientists, and concludes; “A designer and 
a scientist travel the same road but sometimes in opposite directions. The designer goes 
from the abstract to the concrete, scientists from the concrete to the abstract.” 
 
Design science consists of two basic activities, build and evaluate. The “build” activity 
produces four artifacts (March & Smith, 1995): constructs (vocabulary and symbols), 
models (abstractions and representations), methods (algorithm or guidance or process), and 
instantiations (implementation). The evaluation activity determines how well the artifacts 
perform.    
 
Most tariffs design research in telecommunication has been done with known services. 
However, the concept of individual tariffs is built on the assumption of abundant 
individualized mobile services; and most of these are yet to be developed. Research that 
looks into the development and deployment of mobile services in the future poses great 
challenges. Trying to identify a scenario based on current technology trends tends to be 
unreliable. Such examples are abundant, as the predictions of the third generation (3G) 
mobile services have largely failed (Whalley, 2002). Besides technology development, 
mobile services are shaped by interactions among users, between users and providers, and 
during the course of usage, which serves as a means to satisfy economic and social needs 
(Trosby, 2004). Human behavior is guided by human values, which stay relatively constant 
over a long period of time when compared to the fast development of technology 
(Rokeach, 1973). Individuals behave under economic constraints. Furthermore, human 
behavior is influenced by the social environment. Human values, economic constraints and 
social environments, unlike technologies, change relatively slowly. For the above reasons, 
this research tries to incorporate the behavioral aspect into the research on individual 
tariffs. This is in line with the research framework proposed by Hevner, March, Park, & 
Ram (2004), where behavioral sciences and design science research are complementary to 
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each other. Behavioral science has its roots in natural sciences and is concerned with how 
things are. It provides inputs to the design research, as the latter is concerned with how 
things ought to be (Simon, 1996, p. 114).  
 
1.4.2 Research methods of individual services and tariffs  
 
Research in individual mobile services and tariffs is in the interdisciplinary field of 
computer science/communications and economic decision making. We develop a research 
design that integrates various methods and approaches from these different fields to 
address different aspects of our research questions (see Fig. 1-3). 
 
Literature 
review
Individual services 
and tariffs: 
definitions & 
characterizations
(Service, tariff) 
computational design
User survey
Statistical analysis
Sequential constrained optimization
User global survey
(on general preferences) Case study
Usage 
trend
Industry 
trend
Community-based 
individual tariffs
Cases
Monte Carlo simulations
Research question 2 Research questions 1, 2 Research questions 1,2
feedback
(Service, tariff) 
design framework based on 
behavioral models
 
 
Fig. 1-3: Research design and methodology of the dissertation  
 
Our research activities are divided into a “design phase” and an “evaluation phase”, 
reflecting the nature of our research questions.  
 
Before the primary design activities are carried out, we first conceptualize individual 
mobile services and tariffs. By identifying current mobile service usage trends, mobile 
industry development trends, and by conducting a literature review, we provide clear 
characterizations and definitions of individual services and tariffs, and other relevant 
concepts. The literature review focuses on user and supplier behaviors, on economic 
principles and on social factors which provide a solid foundation for the later design 
activities.   
 
The design activities are divided into two main parts. The first design activity aims to 
provide a computational design for a specific class of individual mobile services and 
tariffs. To do this, we first construct a conceptual framework which serves as the 
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theoretical foundation for the later computational design. The conceptual framework is 
built using behavioral models of the user and the supplier. We then operationalize the 
conceptual framework with design methods, computational models and algorithms. The 
methods we employ include “survey”, “statistical analysis” and “sequential constrained 
optimization”.  
  
The second design activity is to extend the concept of individual service and tariffs from a 
corporate setting to a community environment by designing a feasible business model. 
 
Correspondingly, there are two evaluation activities to assess the above designs, and we 
employ multiple methods in these evaluations. First, to evaluate the computational design, 
we develop cases which allow us to carry out detailed numerical analyses. Furthermore, 
we run Monte Carlo simulations based on the cases to provide data for the supplier’s risk 
analysis. Second, to assess the feasibility of the community-based individual tariffs, we 
conduct two qualitative case studies. 
 
Furthermore, to determine the general impacts of individual services and tariffs to the users 
and the supplier, we conduct a global user survey.  
 
Although the research design embraces a broad scope, our core research activity will focus 
on the computational design of individual services and tariffs, and the evaluation thereof, 
through which we wish to partially answer the first research question of “how to determine 
individual services and tariffs” (Section 1.3). The answer to the second research question 
regarding “the benefit of individual services and tariffs to the user and the supplier” will be 
jointly provided by the evaluation activities. 
 
1.5 Scientific and managerial relevance 
 
This research represents a “radical” departure from the current mobile communication 
services and tariffs design, by putting microeconomic pricing principles and full 
deregulation into a sector still governed by public service and monopolistic thinking. It is 
therefore linked to economics and sociology as well as to the evolution of technology.  
 
1.5.1 Economic relevance  
 
By offering individual services, suppliers can avoid the model of competing on a set of 
limited standardized services. The research not only opens up the way for the development 
of new services and tools, but could also change part of the operator’s business from a 
static “take it or leave it” approach to a dynamic and competitive matching of services and 
tariffs to individual requests, while reducing churn, securing profit and minimizing 
OSS/CRM costs. Pricing mobile services depending on the buyers requires a complete 
rethinking of the market mechanisms and channels. 
 
Needless to say, not all service providers would wish to carry out the work involved in 
contracting for individuals with possibly dynamic tariffs and risks, using the fullest 
flexibility of their infrastructure and management platforms. But some emerging operators, 
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e.g. mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) may see this business model as a market 
penetration mechanism, particularly if they do not have great marketing resources.  
Not all consumers may want to consider flexible tariffs but instead prefer stable price 
bundles with little transparency and limited choices. But more consumers are participating 
in, and are playing more important roles in service creation and provisioning to satisfy 
their unique demands. From the moment such capabilities are created for individuals, small 
and medium size companies will follow this same trend, gaining business advantages.  
 
1.5.2 Social relevance  
 
By allowing the user to set a ceiling on tariffs which meets his budget and brings down the 
affordability barrier, individual services and tariffs will accelerate the diffusion of 
innovative communication services within one country and across borders. The digital 
divide between rich and poor users will be reduced as they each have different service 
needs. 
 
On a personal scale, individual mobile services can better meet the various user demands. 
Mobile communication has already changed the behavior of people and their lives (Katz, 
2006), and more significant changes are yet to come.  
 
1.5.3 Technical relevance  
 
This research also has technical relevance. The legacy circuit switching-based billing 
systems in the telecommunications industry do not support individual tariffs. Over the past 
years technical developments have provided, at the service level, limited control capability 
for end customers regarding end-user programmable interfaces of traffic and tariffs (SIP, 
IEEE 1520). Furthermore, the switching systems are now all ATM or IP-based in wireless 
networks, thus actually allowing for billing at packet level (Pau, 2001). This research can 
first provide insights into the feasibility of technical standards for individual tariffs and 
services. Second, the research provides guidance for the development of software and 
system architectures of the new billing and service/content management platforms. Third, 
the research provides directions for operators to design their data mining tools to better 
capture the demands from the users. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature survey: Theoretical building 
blocks 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Individual services and tariffs constitute a new research area and the existing literature in 
this field is very limited, even when taking related mass customization literature into 
account. Given this, this literature survey would focuses primarily on the relevant topics 
that can shed light on our design.  
 
The survey is divided into two parts (see Fig. 2-1). In Part I, we identify the properties of 
mobile services, review research on service customization, and look at existing 
telecommunication tariff models and their limitations. As has been discussed in Section 
1.4.1, this research will take a behavioral science plus design science perspective. 
Therefore in Part II, we put our main efforts into identifying the various dimensions of 
user and supplier behavior, which would provide a solid foundation for our conceptual 
framework design in Chapter 3. We also look at computational game theory, which offers 
a structured analysis of interactions between the user and the supplier.      
 
 
 
Fig. 2-1: Structure of the literature survey 
 
2.2 Mobile services: Properties and customization   
 
Services differ from physical goods in their intangibility, perishability, heterogeneity and 
in the inseparability of production (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 1985). Two 
additional traits have been identified for industrial services (Jackson, Neidell, & Lunsford, 
1995): customization and technology. Mobile services are not necessarily industrial 
services. It is arguable whether “technology” is a characteristic of mobile services. Mobile 
services can however be delivered to a specific device, which is usually used by a specific 
person or machine. This means that, in addition to satisfying the general demands from a 
group of people or machines, mobile services can be tailored to satisfy the unique 
requirements from an individual person or a machine. In this research, the customizable or 
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personalizable parts of mobile services consumed by a user are primarily1 value-added 
services that he may need beyond basic generic services. By default, the individual tariffs 
apply to all such value-added services.    
 
Mobility is one of the key advantages of wireless services over fixed-line services. 
Mobility has two dimensions: spatial and temporal. The former means that services can be 
accessed at almost any location. The latter means the user can access the service whenever 
there is a motivation. This brings many uncertainties as to where and when the services are 
being or will be consumed; and thus there are many technical (Cavalcanti, Agrawal, 
Cordeiro, Xie, & Kumar, 2005) and social consequences (Green, 2002), which makes the 
pricing of mobile services a challenging issue.    
 
Mobile services are intangible goods. Koppius (1999) identifies 12 dimensions of 
intangible goods, out of which the “value determination” is the most important and 
difficult. First, it is because of the idiosyncratic nature of intangible goods, which make it 
difficult to compare them to similar goods. Second, it is because intangible goods are 
experience goods. The classification of the quality of a product into search, experience and 
credence quality has its origin in the marketing literature (Nelson, 1974; Darby & Karni, 
1973; Ziethaml, 1981). Search qualities are those that can be determined before purchase; 
experience qualities are those aspects that can only be determined after purchase or 
consumption; and credence qualities are the aspect that a consumer cannot determine even 
after the purchase because of a gap in necessary skill. A continuum from search to 
experience and to credence quality provides a useful method for value-determination. 
Following this categorization, most mobile services fall inside the interval between search 
and experience goods. Mobile service has to be experienced when consumed for the first 
time. Communication services are however volatile, as they are not available for recurrent 
consumption. In this way they are in contrast to many experience goods, which are 
repetitive. Furthermore, heterogeneity in the production and quality of service is allowed, 
thus the quality of the mobile service may vary and result in new experiences.  
 
To sum up, mobile services are perishable and have an instantaneous experience value. 
The production and consumption of mobile services are inseparable. Mobile services can 
be personalized/customized, which leads to real-time diversity and service quality 
heterogeneity. The intangibility of mobile services makes them more difficult to evaluate 
than physical goods; and also more difficult to evaluate than intangible content products 
because of the volatility. Furthermore, the mobility property adds uncertainty to where and 
when the services will be consumed. It is the combination of these properties that makes 
mobile communications services differ from other types of services, and makes the pricing 
of mobile services a challenging topic.   
 
Recent research in mass customization primarily focuses on the customization of physical 
products such as clothing (e.g. footwear, garments, prêt à porter) or consumer electronics 
(e.g. watches, laptops), and on user design toolkits for such customizations (Abou-Jaoude 
& Kung, 2005; Au & Goonetilleke, 2005; Franke & Pille, 2004; Ogawa & Piller, 2006; 
von Hippel, 2005). Because of their properties (see above), mass customization of services 
                                                          
1 we also research on the personalization of generic service bundles in Section 4.9 
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is rather limited, and applications are widely spread across different industries such as 
education, finance and health care; the corresponding research publications focus on mass 
customization strategy (Gabriel, Gersch, & Weber, 2006; Grenci & Watts, 2007; Lampel 
& Mintzberg, 1996), customization frameworks, processes and customization approaches 
under specific contexts (Huang & Lin, 2005; Winter, 2001), and customer value perception 
(Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). 
 
Current practices of mass customization in the mobile communication industry mainly 
focus on the industrial design of the wireless terminals, on user interfaces and sometimes 
on software based feature selection: see e.g. Sigala (2006) for customers’ perceived value 
dimensions (e.g. functional, social, and emotional) of mass-customized “mobile phone + 
services” and the implications for suppliers in conducting a customer value-based market 
segmentation. Some mobile terminal suppliers make mass customization of their designs 
their key intellectual property rights (IPR) based business model. This is accomplished via 
common design platforms that help third parties produce competing customized products 
(e.g. Ericsson Mobile Platforms AB, Modelabs, Qualcomm). With regard to public mobile 
services which involve the network infrastructure for the production of mass-customized 
services, mass customization remains limited. 
 
2.3 Tariff models for mobile communication services   
 
When they first began to develop, tariff models for mobile telecommunication services 
were inherited from traditional fixed telephony. This was straightforward when both fixed 
and mobile were offering one type of service, i.e. voice; and when most of the wireless 
infrastructure was dependent on the fixed circuit-switched communication infrastructure 
(except the radio base stations). Over the years, the pricing of mobile services developed 
slowly and tariff bundles were introduced. Research into these areas has been carried out, 
to an overwhelming degree, either within the industry or by regulators.  
 
Academic research, on the other hand, has focused on several areas, but is largely 
disconnected from industrial research. In pricing the usage, dynamic pricing in mobile 
services was first discussed by Fitkov-Norris and Khanifar (2000), who applied different 
tariffs dynamically according to the available network resources. Much research has 
followed (Viterbo & Chiasserini, 2001; Yaipairoj & Harmantzis, 2004), since mobile 
resources are scarce and better utilization of the network can greatly increase operator 
revenue. Other early articles on tariffs focused on how the tariff structure (the relationship 
between tariff components) affects consumer behavior and consequently the long-term 
profitability of operators over the mobile voice service (Danaher, 2002; Iyengar, 2004).  
 
Existing research into “public tariffs” tends to follow two themes: focusing either on the 
allocation/utilization optimization of bandwidth/QoS(data packets) through tariffs, or on 
the optimization of the tariff structure for a set of (limited) standardized services and with 
a limited segmentation of consumers. The monopolistic thinking of telecommunications 
operators reflected in this research is still dominant where the prices are driven by 
suppliers. The prevalence of this thinking is due to the closed architecture of 
telecommunication systems, where the operators take full control over the network 
resources. But this is no longer the case with deregulation policies around the globe and 
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technical standards being specified to open up telecommunication systems (e.g. the 
Parlay/OSA specifications, see also Moerdijk & Klostermann, 2003). 
 
Individual mobile services and tariffs require a new mindset. First, as has been discussed, 
mobile services are no longer limited to a set of standard services such as voice and data. 
Services mixing content, either static or dynamic, and applications which enable 
interactions, are included. Therefore, research should no longer be limited to bandwidth or 
QoS, nor to only optimizing tariff structure over limited service choices. Second, services 
can be personalized/customized to meet the specific demands of consumers, who may then 
also take part in the procedure of co-creating the value of the services they demand 
individually. Furthermore, as the market moves from a monopolistic to a highly 
competitive setting, new service creation and provisioning approaches will emerge. All 
these trends lead to a demand-driven market, where consumers play more active roles in 
deciding the tariffs for the services they help to design.  
 
2.4 User behavior 
 
The user of individual services is the recipient of the service. In this research, we focus on 
human beings as users, whose behavior is guided by human values, influenced by the 
social environment and bounded by economic constraints. In this section, we survey the 
relevant research in these fields which will serve as a basis for understanding the users.   
 
2.4.1 Intrinsic drivers  
 
From a sociological perspective, a post-modern society (or a society in high modernity, 
according to Giddens, 1991, p. 4) is characterized by its lack of dominant ideology, culture 
or fashions (Antonides & Raaij 1998, p. 56). This is also reflected in the diversity of 
personal values which give meaning and direction to an individual’s behavior. Not all 
individual users are willing to consider individual services and tariffs. Some prefer a pre-
determined bundle with little transparency and limited choices. There is, however, a 
growing population with values that may serve to engender the adoption of individual 
services and tariffs (see Section 7.2 for a survey that establishes this fact). We now present 
a non-exhaustive list of drivers that we consider fundamental. 
 
Individualism has been probably one of the most abused words in the last century. 
Different schools have contradicting interpretations. We adhere to the definition of 
individualism defended by Hayek (1980) as the theoretical foundation of our research. 
Hayek’s individualism is primarily a theory of society, an attempt to understand the forces 
which determine the social life of man. Under this notion of individualism, there are 
universally accepted principles (institutions) under which man makes his own choices and 
takes full responsibility: he is free to follow his own will, to make full use of his 
knowledge and skills, and he is guided by his concerns for the particular things of which 
he knows and cares about. We should refute here is the belief that individualism postulates 
“egotism”. Instead, individualism starts from men whose whole nature and character are 
determined by their existence in society: it affirms the value of family and all common 
efforts of a small community or group, and it believes in local autonomy and voluntary 
43
 Chapter 2: Literature survey: Theoretical building blocks 17 
association. Furthermore, Hayek’s individualism holds the view that man’s individual 
reason is very limited and imperfect, that the collective efforts of mankind can achieve 
things which have not been designed or understood by any individuals, and are greater 
than individual minds. Individual mobile services and tariffs are reflections of Hayek’s 
individualism, where a person in a free society has the freedom of choice of services and 
prices, at any time and anywhere. Individualism is also reflected in the freedom of service 
creation and provisioning, either to a family, to a small community or group, or to the 
whole society. 
 
Self-identity, in a late modernity setting with rapid social changes, has to be routinely 
created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual (Giddens, 1991). “How 
shall I live?” has to be answered in day-to-day decisions about how to behave, what to 
wear and what to use. Modernity opens up the project of the self, but under the strong 
influence of standardization of commodities. Here, the market is assumed to be a default 
setting of modernity. The market promoted individualism, first out of concerns for the 
freedom of contract and mobility intrinsic in capitalistic employment, and second in order 
to extend the concept to consumption, to designate each individual’s wishes. A good 
example is the corruption of the notion “life style”, where the project of self has been 
associated with the possession or consumption of certain pre-determined products and 
services. The consequence is the suppression of the genuine development of the self. To 
move away from this predicament created by commodified consumption, an individual 
should surround himself with individual experiences. Individual services and tariffs 
promote the user’s autonomy by encouraging the user to define what he wants, not just 
selecting or accepting the pre-defined services, as part of a “framed” style of life. 
 
Innovation was defined by Rogers (2003) as an idea, practice or object that is perceived as 
new by an individual or other unit of adoption. Innovation in the context of individual 
services and tariffs is user-centric, which is in sharp contrast with the supplier-centred 
tradition in the telecommunications operator industry. The latter often innovates in a 
closed form, and uses patents, copyrights or trademarks to prevent others from imitation. 
The former often uses open source (software or tools), rapidly-transferred research results, 
shared knowledge, to create new products or services to accommodate users’ unique 
demands; user-centric innovations are often freely revealed (von Hippel, 2005). In addition 
to the products or services they have developed, participants in user-centric innovations 
gain rewards from the innovation processes (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005). More generally, 
innovation is a specific expression of creativeness. Maslow (1987, p. 160) distinguishes 
“special talent creativeness” from “self-actualization creativeness”. The former refers to 
the level of creativity that belongs to geniuses such as Einstein, Edison and Mozart, which 
is exceptional. The latter refers to the creativity that is latent universally in ordinary 
people, which springs much more directly from personality and shows itself widely in 
ordinary affairs of life, not only in great and obvious products but also in a tendency to do 
everything creatively. Creative people are less inhibited, less constricted, less bound. 
Instead, they are original, inventive, and innovative in whatever their realm of life may be. 
According to Maslow, self-actualization, which is the tendency of people to be actualized 
in what they potentially are, drives people’s creativity: “What humans can be, they must 
be. They must be true to their own nature” (Maslow, 1987). The creation of individual 
mobile services used to be inhibited by technology, knowledge and economic constraints. 
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With the first two constraints mostly alleviated nowadays, this research aims to alleviate 
the last constraint and ultimately unleash the spirit of creativity in ordinary people. 
 
Recognition from others also plays an important role in our values, as we are all social 
animals. In a networked society where physical boundaries are disappearing, a little effort 
may harvest considerable recognition from people around the world (Chan, Bhandar, Oh, 
& Chan, 2004; Hong, 2006; Rheingold, 2002). Recognition from community members 
provides positive feedback to creative activities. This feedback helps an individual 
establish self-esteem, which leads to the feeling of self-confidence, strength, capability and 
adequacy, of being useful and necessary in the world (Maslow, 1987, p. 21).  
 
Determining the extent to which these values are spread and the degree to which these 
values are influencing people’s behavior are beyond the scope of this research. We simply 
take the existence of these personal values as our working assumption: there are people 
keen to have individual services and tariffs. We do however validate this assumption 
through two extensive user surveys (see Section 4.8 and Section 7.2). 
 
2.4.2 Bounded rationality 
 
The concept Homo Economicus or “economic man” describes a model of man who seeks 
to attain specific and predetermined goals to the greatest extent with least costs. Homo 
Economicus can be characterized as “fully rational” and “self-interested”. The model is 
used broadly in economic and other social sciences. However, many researchers have 
found limits to this model. Steele (2004) and Thaler (2000), for example, propose different 
directions to enhance the model.  
 
The strict definition of rationality states that an individual’s preference relation is rational 
if it possesses the properties of completeness and transitivity (Mas-Colell, Whinston & 
Green, 1995: p. 6). This means that the individual is able to compare all the alternatives 
and the comparisons are consistent. Furthermore, rationality implies that the individual has 
complete information about all alternatives and knows the consequences of his choices; he 
then also has unlimited time and unlimited computational power to pick his most preferred 
option. In reality, such a perfectly-rational person can never exist (Miller, 1956). Over the 
past decades, a large mass of empirical data have shown violations of the rationality 
assumption, and this affects also trading schemes such as auctions. Shafir and LeBoeuf 
(2002) provide a detailed review.  
 
In 1957, Herbert Simon pointed out that, most of the time, an individual does not know all 
the alternatives relevant to his decisions (Simon, 1957). Neither does he have perfect 
information about the consequences of choosing a particular alternative, both because of 
limited computational power and because of uncertainty in the external world. The 
individual’s preferences do not possess rational properties when comparing heterogeneous 
alternatives. Simon characterized this as “bounded rationality”. Model construction under 
the bounded rationality assumption can take two approaches. The first is to retain 
optimization, but to simplify it sufficiently so that the optimum is computable. The second 
is to construct a satisficing model which provides good enough decisions, with reasonable 
computational cost (Simon, 1979). Neither approach dominates the other. 
45
 Chapter 2: Literature survey: Theoretical building blocks 19 
Following the pioneering work of Simon on bounded rationality, Kahneman and Tversky 
conducted a series of research projects on various types of judgment under uncertainty. 
Their conclusion was that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles1 which 
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgmental operations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). A recent revisit of these studies by 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) proposed a formulation in which the reduction of 
complexity is achieved by an operation of “attribute substitution”. A judgment is said to 
be mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a specified target attribute of a 
judgment object by substituting another property of that object, the heuristic attribute, 
which comes more readily to mind. Heuristics share this common process of attribute 
substitution; furthermore, the usage of heuristics is not limited to judgment under 
uncertainty. 
 
2.4.3 Social concerns 
 
The self-interested property implies that “economic man” is amoral and has no sense of 
right or wrong. He ignores all social values unless adhering to them gives him benefits: his 
preferences are exogenous and not affected by the societal environment at all (Camerer & 
Fehr, 2006). However, this is never true: in choosing to act, individuals commonly 
consider the consequences of actions not only on themselves but on others as well; these 
individuals have social preferences (Bowles, 2004). This other-regarding (in comparison 
with self-interested) property of social preferences is often embodied as altruism, fairness, 
teamwork, spite, etc. Many social preferences do not possess the properties of 
completeness or transitivity and thus are partially rational or irrational.  
 
Mobile services, by bringing mobility in time and space, enable many social interactions 
which were hardly possible in the past (Green, 2002; Rheingold, 2002). We contend that 
the social preferences enabled by mobile services are determined by the benefits that an 
individual elicits from the interactions under different social environments and with 
different people. Major factors affecting social preferences are: 
 
1. Access to the mobile services, which is an individual’s right.  
2. Social context, by which we mean the social environment in which an individual 
lives in, such as social location and social relationships. In different locations and 
accompanied by different people, an individual’s preferences are affected by 
specific social norms and social relationships (Lasen, 2002; Plant, 2002). This is 
further complicated by a possible “absent presence effect” introduced by a mobile 
service, where a person is physically present but absorbed by a technologically 
mediated world of elsewhere (Gergen, 2002). 
3. Content. The content of a communication service could be categorized as time 
critical and non-time critical, according to the perceived importance of a timely 
service. An individual’s intertemporal preference is usually decided by a value 
function on the subject and a discount function on time. Empirical research 
indicates that the discount function is a generalized hyperbola (Frederick, 
Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). Moreover, 
                                                          
1 The three heuristics being studied were representativeness, availability and anchoring. 
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content could be categorized based on whether the communication is directly or 
indirectly motivated. In directly motivated communication, the action satisfies a 
need: the content is important to the individual, which can be ideas and thoughts, 
feeling and emotions, comfort and support. In indirectly motivated 
communication, the action satisfies an intermediate goal, which can in turn lead to 
the satisfaction of a need. Content is less significant in indirectly motivated 
communication: what is important is the fact that the communication has 
occurred. It occurs just to confirm a relationship (Cook & Yong, 2005; Licoppe, 
2003). 
 
2.5 Supplier behavior  
 
2.5.1 Four types of suppliers with different goals 
 
Benkler (2002) points out that in addition to the two common forms of organizing 
economic production (either through a firm under the direction of a manager, or through 
individuals themselves in the market following price signals), there is a third model of 
production. Benkler calls it “common-based peer production”. The distinguishing 
characteristic of this model is that groups of individuals collaborate on large-scale projects 
following a diverse cluster of motivational drives and social signals rather than market 
prices or managerial commands. A well-known example is the Linux kernel project (see 
www.kernel.org) where thousands of people around the world collaborate to develop the 
core of an operating system. Long before this, but less publicized, was the joint 
development of core processor architecture, UNIX, communication protocols, 
measurement instruments, etc, within the telecommunication supplier industry, enabling 
the interoperability found in communication services nowadays. The third model of 
production is becoming more and more common and important in today’s information 
society. Already, mobile services exist that have been created and provided following this 
model. For example, a service called cellphedia (see http://www.cellphedia.com/) allows 
users to send and receive encyclopedia-type inquiries between specific, pre-defined 
groups, through text messaging. Since the group of individuals sharing a common goal can 
also be characterized as a community of mind (Tönnies, 1967) or a community of interest, 
we suggest that the “common-based peer production” can also be characterized as 
“community-based production”. We thus identify four types of suppliers of wireless and 
services: 
 
1. Operators: to distinguish them from communities as suppliers (see below), we 
term them operators. There are public and private operators. The former (e.g. 
most public mobile operators) are subject to a universal service obligation (USO) 
under the regulatory regime. The latter sell services to customers under the 
restrictions only of commercial laws (e.g. WiFi operators). What is of concern is 
the economic implications of the USO, as the public operators usually need to 
bear higher costs than private operators.  
2. Closed communities where membership is required. Only the members can 
contribute their efforts, and consequently the usage of the services is limited to 
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only the members. The contributions from members of a community vary from 
knowledge, information, expertise, time, even empathy and sometimes money. 
3. Open communities which do not require a formal membership; but a certain level 
of registration and authentication are still needed to meet privacy policies and 
regulation. At the same time, open communities are also subject to liability risks 
and IPR issues.    
4. Individuals, who normally do not supply infrastructure, but service specifications 
and content. 
 
The main differences among the four types of suppliers lie in their different goals. The 
nature of firms such as operators dictates that their goal is profit/market share 
maximization and risk minimization (Tirole, 1988). A supplier, however, may also have 
social preferences (e.g. preference for fairness, reciprocity) in his decisions as well as 
environmental preferences. There may be conflicts between a supplier’s economic benefit 
and social preferences; he will try to achieve equilibrium/equilibria between them. The 
equilibrium/equilibria is seldom computation-based but mostly subjective or at best based 
on ranking of preferences. None of the existing models provides comprehensive 
measurement and calibration instruments to quantify the social preferences of a firm (Wu 
& Loch, 2007). In this research, we limit our firm model (see Section 3.2) to derive only 
economic benefits from service offerings. 
 
The non-profit seeking nature of communities drives their goal to be achieving financial 
breakeven and minimizing risks. Compared to firms, they have more social aspects to deal 
with. This is reflected in a much more complicated utility function to accommodate social 
concerns from within the community. It may also be reflected in the more different setting 
of constraints and more complex decision rules (e.g. majority, unanimity) in a closed 
community environment1.  
 
The difference between closed and open communities lies mainly in their risk adversity 
(we will come back this topic shortly in Section 2.5.3) and information sharing aspects 
(Cornes & Sandler, 1999). When a single individual is the supplier, he can either choose to 
seek a profit and act as a firm, or to achieve a financial breakeven, or to maximize social 
benefits.    
 
Out of the four types of suppliers identified above, the most important types are the firms 
and communities, who account for the majority of the suppliers and provide most of the 
mobile services. Weighing the complexity of the firm’s and community’s behaviors, the 
leading role that firms play in supplying mobile services, and the limited time budget of 
this research, we decide to focus primarily on firms as suppliers. We construct a behavioral 
model of a firm in the context of individual mobile communication services and tariffs in 
Chapter 3. Based on this, we develop a computational design in Chapters 4 and 5. We will 
look into community-supplied individual services and tariffs in Chapter 6, with emphasis 
on the business model and its feasibility. 
 
                                                          
1 This could be the opposite in communities with selective screening of members. 
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2.5.2 Revenue assurance practices 
 
In this section, we examine two types of supplier behaviors that can affect their profit: 
price discrimination and user involvement. 
 
2.5.2.1 Price discrimination  
 
Price discrimination or price differentiation is a common practice in today’s business 
world1, 2. The concept was coined by Pigou (1920), who distinguished three types of price 
discrimination. In first-degree (perfect) price discrimination, each unit of commodity is 
sold at a difference price, which is the maximum the user wants to pay. In second degree 
price discrimination (nonlinear pricing), commodities are divided into n groups and sold at 
n different prices. In third degree price discrimination consumers are divided into n 
different groups and each group is charged a unique price. Different types of price 
discrimination have different welfare effects in terms of maximizing consumer and 
supplier surplus. Theoretically, first-degree price discrimination leads to a Pareto efficient 
outcome, meaning that neither the consumer nor the supplier can be made better-off 
without another being worse-off; second and third degree price discrimination improve 
overall welfare in general, with some users receiving insufficient amount of product or 
service. Nevertheless, these users are better-off than if they were never served.  
 
Early analyses of price discrimination were undertaken under monopolistic settings and for 
physical goods; the supplier’s technologies involved no economies of scope, and usually 
possessed constant or decreasing return to scale. Varian (1987) provides a useful overview 
of these analyses. The general conclusion is that the firms which conduct price 
discrimination have some market power: they may only shuffle the prices paid by pre-
existing users without serving extra user groups, neither increasing the amount of product 
or service. In this case, overall welfare falls.  
 
On the other hand, Eden (1990) observes that price discrimination and price dispersion can 
occur in a competitive environment, where a price dispersion equilibrium can be achieved 
when competitors all charge discriminatory prices but the mix of prices varies among 
firms. Levine (2002) argues that price discrimination is not necessarily evidence of market 
power: in more situations, it is the optimal strategy for a firm to allocate common costs 
among buyers. This line of argument provides an alternative way to look at price 
discrimination. Furthermore, Varian (1996) demonstrates that for industries that involve 
technologies which exhibit increasing return to scale, large fixed and sunk costs, and 
significant economies of scope, the rule of setting prices at marginal cost is no longer 
                                                          
1 The old legislation forbidding price discrimination in many countries around the world 
has all but vanished, except in the present context for minimal service bundles supplied 
under Universal Service provisioning rules.  
2 One common practice is to segment users according to space, time, age, income difference 
and quality (versioning). Another approach is to bundle. Adams and Yellen (1976) 
demonstrated that commodity bundling can be profitable because of its ability to sort users 
into groups with different willingness-to-pay. Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) examined the 
bundling of information goods and found a similar result. 
49
 Chapter 2: Literature survey: Theoretical building blocks 23 
economically viable: the marginal cost is close to zero. The pricing principle for this 
context is that marginal willingness to pay should equal the marginal cost.  
 
Current technologies already permit suppliers to track and trace user behaviors1 and infer 
their preferences so as to provide services accordingly. But most users dislike the feeling 
of being (passively) traced and become concerned by this erosion of privacy (Odlyzko, 
2003). Individual services and tariffs can invite users to be actively involved in service 
individualization and to pay according to their willingness. It provides a possible approach 
to implementing the idea of first-degree price discrimination and pushing the market to 
Pareto efficiency, under a fully competitive environment2.  
 
2.5.2.2 User involvement 
 
Willingness to pay (WTP) is the maximum amount of money the user is prepared to pay 
for a service over a certain time interval, which is a measurement of the value that the user 
puts on the service. WTP is higher when attributes of a service meet precisely the user 
demands.  
 
It is quite unlikely, if not impossible, that the supplier can identify all the demands of users 
simply by observations and offering every possible choice. Even if the supplier does so, 
the burden of having to choose from too many options may simply lead to information 
overload and frustrate the user. A plausible solution is to introduce interactions, and 
change the role of the user from being a passive audience to becoming an active player in 
co-creating value (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). With the technology development such 
as Web 2.0, this is becoming a more common phenomenon, where consumers are involved 
in the production and service innovation (Pascu, 2007). 
 
By involving the consumers in service design through interactions, users’ specific demands 
are identified and integrated into the service. The user’s willingness to pay is usually 
higher than the comparable standard services, ceteris paribus. Franke and Piller (2004) 
studied the online design of watches with over 700 participants, and the user involvement 
was facilitated by a “software toolkit”. They found that the user WTP for a self-designed 
watch even exceeds the best-selling standard watches of the same technical quality. More 
empirical studies which provide similar results can be found in Piller, Schubert, Koch, & 
Möslein (2005) and von Hipple (2005).  
 
2.5.3 Risks 
 
The main concern of an open or closed community when offering mobile services is not 
profit, but the risk of insufficient funding which leads to service disruption. The mobile 
                                                          
1 For example, HTTP cookies can be used to track user browsing behavior; the 3G systems 
have build-in functions that can pinpoint the location of the user by base station 
triangulation. 
2 Reselling the services can be prevented by personalization, where each consumer receives 
the service tailored exactly to his needs. Each consumer is receiving different services to a 
certain degree. 
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services offered to members of an open community can be treated as public goods. One of 
the most distinct characteristics of public goods is non-exclusiveness, where the free-riding 
problem can emerge (Hirshleifer, 1983; Diekmann, 1993; Fisher & Ackerman, 1998). A 
free market is unlikely to produce the optimum amount of public goods (Samuelson, 
1954). Research in risk minimization of the under-provision of public goods has been 
mainly focused on government intervention through institutions and legislations. Reviews 
of this work are beyond the scope of our research. 
 
Wireless services provisioned by an operator or a closed community can be seen as club 
goods. Club goods differ from public goods in several aspects (Buchanan, 1965; Sandler & 
Tschirhart, 1995): club goods are exclusive, which reduces the free-riding problem. Clubs 
divide up the population, which results in competition among clubs; and club goods 
involve at least two allocative choices (e.g. size of membership vs. provision level of 
shared goods), in contrast to the provision choice of public goods. The club goods 
characteristics of operator/close community-provided mobile services suggest that theories 
and models from the insurance industry can be applied in managing the accompanying 
risks (Cornes & Sandler, 1999). 
 
Insurance alleviates financial losses by transferring risk of loss from one entity to another. 
The design of exclusion mechanisms of a club, the degree of heterogeneity between 
members, the size of the membership, the provision level of services, all lead to 
differences in the aggregated distribution of risks. Various models and computational 
techniques have been developed over years for life and non-life insurances/reinsurance 
(Shapiro & Jain, 2003). But there is no earlier public research applying this “pooling” 
thinking to telecommunication services and tariffs.  
 
In the context of individual mobile services and tariffs, the focus will be on pooling the 
distribution of each individual’s willingness-to-pay for an individually designed service. 
The supplier receives different revenue from each individual contract: some individual 
contracts may even generate losses. By pooling the revenue together from all the diverse 
users, the supplier may generate a profit on average, with some uncertainty. The supplier 
needs to make decisions based on the expected profit and corresponding risks. Risk level 
can also be different for operator and closed community-offered individual tariffs: the only 
goal of a firm is profit maximization, while the goals of a community are far more diverse.   
 
2.6 Game theory 
 
Game theory, as a formal approach to analyzing interactions, was introduced by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). A few years 
later, John Nash (1950) proposed an “optimum” solution concept for non-cooperative 
games which involve two or more rational players. The concept, which is now called Nash 
equilibrium, describes a state in which no single player can benefit by changing his 
strategy while other players’ strategies are kept unchanged. Repeated games were 
introduced by Luce and Raiffa (1957), which consist of some number of repetitions of 
some base game. The development in game theory flourished through the 50s to 80s, 
which led to its application in various fields, including evolutionary biology, political 
science, philosophy and telecommunication network design (Altman & Wynter, 2004). 
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Classic game theory assumes that the players are perfectly rational beings who can 
perform backward-induction and optimization over information available to them in 
searching for an equilibrium. However, in reality, “a typical analysis involves a collection 
of game theorists spending months solving for the equilibrium, and then simply assuming 
that this equilibrium is obvious to the players” (Samuelson, 1996). Gradually, game theory 
has evolved to incorporate “bounded rationality” into its analyses (Aumann, 1997; 
Rubinstein, 1997).  
 
The cooperation between computer science and game theory gave birth to computational 
game theory, which uses computers to model interactions. While classic game theory is 
rich in its mathematical foundations, the emphasis of computational game theory is on 
computation and algorithms: it provides insight into strategic interactions which are too 
complicated to have an analytic solution (Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, & Vazirani, 2007). 
Computational games can be solved numerically. 
 
In the context of individual services and tariffs, and learning from the early history of the 
telephone (see Section 1.1), the contracting procedure between the user and the supplier 
involves a series of interactions, which can be analyzed using game theory. The game 
model must first consider the behavior of the users and the supplier. Second, the different 
bargaining powers between the user and the supplier should be considered. Third, the 
game equilibrium solutions, if they exist, must be determined.  
 
There are many classes of games, such as symmetric games, zero-sum games, and prefect 
information games: see Fudenberg & Tirole, (1991). We are interested in a specific type of 
game called a Stackelberg game, which is a model of duopoly (von Stackelberg, 1934). In 
a standard Stackelberg setting, there is a leader and a follower and they compete on 
quantity. The leader moves first, choosing a quantity, the follower observes the leader’s 
move and picks a quantity. The leader usually has a first-mover advantage which depends 
on his commitment power. 
 
Stackelberg games were investigated in the design of communication networks. Korilis, 
Lazar, & Orda (1997) considered a network manager acting as the Stackelberg game leader, 
who could control part of the network flow. The users, as the game followers, were 
allowed to choose routes after the leader had chosen routes. Korilis et al. demonstrated that 
by controlling a small portion of the network flow, the system performance can often be 
driven into optimum. Başar and Srikant (2002) studied a usage-based pricing scheme of 
the Internet, where the network (leader) sets the price and the non-cooperative users 
(followers) react to price and congestion caused by overall traffic. They derived an optimal 
price which can maximize network revenue with a large number of users. Ninan and 
Devetsikiotis (2005) applied a similar game setting to connection-oriented networks and 
provided algorithms for attaining the optimum network prices.    
 
In Section 3.4 we will use the Stackelberg concept to construct our conceptual framework 
for individual services and tariffs. 
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2.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided a non-exhaustive survey of the literature that is relevant to the 
design of individual mobile services and tariffs. 
 
In Section 2.2, we identified five properties of mobile services. It is the combination of 
these properties, not any one alone, that makes the design and pricing of individual mobile 
services a challenging issue. We also reviewed current research in service customization, 
which showed that the research area is still in its early stage, especially in mobile services 
customization. 
 
In Section 2.3, we surveyed the existing telecommunication tariff models, which focus 
mostly on a set of limited standardized services defined by the suppliers. These supplier-
centric tariff models cannot be used for individualized services. Therefore a more user-
centric service and tariff design method needs to be established.  
 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 provided insights, from a behavioral science perspective, into the 
design of individual mobile services and tariffs. In Section 2.4, we first reviewed the 
existing literature on the intrinsic drivers, and decided to use the identified personal values 
as the bases for our working assumption that there are people willing to have 
individualized services and tariffs (we attempt to determine their proportion in the 
population in Section 7.2, through a survey). Second, we reviewed the literature on user 
behavior when making a decision in a relatively complex setting. In this setting, user 
behavior is characterized by having “bounded rationality” and “social concerns.” The 
literature related to the supplier’s behavior was presented in Section 2.5. We identified 
four types of suppliers who have different goals when offering a mobile service. These 
different goals lead to different behavior. We decided to focus primarily on firms as 
suppliers in this research. We then looked at the revenue assurance and risk management 
practices of the suppliers, which could shed light on the modeling of supplier behavior as 
part of the design.  
 
The last piece of the literature review in Section 2.6 focused on how to provide a 
structured analysis of the interactions between the user and the supplier, when they jointly 
design the individual service and tariff for the user. Computational game theory is 
identified as a useful tool that provides insight into strategic interactions which are too 
complicated to have an analytic solution. A specific type of game called the Stackelberg 
game was also identified, which would be used in our later design.  
 
The theoretical building-blocks presented in this literature review lead us to Chapter 3, 
where we develop a conceptual framework for the design of individual services and tariffs. 
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Chapter 3 
A conceptual framework for individual 
services and tariffs 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter1, we construct a conceptual framework for individual services and tariffs by 
using the theoretical building blocks from Chapter 2. The framework consists of 
behavioral models of the user and the supplier (firm), and a game theoretical negotiation 
mechanism to determine the individual services and tariffs. The framework provides a 
theoretical foundation upon which the computational design of individual services and 
tariffs in Chapters 4 and 5 can be based.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 suggests a supplier behavioral model and 
introduces the concept of the service design space; Section 3.3 proposes a user behavioral 
model and introduces the concept of the service perceptual space; Section 3.4 describes a 
negotiation process between a user and a supplier in which the user has a dominant 
influence. The negotiation process is investigated by a user-led recursive Stackelberg 
game; Section 3.5 summarizes the chapter. The linkage between the content at section 
level is shown in the Table below. 
 
Supplier behavioral decision model, service design space 
Based on  Section 2.5 on supplier behavior  
3.2 
Results used in  Section 4.2 in mapping relationship, Section 4.4 in supplier computational
models, Sections 4.5, 4.9 in negotiation algorithms, Sections 5.2 in
supplier’s decision under risks 
User behavioral decision model, service perceptual space 
Based on  Section 2.4 on user behavior  
3.3 
Results used in  Section 4.2 in mapping relationship, Section 4.3 in user computational
model, Sections 4.5, 4.9 in algorithms 
Negotiation and the Stackelberg game 
Based on  Section 2.6 on game theory 
3.4 
Results used in Sections 4.5, 4.9 in algorithms 
 
3.2 Supplier behavioral decision model, service design space  
 
In this section, we provide a behavioral decision model of the supplier in the context of 
individual services and tariffs. We introduce and articulate the concept of a service design 
space as the decision space for the supplier.  
 
In modern decision theory, decisions are made based on preferences. The art of decision 
making is to obtain a complete ranking of the alternatives that reflect the preferences 
(Roberts, 1972). Often, this is done by assigning a numerical value to each alternative. The 
                                                          
1 This chapter is partially based on Chen & Pau (2006a). 
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value is usually called utility. In many situations, the alternative outcomes are associated 
with different probabilities; thus many choices have to be made under uncertainty. 
Furthermore in reality, there are conditions that the decision must meet, and these 
conditions are usually modeled as constraints. These concepts provide the basic elements 
in constructing a behavioral decision model. 
 
Recall that in Section 2.5.1 we decided to focus primarily on firms as the suppliers of 
individual services and tariffs. The firms’ behavior is characterized by seeking maximum 
economic utility (i.e. profit or market share) with minimum risks.  
 
The supplier’s utility function should be built on the specific mobile service features it is 
offering to the customers. As wireless, communications and computing technologies 
evolve, and interoperability is mandated with a growing set of services, the specification of 
a mobile service becomes much more complex. From a supplier’s perspective, it is 
common to define tens or even hundreds of service attributes for a single service, most of 
which are technical: signaling and control, synchronization data, network parameters, 
specific protocol tunings, security settings for different traffic flows, application interfaces, 
etc.; and others are business-based: price, contract length, content diversity, etc. For the 
sake of simplicity, we characterize such supplier-defined service attributes as (service) 
design attributes. We call the Euclidean space constructed by these design attributes a 
(service) design space, which is the space within which the supplier makes decisions. The 
supplier’s utility function is a function of the service design attributes.   
 
The firms’ behavior is constrained by the specific individual services they are offering. For 
example, a supplier must balance the relationship between the values of the design 
attributes and other engineering attributes (link capacities, etc.) to guarantee a minimum 
Quality of Service (QoS) (see the mSinging case in Section 4.8). The number and types of 
constraints are service dependent. 
 
Regarding the decision rules, although the supplier seeks to maximize economic benefit in 
each individual contract, his decision rules are however set in such a way that he may lose 
in some contracts when compared to the initial non-negotiable offers to the public at large; 
but by pooling the different individualized contracts together, he can achieve the highest 
economic utility with minimum risks at corporate level.  
 
3.3 User behavioral decision model, service perceptual space 
  
In this section, we provide a behavioral decision model of the user in the context of 
individual services and tariffs, and introduce the concept of service perceptual space. 
 
Recall that in Section 2.4, the user’s behavior was characterized as having bounded 
rationality and social concerns. Having the social dimension means first that the user elicits 
not only economic but also social benefits from a mobile service1 and second that there is 
irrationality in the user’s preferences.  
                                                          
1 Economic benefit in a given situation is derived from the various service attributes, or 
from the transactions that the mobile service enables, either with an economic agent, or 
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A preference relation can be represented by a utility function only if it is rational (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995), where the preference must satisfy completeness and transitivity. Many 
preferences, especially social preferences, are partially rational or irrational. Therefore 
many situations cannot be described by utilities but only by preferences. Here we assume 
that there are partial preferences, which can be mapped out by types and contexts. If a 
selection of a subset of preferences leads to a locally continuous function, then there exists 
a utility function that can be used for computational purposes over that range of 
preferences. 
 
The implication of bounded rationality (see Section 2.4.2) is that, although the user tries to 
optimize his overall utility from a mobile service, he optimizes in a much simpler way 
using simplified utility functions and constraints, and satisficing decision rules: i.e. the 
user tries to achieve an acceptable level of utility before he stops  
 
Unlike the supplier, who knows and deals with the technical details of a mobile service, 
the user usually has a much simpler understanding of a mobile service. We propose that, 
from a user’s perspective, there are perceived attributes of a given mobile service. For 
example, the perceived attribute ‘wireless connection’ can be mapped into design attributes 
such as uplink, downlink, Bit Error Rate of each link, and retransmission rate of each link. 
Thus a user’s requirement for a “good wireless connection” may be designed as ‘an uplink 
speed at 128kbps, downlink speed at 384kbps, Bit Error Rate below 5%...etc’. The 
perceived attributes are actually the results of a reductionist mapping or an attribute 
substitution plus simplification (Section 2.4.2), which not only simplifies the 
understanding of the service attributes but also significantly reduces the number of them. 
The reductionist mapping can be based on certain heuristics or be the result of learning of 
selected technical attributes into features that the user in general can relate to. For a 
specific service, we define a (service) perceptual space as a Euclidean space constructed 
by the reduced perceived attributes of a service. This is the space in which the user makes 
his decisions. 
 
The user’s utility function is constructed based on the perceived service attributes (e.g. 
connection, content richness). There can be multiple perceived attributes for a given 
mobile service. A user’s utility function in such a case can be constructed by following the 
method of multiple attribute utility (MAU) theory (Clemen & Reilly, 2001; Keeney & 
Raiffa, 1993). First, a utility function for each service attribute is assessed. Then a multiple 
attribute utility function determines how the level of one attribute affects overall utility vis-
à-vis a set of assessed weights of their relative importance. 
 
A distance-based utility function was used by Wold (1943), Arrow and Hahn (1971) 
among many others. The process involves selecting a reference point and measuring the 
distance to it from the elements in the choice set; the distance can be any Minkowski 
distance of order p. Very often it is the L2-norm distance, which is also known as 
Euclidean distance. For an individual user, a reference point in the perceptual space can be 
the vector that consists of the ideal values for the perceived service attributes. The distance 
                                                                                                                                                  
with a machine (e.g. an application server). A user elicits social benefits from the social 
interactions and benefits that the mobile service enables. 
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to the reference point can provide a simple measurement of the satisfaction that the user 
expects to obtain from the supplier’s offer.     
 
The user’s constraints are also functions of the perceived attributes.  
 
3.4 Negotiation and the Stackelberg game 
 
Learning from the history of telecommunications (Section 1.1), where the users and the 
suppliers negotiated to have individual services and tariffs, we apply this “negotiation” 
mechanism in our research as the method to design the services and tariffs. The difference 
with monopolistic setting of the 1880s is that we assume the market of mobile services to 
be fully competitive: there are plenty of suppliers, and the users have a dominant influence 
in negotiation with any of them. 
 
The user and the supplier negotiate on service attributes and their values, and the contract 
sum for a given period. The process consists of a sequence of offers and counter-offers, 
leading eventually either to an agreement or to an abandonment of the process of 
negotiation. The negotiation could have three settings: 
 
1. One user vs. one supplier 
In this setting, a user negotiates with one supplier once at a time. A user who fails 
to reach an agreement acceptable to him with this supplier may switch to another 
supplier, or change his initial requirements.  
 
The Stackelberg game model (Section 2.6) can be applied here to model the 
dominant influence of the user in the negotiation. The bilateral negotiation 
procedure between the user and the supplier can be modeled by a repeated game. 
Thus this negotiation is modeled as a user-led recursive Stackelberg game, where 
the payoffs are the utilities that both parties receive from the individual service 
which they design together through the process. 
 
The recursive Stackelberg game is non-cooperative in essence because the user 
and the supplier have different goals in the negotiation; therefore, it is not a 
bargaining game. This is a game with imperfect information. As the negotiation 
proceeds, there is a process of learning. The adjustments will be in the player’s 
constraints and are based on the offers from the other player. The game is 
assumed to be deterministic. The complexity of the game depends on the utility 
functions and constraints of the players. The existence of equilibria depends on 
the parameters in the constraints and decision rules, which will be the studied in 
the following Chapters 4 and 5.   
 
2. Many users vs. one supplier 
This setting represents the situation in which a user community negotiates with a 
supplier. The difference between this setting and the one user vs. one supplier 
setting is that in this setting, the user side has a higher bargaining power but at the 
same time has the difficulty in reaching a consensus amongst the users. The 
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research focus could be on the design of mechanism to reach consensuses during 
the negotiation, which is outside the scope of this research.   
 
3. One user vs. many suppliers   
This setting represents the situation where a user uses a reverse auction by 
sending out his service requirements to many suppliers at the same time; the 
suppliers then compete to attain the business with different offers and prices. The 
bidding process can be in one or several steps, and the different suppliers have 
different utilities. Although such a reverse auction is a possibility, it is highly 
unlikely to be used for value-added services 1. One of the reasons lies in the 
varying number of interactions for different suppliers to estimate/learn about a 
user’s preference sensitivity. Another has to do with possibly different content 
assets and different third-parties-assisted value-added services, the characteristics 
of which cannot be exchanged during the reverse auction process. Finally, yet 
another reason is that suppliers will use different user interfaces and never 
delegate the auction process to a broker (regulatory impossibility). Instead, the 
one user can still run Q different Stackelberg negotiations in parallel with Q 
suppliers, and decide at the end amongst those for which a valid offer has been 
received as a result of the negotiation; this offer is not just one price but also 
based on qualitative and quantitative service attributes. Thus the basic element is 
still the one user vs. one supplier Stackelberg negotiation setting.   
 
Given the above discussion, we decide to focus on the “one user vs. one supplier” 
Stackelberg negotiation setting in this research.  
 
3.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has provided a conceptual framework for the design of individual services 
and tariffs in an interactive way.  
 
In Section 3.2, after weighing their relative importance and complexity, we decided to 
focus on firms as suppliers rather than focusing on other types of suppliers in this research. 
We provided a behavioral model of the firm, which is characterized by seeking maximum 
economic benefits and minimum risks. We introduced an engineering and business-based 
“service design space” as the supplier’s decision space. The service design space allows 
the detailed technical attributes to be used in the service design and consequently to be 
implemented by the supplier.  
 
In Section 3.3, we provided a model of the user that is characterized by having bounded 
rationality and social concerns. To address the bounded rationality, we introduced a 
simplified “service perceptual space” as the user’s optimization and decision space when 
the mobile service to be individualized is complicated (e.g. attribute number ≥ 7). In 
addition, we applied satisficing decision rules to the user during the decision making 
process. Moreover, we employed a simple distance-based utility function which can reflect 
some irrational aspects of the user’s social dimension in his model.  
                                                          
1 The mechanism is more likely to be used for commodity services. 
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In Section 3.4, we discussed three negotiation settings as the mechanisms to design 
individual mobile services and tariffs. In all these settings, the user has a dominant 
influence in the negotiation. We decided to focus on the “one user vs. one supplier” setting 
where the negotiation process is modeled by a recursive user-led Stackelberg game.  
 
Now that we have laid out all the theoretical groundwork for individual services and 
tariffs, we continue in the next chapters with the concrete computational design. 
 
 
59
 
 
Chapter 4 
Computational design of individual services 
and tariffs with cases 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter1, we operationalize the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3 by 
introducing methods, computational models and negotiation algorithms for the design of 
both a complicated value-added mobile service and a common generic mobile service 
bundle. The purpose of the computational design is that, when implemented as a tool, it 
can determine a negotiation result when the user simply states his wishes in the beginning.  
 
We evaluate the design through numerical cases using a prototype implementation. We 
then compare the computational results of the negotiations with the initial public services 
and tariffs. The analyses in this chapter are carried out on individual negotiation games. It 
is in the next chapter that we address the supplier’s business concerns in term of profits, 
market share and risks. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: in Section 4.2, we articulate how to determine the 
service-specific mapping between the service design space and the service perceptual 
space; this is followed by Sections 4.3 and 4.4 introducing the computational models of the 
user and the supplier respectively. After these preliminary steps, we present the negotiation 
game algorithms for value-added mobile services in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we 
describe a proof-of-concept software implementation of the computational design. In 
Sections 4.7 and 4.8, we provide evaluations of the design and tool through a value-added 
mobile music service under two different settings: a fictive user vs. a fictive supplier and a 
realistic user vs. a realistic supplier. In Section 4.9, we extend our design to the 
individualization of a common generic mobile service bundle. We provide a negotiation 
algorithm and evaluate the design with a large-scale case. Section 4.10 summarizes the 
chapter. The linkage between content at section level is shown in the Table below. 
 
Mapping between the design and the perceptual space 
Based on  Sections 3.2/3.3 on the concept of service design/perceptual space  
4.2 
Results used in  Section 4.5 in algorithms, Sections 4.7, 4.8 in numerical case computations, 
Section 5.2 in user preferences distribution characterization   
User / supplier computational model    
Based on  Sections 3.3 /3.2 on user/supplier behavioral model 
4.3 
4.4 
Results used in  Sections 4.5, 4.9 in negotiation algorithms 
Computational Stackelberg negotiation game 
Based on  Sections 2.6, 3.4 on computational game theory & Stackelberg game model 
4.5 
Results used in  Section 4.6 in prototype implementation, Sections 4.7, 4.8 in numerical 
cases; Section 4.9 as a design basis for generic service bundle negotiation 
algorithm; Sections 5.2, 5.3 as the basis for Monte Carlo simulation.      
                                                          
1 This chapter is partially based on Chen & Pau (2006b, 2007a) 
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Prototype implementation (I) 
Based on  Sections 4.2-4.5 on mappings, computational models and algorithms  
4.6 
Results used in  Sections 4.7-4.9 in numerical cases (as a computing tool), Sections 5.2, 7.3 
as the basis for complete prototype and real systematic implementations 
Case mSinging v1.0: fictive users vs. a fictive supplier  
                          v2.0: realistic users vs. a realistic supplier 
Based on  Section 4.2 on mapping, Sections 4.3, 4.4 on user and supplier behavioral 
models, Section 4.5 on algorithms, Section 4.6 on implementation   
4.7 
4.8 
Results used in  Sections 5.2, 5.3 to provide case-based evaluations of the risk metrics 
Generic mobile services 
Based on  Sections 4.3-4.5 on user, supplier behavioral models and the Stackelberg 
negotiation algorithms, Section 4.6 on implementation 
4.9 
Results used in  Section 5.2 to provide case-based evaluations of the risk metric. 
 
4.2 Mapping between the design and the perceptual spaces 
 
In Chapter 3, we introduced the concepts of the service design space and the service 
perceptual space, where the latter is a reductionist mapping of the former. In this section, 
we proceed to introduce methods to determine the mapping relationship, which will be 
used later in the computational model and the negotiation algorithms. The methods we use 
are “survey” and “principle component analysis”. The latter is a statistical method that 
analyzes data obtained from a survey.  
 
Generally, users can be divided into broad groups that share similar preferences for a class 
of services (e.g. people interested in mobile banking, or mobile health care, or mobile 
music). When designing a new class of individual mobile services, we conduct a user 
survey on a specific group of users having broadly similar interests (a.k.a. the targeted user 
group of the services). The survey asks the users to state their preferences for the service 
attributes in the service design space. Training may be necessary for the randomly selected 
respondents to understand the technical specifications. Furthermore, training is necessary 
when the supplier introduces a novel service of which the users have no past experience. 
We then perform a principle component analysis (PCA), which is a statistical method, on 
the obtained data to determine the mapping relationship. The user survey is named PCA 
learning survey after this purpose.1 The obtained data is called the PCA learning data set. 
Because of the manner in which the survey is conducted, the mapping relationship is 
service dependent and user (population) dependent. We assume the mapping is valid for a 
new user, who can be placed in the same user target group for the same class of mobile 
services.   
 
Let N be the number of the “potential users” (population) in the target group. Let s be the 
number of respondents (sample size) in the survey. Let n be the number of attributes in the 
service design space. The PCA learning data set is an s-by-n data matrix. Each row 
corresponds to a user’s preferences for the design attributes (an observation), which can be 
                                                          
1 In the telecommunications industry, such target group data (anonymized) are widely 
available from specialist suppliers, who may access categorized subscriber usage data 
collected by the operators via the networks.  This is an alternative way to obtain the user 
preferences data other than by the survey method. 
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seen as the coordinates of a point in the design space: call it a user target point in the 
service design space, denoted as t0. Each column in the matrix corresponds to a service 
design attribute. 
 
The principle component analysis generates an n-by-n coefficient matrix: each column 
corresponds to a principal component, and the principle components are sorted by order of 
decreasing variance. The PCA method has two advantages:  
 
• The first principal components often explain more variance than the rest of the 
components, which can be left out without losing much differentiating 
information.  
• The generated principal components are orthogonal to each other (Lattin, 
Carroll, & Green, 2003). 
 
In practice, we usually take the first m principle components that cover most of the total 
data set variance (e.g. 80%, as a rule of thumb1) as the mapping dimensions; usually m << 
n. Thus the dimensionality of the data will be significantly reduced after the principle 
component transformation and selection.  
 
Let P be the reduced principle component coefficient matrix constructed by the first m 
principle components ranked by decreasing variances, P is an n-by-m matrix. We treat the 
selected generated principle components as the revealed perceived service attributes of the 
users. The coordinate system constructed by these selected principle components is what 
has been called service perceptual space in Section 3.3.  
 
Given the orthogonality property of the PCA method, we can presume that the perceived 
attributes are mutually exclusive. The interpretation of the principle components is 
dependent on a specific user group and service attribute set; it may need help from experts 
who specialize in the areas related to that class of value-added services. The interpretation 
process has several steps (Pau, 1981):  
 
1. Sort the selected principle components by decreasing variances. Create new 
coordinate systems (also called maps) by taking pair-wisely the principle 
components, ranked by decreasing total variance weight: i.e. the 1st and 2nd 
components define the first coordinate system, the 1st and 3rd components define 
the second, the 2nd and 3rd components define the third map, etc. Each axis 
corresponds to a component. 
2. Visualize on each map the magnitude and sign of each design attribute's 
contribution to the chosen pair of principal components. Each design attribute is 
visualized in the map by a vector, and the direction and length of the vector 
indicates the degree to which each design attribute contributes to the chosen pair 
of principal components.  
3. In the map created by the 1st and 2nd components, locate the design 
attributes/vectors which are far away from the origin in one direction (e.g. 
                                                          
1  Other criteria to determine the number of principle components to be retained are 
discussed in Lattin et. al (2003, p. 112-117)  
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horizontal or vertical); find out the common characteristics among these design 
attributes from their verbal descriptions, which is the meaning of the PCA 
component linked to that direction.  
4. Validate the interpretation by looking at the original (raw) data and the related 
textual descriptions. 
5. Repeat step 3-4 with maps of less total variance. 
 
An example is provided in Section 4.8 through a numerical case, where we show how the 
new coordinate systems are constructed and what are the interpretations of the perceived 
service attributes. It is also reported in Section 4.8 that the joint analysis of the perceived 
attributes based on a learning data set with users sometimes allows us to obtain better 
interpretations in words of the nature of these perceived attributes. This practice is also 
important for the acceptability of the method amongst users.  
 
The determination of principle components depends on the user preference data obtained 
from the survey. Given the assumption that the mapping is valid for a new user who has 
similar preferences to the target group or the surveyed users, it is natural to ask what the 
appropriate sample size is in order to have stable principle components. A variety of rules 
were recommended by researchers and textbook authors about how the sample size s 
should be determined as a function of the number of service design attributes n. 
Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) performed a literature survey and found that few of these 
rules were based on empirical evidence. They used Monte Carlo method and 
systematically varied sample size (from 50 to1000), and the number of design variables 
(from 36 to 144), and found that s/n ratio was not an important factor in determining 
stability. The absolute sample size s was the most important factor. Osborne and Costello 
(2004), based on Guadagnoli’s work, checked when interaction happened between s and 
s/n. Their results showed that as s increases, s/n becomes less important and the converse 
is also true: as s/n increases, s becomes less important. The best outcome occurs when 
large s and s/n are both present. But their results also indicate there is no “critical mass” or 
“critical ratio”. Thus the recommendation is that the more data, the better, with respect to 
the objective of having stable principle components. However in practice, we should keep 
in mind that the survey sample size is often constrained by available time and budget.  
 
From another perspective, Pau (1979) gives algorithms to determine s and s/n from 
Mahalanobis distance between the pair-wise variances and a given number of maps needed 
for an interpretation. This provides a minimum requirement for the sample size. 
 
4.3 User computational model 
 
Decision variables and the user target point 
The user makes decisions in service perceptual space because this is a space that he is 
familiar with and in which he can make decisions without much effort. Let Z represent the 
service perceptual space. Let Z = [z1, z2,…,zm], Z∈Rm be a vector of m variables in the 
perceptual space. z1, z2,…,zm are the user’s decision variables, and each corresponds to a 
user perceived service attribute. Let z0 = [z10, z20,…,zm0], z0∈ Rm be the vector that 
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contains the set of ideal values that the user wishes to reach for the perceived attributes 
jointly. z0 is called a user target point in perceptual space.  
 
During the design phase, the user’s target point is first obtained in the service design space 
together with the PCA learning survey. The corresponding target point in the perceptual 
space is obtained by multiplying the vector by the reductionist mapping P (Section 4.2). 
Thus z0 = t0P.  
 
Constraints  
The user has constraints on the individual service. In our design, these constraints are first 
expressed in the service design space and then mapped into the perceptual space. This is 
because during the service design phase, the constraints expressed in design space can be 
concretely related to the design attributes, while the constraints in perceptual space are 
hard to quantify. For example, it is rather straightforward to define the minimum tolerant 
level of downlink speed to be 10kbps. It is however difficult to quantify a perceived 
attribute, e.g. “a fast connection”. There is no reference based on which the user can set the 
lower limit for this attribute. The concept “fast connection” itself is a relative concept.  
 
User constraints can be divided into generic constraints (e.g. budget constraints, time 
constraints) and service-specific constraints. Some of the user’s constraints are static; 
others are dynamic and depend on the input from the previous round of negotiation from 
the supplier. The constraints can also be categorized into linear and non-linear constraints 
and into unilateral and bilateral constraints. 
 
We define a “feasible region” of a user’s decision variable as the feasible range of a 
perceived service attribute. This feasible region is the boundary constraint of a user’s 
decision variable.   
 
Given the service design attributes x1, x2…xn1, let a unilateral user constraint in the service 
design space be f xu  (x1, x2…xn) ≤ 0. The mapping of a unilateral constraint from the 
design space to the perceptual space generates a new function f zu (z1, z2,…,zm) ≤ 0 such 
that anytime a vector xa satisfies f xu (x1, x2…xn) ≤ 0, its corresponding mapping za (za = 
xaP) satisfies f zu (z1, z2,…,zm) ≤ 0. 
 
Let the supplier’s offer from the previous round of the negotiation in the service design 
space be x_supplier_offer, which is a vector. Let a bilateral user constraint in the service 
design space be f xb (x1, x2…xn, x_supplier_offer) ≤ 0. Let the mapping of x_supplier_offer 
in the perceptual space be z_supplier_offer, z_supplier_offer = x_supplier_offer P. The 
mapping of a bilateral constraint from the design space to the perceptual space generates a 
new function f zb (z1, z2,…,zm, z_supplier_offer ) ≤ 0 such that a vector xa satisfies f xb (x1, 
x2…xn, x_supplier_offer) ≤ 0, its corresponding mapping za (za = xaP) satisfies f zb (z1, 
z2,…,zm, z_supplier_offer ) ≤ 0.    
                                                          
1 N.B. x1, …xn are the decision variables of the supplier. Here, for simplicity, we use them in 
the expression of the user’s constraints in the design space, and x1,…xn represents the 
mapping of the user’s decision variables z1, z2,…,zm from the perceptual space into the 
design space. 
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Feasible solution  
Let za = [ za1, za2…,zam], za∈Rm be a set of values in perceptual space which satisfies all the 
user’s constraints. za can also been seen as a point in perceptual space. Call it a feasible 
point for the user. 
 
Utility function   
The user’s utility function is defined in relation to the Euclidean distance between a 
feasible point and the target point. Let U_user(z) be the user’s utility function in the 
perceptual space, U_user(z) = exp(-||za-z0||). The user elicits higher utility when the offer 
from the supplier is closer to his wishes. This utility function has limitations, but to a 
certain degree, it also reflects certain “irrational” aspects: a user may not prefer lower 
prices than his target value ceteris paribus, or his social preferences may overshadow a 
more favorable price. Another concern is that the range of the utility function is (0,1]. 1 
represents the situation in which the offer from the supplier matches exactly the user’s 
wishes. The small range of the utility function may cause problems in later computation 
when the user and supplier jointly optimize their utility, and when the supplier’s utility 
range is much larger than that of the user (see Sections 4.7.3, 4.7.5).       
 
The user’s decision rules are described in Section 4.5.2 as part of the negotiation 
algorithms. 
 
4.4 Supplier computational model 
 
4.4.1 Simplified supplier 
 
Decision variables and the public offer  
The supplier makes decisions in the service design space because he can grasp all the 
technical design attributes and also because he eventually needs to provide/implement the 
service. Let X represent the service design space. Let X = [x1, x2,…,xn], X∈Rn be a vector 
of n variables in the service design space: x1, x2,…,xn are the supplier’s decision variables, 
and each corresponds to a service design attribute. For convenience purpose, let the last 
variable xn represent the price for the individualized service.   
 
Some high-level service design attributes can be broken down into many more detailed 
engineering attributes which can be readily implemented. Each of the engineering 
attributes corresponds to an internal decision variable (a parameter), the value of which 
depends largely on the specific service requests (see Section 4.8.1.3 for examples).  
 
The supplier of individual services and tariffs also publishes the service design attributes 
and corresponding value settings of a non-negotiable service to the public. Let this non-
negotiable offer be the public offer s0(X) = [x10, x20,…,xn0].     
 
Constraints  
The supplier’s constraints are expressed in the design space because the supplier needs to 
set technical attributes with explicit bounds understandable in an engineering sense. The 
supplier must balance the relationship between the values of the service attributes to 
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guarantee capacity and minimum QoS requirements. Some of the supplier’s constraints are 
dynamic and depend on the user’s input in the previous round of negotiation. There are 
also linear and non-linear constraints, as well as unilateral and bilateral constraints. 
 
We define a “feasible region” of a supplier’s decision variable as the meaningful range of a 
service design attribute. This feasible region is in fact the boundary constraint of a 
supplier’s decision variable. 
 
Let a unilateral supplier constraint in the service design space be g xu (x1, x2…xn) ≤ 0. Let 
the user’s request at the current round of negotiation be x_user_request, which is a vector. 
Let a bilateral supplier constraint in the design space be g xb (x1, x2…xn, x_user_request) ≤ 
0.  
 
Feasible solution  
Let xa = [ xa1, xa2…xan], xa∈Rn be a set of values in service design space which satisfies all 
the supplier’s constraints; call it a feasible solution for the supplier.  
 
Utility function 
The supplier’s utility, when offering individual services, is defined as the incremental 
profit (Δπ) from serving the specific individual demands of an additional user to his 
existing customer base. The incremental revenue is mainly decided by the price the user of 
that individual service intends to pay, and by the contract duration, for the service 
satisfying the user-requested characteristics. By assuming a unit cost for each service 
attribute (un), a simplified linearized supplier’s utility function can be written as1  
U_supplier(X) = Δprofit(X) = Δπ(X) = ∑−
=
−
1
1
n
a
aan uxx  
The supplier’s decision rules are described in Section 4.5.2 as part of the negotiation 
algorithms. In Chapter 5, we will discuss market share and the risk aspects of the suppliers 
 
4.4.2 Approximated supplier 
 
We designed and built a detailed and complex realistic computational model of a wireless 
and mobile service supplier (Chen & Pau, 2007a). In this model, the supplier’s decision 
variables and constraints setting are the same as in Section 4.4.1. The supplier’s utility is 
also defined as the incremental profit from serving an additional user. The improvement, 
when compared to the simplified model introduced above, lies in the incremental cost and 
revenue model of the supplier.  
 
The realistic model is, however, not a full business model: it does not include the 
marketing, finance, facilities, stock, administration, etc. overheads. Furthermore, the 
realistic model is only an approximated incremental model for the supplier when he adds a 
customer to the system for a stated duration, while investments and installation for the pre-
                                                          
1 This formula is only given for explanation purposes and will not be used elsewhere in this 
thesis. 
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existing subscriber base have already been undertaken. It is an approximation to the 
derivative but not the profit function itself.  
 
First, the improved realistic model addresses the investment and operational cost non-
linearities linked to the necessary wireless access links, transmission links and 
switching/routing nodes. Second, the model allows a possible alternative provisioning of 
the individualized service by 2G/2.5G/3G and broadband generic access, each having 
different provisioning costs; the corresponding infrastructure capacity needs are decided 
based on the total traffic requirements derived from the needed service attribute values, 
from the management traffic and from the user’s willingness-to-pay. Third, the model 
handles the individualized service-specific usage of the customer relationship management 
(CRM) system, the operation support system (OSS), and the content acquisition / storage / 
billing systems, besides handling the necessary incremental manpower costs involved in 
providing the individualized service to the single incremental user.         
 
To provide individual mobile services, the supplier generally needs to spend on: 
 
1. communication (network) infrastructure; 
2. and/or value-added content; 
3. and/or value-added applications; 
4. and on the setup, maintenance and management thereof. 
 
The expenses of a supplier can be categorized into capital expenditures (CAPEX), which 
are investments, and operating expenditures (OPEX), which are ongoing running and 
maintenance costs. The total cost is the sum of CAPEX and OPEX.  
 
The incremental CAPEX 
The CAPEX for communications (network) infrastructure can be roughly broken down 
into investments in core network, site buildout and radio access networks. The core 
network consists of authentication, backbone transmission, switches, routers, charging and 
billing, roaming gateways, and the CRM system. Radio access networks consist of base 
stations, radio network controllers and the transmission to core network. Site buildout cost 
is embedded in the base station CAPEX in our model. 
 
The supplier usually also needs to make investments in content and/or in applications. The 
investment in contents could be a shared investment (e.g. 5%) together with other firms or 
organizations (e.g. a music label or a publisher), so the supplier can have access to the 
latest content at a relatively low price; or a full investment (100%) by the supplier himself 
in order to have full control over the content. Investment in needed applications (e.g. 
software and storage) is usually borne 100% by the operator as they are deemed usable for 
other services or customers. Some investments, which will generate extra incomes to the 
supplier (e.g. royalty fees paid by other firms), are also considered in the model; either in 
the CAPEX part (if the income is one-time based) or in the OPEX part (if the income is 
repetitive). 
 
One additional characteristic of the CAPEX is that most of the investment objects usually 
last much longer than the service request duration of users of individual service (see 
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Section 7.2.2.); e.g. communications infrastructure usually lasts 10-15 years. In our model 
of the incremental profit from an individualized contract, we therefore only consider the 
depreciated/amortized 1  value of the investment objects (infrastructure, content, 
applications) over the individual contract period.  
 
We use the simplest depreciation method: straight-line depreciation, where the monthly 
depreciated amount is calculated by taking investment acquisition price subtracted by 
salvage value divided by the productive months of the asset. Here the salvage value is 
assumed to be zero and productive months are assumed to be the life spans of the 
investment objects (see Section 4.8.1.3 for examples of the life spans of different 
investment objects). The depreciated amount of an investment object over the contract 
length is simply the product of the monthly depreciation amount by the individualized 
contract length.  
 
Let X = [x1, x2,…, xn], X∈Rn be the supplier’s decision variables which correspond to the 
service design attributes (see Section 4.4.1). For convenience purpose, let the first variable 
in the vector x1 be the variable that represents the individualized contract length; let the last 
variable xn  represent price for the individualized service; let X’ = [x2, x3…xn-1, xn], 
X’∈Rn-1. 
 
Let the CAPEX of different investment objects be a function of the decision variables X’, 
denoted as Ch(X’), where h = 1, 2, 3… represents the different investment objects  
determined by X’, and certain internal decision variables which are only known to the 
supplier and used in the service design (e.g. content diversity, user diversity, etc: see 
Section 4.8 for more examples). Let the incomes from different investment objects be a 
function of the decision variables, denoted as Dh(X’). Let dep() be the function that 
computes the monthly depreciated amount of an investment object. If the investment 
object generates income, the dep() function computes the monthly income that is 
attributable to that investment object.  
 
Given the assumed number of customers of a specific class of individual service (N), for 
which the base value CAPEX investments are made, the incremental CAPEX from serving 
an additional individual user, denoted as ΔCAPEX (X), is estimated as: 
 
ΔCAPEX (X) = ( Σ dep(Ch(X’)) – Σ dep(Dh(X’))) × x1 / N                           (4-1) 
h = 1, 2, 3 … 
 
The incremental OPEX 
OPEX are ongoing running costs that include individual service specific payments to 
employees, power, rents, costs in software system maintenance/upgrade, infrastructure 
running and maintenance, network management, billing and payment operations, and 
CRM. While it is viable to calculate the incremental CAPEX, it is challenging to estimate 
the incremental OPEX. First, the OPEX of some cost items decrease as the capacity grows 
                                                          
1 In finance and accounting, the concept of depreciation is usually applied to tangible assets 
while amortization is usually applied to intangible assets. In this thesis, we do not 
distinguish between them. 
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(e.g. storage); second, some items can substitute for other items to a certain degree 
(transmission bandwidth vs. switch buffer size); third and most importantly, OPEX accrues 
in relation to the traffic, and to the size and number of nodes of the whole service-
provisioning infrastructure, especially with regard to complexity (including service 
complexity). Fourth, as demonstrated by the teletraffic theory, the traffic and therefore 
OPEX costs are congestion and time dependent.   
 
To estimate OPEX, full traffic data, enterprise resource planning (ERP) data, business 
process management models, and real time accounting system data are needed. This 
research had no access to such an overwhelming amount of data. 
 
Instead, inspired by the production functions used in microeconomics, we construct a 
simplified but nevertheless realistic incremental service provisioning production and cost 
function. The parameters are to be fitted to real data under stable conditions. This approach 
is also justified by the fact that only incremental costs from one individual contract need 
estimation, not the aggregate amounts. The specific incremental OPEX cost function has 
two parts: 
 
1. The infrastructure and content-based service provisioning part models the 
incremental operational costs associated with setting up the complex service 
provisioning infrastructure. It has a product form which is similar to a Cobb-
Douglas production function, with explicit marginal elasticities and production 
factor substitution between the investment objects. The production factors can be 
transmission infrastructure, storage, or content (see Section 4.8.1.3 for examples). 
Each item in this part is indispensable and may affect (e.g. substitute) other items.  
 
2. The service operations provisioning part models the incremental operational costs 
associated with service operation objects. It has an additive form because some of 
the service operational objects are optional and they have separate linear 
relationships regarding the incremental service costs. The service operation 
objects can be the salaries paid to the employees, or to the music teachers such as 
in the mSinging case (Section 4.8), or the content distribution fee paid to the 
content owner, etc.  
      
Let αh > 0, h = 1, 2, 3…be the marginal production elasticity associated with each 
investment object. Given the assumed aggregated number of customers of a specific class 
of individual services (N), X’ = [x2, x3…xn], and the cost of the investment object Ch(X’) 
(see above and Section 4.4.1), the incremental infrastructure and content-based part of the 
service provisioning incremental OPEX function can be written as:  
 
Δ infrastructure and content-linked operational costs (X) =  ∏ NXc hh /))'(( αβ   (4-2) 
h=1, 2, 3… 
 
Here β is a scaling factor that is used to obtain operational costs from the investment 
objects. The condition∑ >
h
h 1α , reflects the fact that capital items have increasing 
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returns to scale of the service production factors. For example, if the number of base 
stations doubles, the infrastructure and content-based operational provisioning costs 
associated with them will be more than double. 
 
Let Ow(X’) be the monthly cost associated with each operational object for an additional 
user, w = 1, 2, 3…represents the different operational objects; the number of operational 
object is service dependent. Given contract length x1 (see above), the incremental 
operations based service provisioning cost for an additional individualized contract is then: 
 
Δ service operations provisioning costs (X) = (Σ Ow(X’)) ×  x1                   (4-3) 
w = 1, 2, 3…  
 
The supplier’s incremental profit 
Based on formulae 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3, the supplier’s incremental profit from an 
individualized contract, denoted as Δ π (X), can be written as 
 
Δ π (X) = xn – ΔCAPEX (X) - Δ infrastructure and content-linked operational costs (X)- Δ 
service operations provisioning costs (X)                             (4-4) 
 
In summary, the inputs to the supplier’s incremental cost and revenue model are the user’s 
requests on the service design attributes (including price and contract duration), given a 
pre-existing subscriber base in the same service class, and given certain communications 
technology options. However, the engineering, content and value-added service-related 
attributes are the ones embedded in the contract and resulting from a mutually agreed 
negotiation. They are not necessarily in the initial user requests. The output is the 
supplier’s incremental operational profit from the provisioning of that individual service 
design before overheads (financial, administration, marketing etc). The parameters of the 
supply model were estimated from real systems supplier data, and further parameters were 
fitted to real wireless operator operations for a typical geographical coverage1.  
 
4.5 Computational Stackelberg negotiation game 
 
In the conceptual framework developed in Section 3.4, we proposed that the user and the 
supplier jointly design the individual services and tariffs through a negotiation. The 
negotiation, however, has a non-cooperative and recursive nature and is modeled as an n-
stage user-led two-player Stackelberg game.  
 
The negotiation process is designed as follows: in the beginning of the individual service 
creation, the user sets forth his wishes on a set of service attributes and their values, 
including a tariff and a duration based on a non-negotiable public offer s0 (Section 4.4.1) 
that he has been informed about. The negotiation starts with the user proposing his 
requests after optimizing his own utility under his constraints. The supplier replies with an 
offer after his optimization. This offer and counter-offer can go on recursively and the 
players update their constraints based on what the other proposed as values leading to 
changes in the variable tolerance bounds as a learning process. The negotiation either ends 
                                                          
1 The model cannot be released without supplier permission. 
70
44 Individual mobile communication services and tariffs 
with a contract or a service level agreement (SLA) written in the service design space (we 
will return to this issue in Section 7.3), or with the user or the supplier quitting.  
 
4.5.1 Information structure  
 
The information structure in this negotiation plays an important role due to the user and 
supplier constraints, and due also to the negotiation recursions with single-player 
optimization by each player separately based on inputs from the other player in the 
previous step.  
 
Essentially, each player has a private information set including utility, constraints (see 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4), and decision rules, and furthermore the supplier has an operational 
model; but there is an information communication between the players as set forth in Fig. 
4-1. The players share the same design space X, but only the supplier makes use of it, 
deriving from the design attributes in X engineering attributes (see Section 4.8.1.3 for an 
example), while the user only observes a very limited subset of X and operates in the 
perceptual space Z. Two cases exist: 
  
1. either the supplier computes the PCA mapping and communicates the complete 
mapping relationship to the user. The user makes a selection of the principle 
components (perceived attributes), and owns alone the reduced mapping result P 
(and its pseudo-inverse, P-1). The players then communicate in the design space 
X. 
2. or the user computes the PCA mapping, selects the principle components to be 
retained, which form the reduced mapping P (and P-1), and communicates to the 
supplier with P and P-1. In this case, the two players communicate in the 
perceptual space Z. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4-1: Information structure of the Stackelberg negotiation game  
 
In both cases, the transformation between the service design space and the service 
perceptual space is necessary. We call the transformation from the service design space to 
the service perceptual space the direct mapping; while the transformation in the opposite 
direction the reverse mapping. Given the reductionist PCA mapping coefficients P (see 
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Section 4.2) and its pseudo inverse P-1, the direct mapping of a design space vector xa in 
the perceptual space (denoted as za) can be obtained by multiplying by P, za = xaP; while 
the reverse mapping of a perceptual space vector zb in the design space (denoted as xb) can 
be obtained by multiplying by P-1, xb = zb P-1.      
 
In this research, we consider the first case where the user owns alone the selection of the 
service category, and the PCA mapping P. One more complication is that for the user, the 
utility function is expressed in the service perceptual space and the optimization is carried 
out in the perceptual space. The target point and constraints are, however, expressed in the 
service design space in the beginning due to the reasons mentioned in Section 4.3; thus, a 
“direct transformation” on them is carried out when necessary.  
 
The transformation from the service design space to the service perceptual space will cause 
some loss of information. The degree of loss depends on the total variances accounted for 
by the retained m principle components. On the other hand, the transformation from the 
service perceptual space back to the service design space, e.g. mapping a user feasible 
point (see Section 4.3) in the service perceptual space to the service design space, will not 
cause loss of information. 
       
4.5.2 Negotiation algorithm 
 
Let i = 1, 2,…, k represent the round of negotiation (i-th stage of the game). 
 
Let Z = [z1, z2,…,zm] be the user’s decision variables in the service perceptual space. Let 
z_user_requesti be the user’s optimization result at the i-th round of negotiation in the 
perceptual space, z_user_requesti is an m-dimensional vector; let x_user_requesti be the 
corresponding mapping of this result in the design space, x_user_requesti is an n-
dimensional vector. Let t0(X) be the user’s target point in the service design space, which 
is an n-dimensional vector. Let z0 = [z10, z20,…,zm0] be the user’s target point in the service 
perceptual space.  z0 = t0P. 
 
Let X = [x1, x2,…,xn] be the supplier’s decision variables in the service design space. Let 
x_supplier_offeri be the supplier’s optimization result at the i-th round of negotiation, 
x_supplier_offeri is an n-dimensional vector; let z_supplier_offeri be the corresponding 
mapping of this result in the perceptual space, z_supplier_offeri is an m-dimensional 
vector. Let s0(X) be the supplier’s public offer in the service design space, which is an n-
dimensional vector. Let the mapped supplier’s public offer in the service perceptual space 
be s0(Z), which is an m-dimensional vector s0(Z) = s0(X) P. Let x_supplier_offer0 = s0(X); 
Let z_supplier_offer0 = s0(Z).  
 
The full negotiation algorithm consists of one preparation step and two recursive steps, 
which is illustrated in Fig. 4-2. The detailed algorithm is as follows: 
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Fig. 4-2: The Stackelberg negotiation game algorithm between a user and a supplier  
 
Step 0: preparation 
 
1. In the beginning, the supplier announces the offering of a class of individual 
mobile services. He publishes the non-negotiable public offer s0(X), which is a set 
of service attributes (including price and duration) and their values expressed in 
the service design space.  
2. A PCA learning survey is carried out. A principle component analysis is 
performed on the obtained data and the reductionist mapping coefficient P is 
determined, as described in Section 4.2. The design attributes are translated into 
the perceptual attributes through the procedure described in Section 4.2. Here we 
assume that the user owns alone the PCA mapping P and its pseudo inverse P-1, 
and thus must communicate with the supplier in the service design space X (see 
Section 4.5.1) 
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3. A new user, who is assumed to be in the same user target group as the surveyed 
user, sets his target point t0(X) in the design space based on the public offer s0(X) 
published by the supplier. The corresponding user target point in the perceptual 
space, denoted as z0, can be obtained by multiplying by P: z0 = t0(X) P. 
4. The supplier’s public offer s0(X) is mapped into the perceptual space, denoted 
s0(Z), s0(Z) = s0(X) P. 
5. The user’s utility from the supplier’s public offer s0(z) is determined by exp(-
||s0(Z)-z0||). 
 
The game starts with i =1. 
 
Stage i 
       Step 1: user designs and proposes  
The goal of the user at stage i is to maximize his utility subject to his constraints. He 
then makes a decision and communicates with the supplier. There are several sub-
steps:     
 
1. Constraints update  
The user has unilateral constraints and bilateral constraints (Section 4.3). At stage 
i (a.k.a. iteration i), the user updates his bilateral constraints according to the 
supplier’s offer x_supplier_offeri-1 in the previous iteration i-1. Because the user’s 
constraints are expressed in design space, a transformation is necessary to map the 
user’s constraints to the perceptual space (see Section 4.3). Let the bilateral user 
constraints in the perceptual space be f zba (z1, z2,…,zm, z_supplier_offer(i-1)) ≤ 0 ; 
a =1, 2, 3… represents the bilateral user constraints, the number of which is 
service dependent. Let the unilateral user constraints in the service perceptual 
space be f zud (z1, z2,…,zm) ≤ 0 ; d =1, 2, 3… represents the unilateral user 
constraints, the number of which is service dependent.  
 
2. Utility maximization 
The user maximizes his utility U_user(z) = exp(-||zai-z0||) (Section 4.3) by 
minimizing the distance between a feasible point and the target point, subject to 
the updated bilateral constraints and the unilateral constraints; the initial starting 
point of the maximization is the supplier’s offer from the previous iteration 
z_supplier_offer(i-1).  
 
Max U_user (z)   
Subject to  f zba (z1, z2,…,zm, z_supplier_offer(i-1)) ≤ 0 & 
                      f zud (z1, z2,…,zm) ≤ 0 ,   a = 1, 2, 3…; d = 1, 2, 3… 
 
Let the user maximization result at iteration i be z_user_requesti.     
 
3. Decision  
Based on the maximization result z_user_requesti and his own decision rules, the 
user decides to stop or not. The user’s decision rules are: 
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1) If at iteration i, the maximization result leads to a utility that is worse than 
which he elicits from the public offer s0(Z), quit.  
i.e. U_user(z_user_ requesti) - U_user(s0(Z))  ≤ 0 
2) If at the 1st iteration (i=1), the feasible set is empty, quit. An empty feasible 
set indicates that the user’s constraints exclude all the inputs and thus 
z_user_requesti is a null vector.  
3) If at iteration i (≥2), the feasible set becomes empty, backtrack by one 
iteration and continue. 
4) If the feasible set is empty for two consecutive iterations i-1and i, (i≥2), quit.  
5) Otherwise, continue. 
 
4. Communication 
 
1.) If the user decides to continue with the current negotiation, he needs to send 
his service requests to the supplier. Given that P and P-1 are not shared with 
the supplier, the user needs to map his maximization result z_user_ requesti 
into the service design space. Let the mapped result be x_user_requesti, the 
user sends this service design space vector to the supplier   
2.) If the user decides to stop and quit, he informs the supplier about his 
decision.  
 
       Step 2: supplier designs and proposes 
The goal of the supplier at stage i is to maximize his utility (incremental profit) 
subject to his constraints. He then makes the decision and communicates with the 
user. There are several sub-steps: 
 
1. Constraints update 
The supplier has unilateral constraints and bilateral constraints (Section 4.4.1). At 
iteration i, the supplier updates his bilateral constraints according to the user’s 
offer x_user_requesti in the current iteration i. Let the bilateral supplier 
constraints in the design space be g xbe (x1, x2,…,xn, x_user_requesti) ≤ 0, e = 1, 2, 
3 … represents the bilateral supplier constraints, the number of which is service 
dependent. Let the unilateral supplier constraints in the service design space be    
g xul (x1, x2, …,xn) ≤ 0. l =1, 2, 3… represents the unilateral supplier constraints, 
the number of which is service dependent.  
 
2. Utility maximization  
The supplier maximizes his utility U_supplier(X), which is the incremental profit 
from serving an additional user (Section 4.4), subject to the updated bilateral 
constraints and the unilateral constraints; the initial starting point of the 
maximization is the user’s request x_user_requesti at current iteration i.   
 
       Max  U_supplier (X) 
       Subject to g xbe (x1, x2,…,xn, x_user_requesti) ≤ 0 & 
  g xul (x1, x2, …,xn) ≤ 0, e = 1, 2, 3…; l = 1, 2 , 3… 
 
Let the maximization result at iteration i be x_supplier_offeri  
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3. Decision 
Based on the optimization result x_supplier_offeri and his own decision rules, the 
supplier decides whether to accept the proposal, or to propose back his last 
optimized values; or stop the game. 
 
We introduce a parameter which will be used in the supplier’s decision rules. The 
parameter is called minimum profit threshold, denoted as θ. The supplier will not 
agree to sign a contract with an individual user when the expected profit from that 
user is below θ (θ and the related calculation will be discussed in details in 
Chapter 5).   
 
Supplier decision rules are: 
 
1) If at the 1st iteration (i=1), the feasible set is empty, quit. An empty feasible 
set indicates that the supplier’s constraints exclude all the inputs and thus 
x_supplier_offeri is a null vector.   
2) If at iteration i (≥2), the feasible set becomes empty, backtrack by one 
iteration and continue. 
3) If the feasible set is empty for two consecutive iterations i-1and i, (i≥2), quit. 
4) If there is no difference between the maximization results of two consecutive 
iterations i-1and i, (i≥2) of the supplier, and the supplier’s utility from the 
user’s request at iteration i is larger than or equal to θ, sign the contract and 
quit.  
i.e. U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri) - U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri-1) = 0 & 
U_supplier(x_user_requesti) ≥ θ, (i≥2) 
5) If there is no difference between the maximization results of two consecutive 
iterations i-1and i, (i≥2) of the supplier, and the supplier’s utility from the 
user’s request at iteration i is less than θ, quit without signing. 
i.e. U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri) - U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri-1) = 0 & 
U_supplier(x_user_requesti) < θ, (i≥2) 
6) If oscillation happens among iterations i, i-1 and i-2 (i≥3) as defined below, 
and the supplier’s utility from the user’s request at iteration i is larger than or 
equal to θ, sign the contract and quit. 
i.e. U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri) - U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri-2) = 0  & 
U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri-1) - U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri-3) = 0  & 
U_supplier(x_user_requesti) ≥ θ, (i≥3)  
7) If oscillation happens among iterations i, i-1 and i-2 (i≥3) as defined below, 
and the supplier’s utility from the user’s request at iteration i is less than θ, 
quit without signing. 
i.e. U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri) - U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri-2) = 0  & 
U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri-1) - U_supplier(x_supplier_offeri-3) = 0  & 
U_supplier(x_user_requesti) < θ, (i≥3) 
8) Otherwise, if conditions 1) – 7) are not met, continue to negotiate.   
 
Note: oscillation may happen between 3 or more iterations, and the decision rules 
for such situations are similar to rules 6) and 7) of the supplier. This indeed 
happened in the mSinging case presented in Sections 4.7 and 4.8.  
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4. Communication  
 
1) If the supplier decides to continue with the current negotiation, he needs to 
inform the user about his latest offer x_supplier_offeri. The game enters the 
next stage: (i = i+1). 
2) If the supplier decides to stop and quit, he communicates to the user his 
decision and the game terminates. 
 
Recursion: the procedure repeats from Step1-Step2 until either player decides to stop, with 
or without reaching an equilibrium and signing a contract.  
 
Negotiation outcomes 
  
1. If the negotiation game produces an accepted outcome for both players, with 
acceptance established by the decision rules of both players, then a service level 
agreement (SLA) can be agreed upon and the system will be notified by a normal 
handshaking protocol such as session initiation protocol (SIP) (Section 7.3). 
2. If either player after iteration 2 refuses to continue, then the game stops and the 
user can either propose his service requests to another supplier, or accept the 
closest public generic service offer of the supplier (who cannot discriminate 
against him under public service provisions).  
3. If the initial service requested by the user is outside the feasible sets of either 
player, the game stops and the previous outcome applies.  
 
4.5.3 Negotiation algorithm with discretization 
 
The non-linearities and possible discontinuities of the investment and operational costs 
make it difficult to build an approximated supplier’s incremental cost and revenue model 
using one single or a few explicit mathematical formulae. Our model (Section 4.4.2) was 
built using spreadsheets and an instantiation of the operational model is in Section 4.8.  
 
Next, some of the decision variables in the model can take only integer or discrete values 
to be meaningful (e.g. contract duration of 1 month but not 0.9123 month). For constrained 
nonlinear optimization, most of the commercial optimization software (e.g. MATLAB1 
routine FMINCON and NAG Foundation Toolbox2 routine E04UCF) requires an explicit 
target function and that all variables have continuous real values. There are almost no 
commercial non-linear integer optimization packages with continuous utility functions; 
therefore such commercial tools cannot be used in the computation which involved the 
approximated model.  
 
 
                                                          
1 MATLAB is a numerical computing environment and programming language created by 
Mathworks, Inc.  
2  NAG Foundation Toolbox: a software for numerical computing from the Numerical 
Algorithms Group. 
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4.5.3.1 Discretization and exhaustive search 
 
To compute a function that has both discrete variables and continuous variables, we 
discretize all variables and conduct an exhaustive search (Romeijn & Pardalos, 1995); the 
continuous variable samplings are made to converge by fractional decompositions with 
increasing resolutions. The exhaustive search is on alternative values of all variables 
within intervals which are either fixed (due to the usage of the variable) or made to have 
increasing resolutions (for continuous variables).   
 
Discretization takes several steps: 
Step 1: intervals Generate sub-intervals for each variable based on its feasible region 
defined in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, and a chosen number of intervals (n_interval). This is done 
by equally dividing the feasible region into n_intervals. n_interval is an integer ranging 
from 2 to N. The number of interval is the same for all variables in one computation. For 
variables which are only meaningful when discrete, the number of intervals is adapted to 
usage.  
 
Step 2: discretized values Generate representative values of the variables inside the sub-
intervals. There are three conventions to generate the discretized values: left 
edge/center/right edge, which take the smallest/median/highest value of each sub-interval 
correspondingly. During one negotiation computation, only one convention should be 
followed. 
 
Step 3: map (real) values to discretized values. When the value of a continuous variable 
falls within a sub-interval, it will be mapped onto the representative value of this sub-
interval. Discrete variables will always have true exact values 
 
Fig. 4-3 illustrates the discretization process of a design space variable x7 (tariff) in the 
mSinging case v2.0 of a user (Section 4.8). The feasible region is decided by the lower 
bound and the upper bound of the variable, which are 5 and 185 respectively. n_interval = 
3. A “center convention” is followed in generating the representative discretized values; 
the results are x7_low=35, x7_medium=95 and x7_high=155. The close proximity to 
x7_low decides that x7a, which can be an offered price from the supplier, will be 
represented by the value of x7_low, which is 35. The representing value will be used in the 
computation (i.e. in the exhaustive search) instead of the actual value (x7a), thus 
significantly reducing the possible combination of inputs in the exhaustive search.  
  
lower bound upper bound
x1_low x1a x1_highx1_medium
5
35 95 155
185
 
 
Fig. 4-3: Discretization of a variable in service design space  
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The discretization rate of the variable can be indicated by the number of intervals. When 
the discretization rate is low, the discretization significantly reduces the number of 
possible values of each variable. This greatly reduces the computational complexity. But it 
is at the expense of less accurate results. The results are more of a qualitative indication of 
the service attributes rather than a quantitative one. When the discretization rate becomes 
higher, the result becomes more accurate and thus gives a quantitative indication of the 
values of the service attributes. 
 
In our computation, the user’s target point is not discretized. Given that the user can 
choose discretized values of his variables, it is possible that the user cannot reach the target 
point (distance to target point ≠ 0) even all the constraints are slack. The boundary values 
of the constraints of both the user and the supplier are not discretized. 
 
This method only provides exact results subject to certain convergence conditions. 
However its exhaustivity guarantees that no local optimum is chosen, but always a global 
optimum, which is an advantage. It is recommended to verify the results found against the 
real-valued algorithm.  
 
4.5.3.2 Algorithm 
 
In this section, we present the negotiation algorithm with discretization of the decision 
variables and the constraints. 
 
Let i= 1, 2,…, k represents the round of negotiation (i-th stage of the game). 
 
Let DZ = [Dz1,…,Dzm], DZ∈Qm be the discretized user decision variables in the service 
perceptual space. Let Dz_user_requesti be the user’s optimization result at the i-th round of 
negotiation in the perceptual space, Dz_user_requesti is an m-dimensional vector and takes 
discretized values; let Dx_user_requesti be the discretized mapping of Dz_user_requesti in 
the service design space, Dx_user_requesti is an n-dimensional vector. Let t0(X) be the 
user’s target point in the service design space, which is an n-dimensional vector; let the 
mapped target user point in the perceptual space be z0 = [z10, z20…zm0].  
 
Let DX = [Dx1,…,Dxn], DX∈Qn be the discretized supplier’s decision variables in the 
service design space. Let Dx_supplier_offeri be the supplier’s optimization result at the i-th 
round of negotiation, Dx_supplier_offeri is an n-dimensional vector and takes discretized 
values; let Dz_supplier_offeri be the discretized mapping of Dx_supplier_offeri in the 
perceptual space, Dz_supplier_offeri is an m-dimensional vector. Let the supplier’s public 
offer in the service design space be s0(X), which is an n-dimensional vector. Let the 
mapped supplier’s public offer in the service perceptual space be s0(Z), which is an m-
dimensional vector. Let x_supplier_offer0 = s0(X); Let z_supplier_offer0 = s0(Z).    
 
The full negotiation game algorithm with discretization is similar to the normal algorithm 
presented in Section 4.5.2. It consists of one preparation step and two recursive steps, 
which is illustrated in Fig. 4-4. The explanations below only show the differences in sub-
steps or iterations from the normal algorithm.   
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Fig. 4-4: Discretized Stackelberg negotiation game algorithm between a user and a 
supplier 
 
Step 0: preparation  
Part of the preparation procedure is similar to the sub-steps 1-5 of Step 0 of the normal 
algorithm in Section 4.5.2. The extra sub-steps here are: 
6. Choose the number of sub-intervals (n_interval) which determines the 
quantitization level.   
7. Choose a value generation convention which will be used throughout the 
computation. 
 
The game starts with i =1. 
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Stage i 
       Step 1: user designs and proposes  
The goal of the user at stage i is to maximize his utility subject to his constraints. He 
then makes a decision and communicates with the supplier.  
 
There are several sub-steps, which are similar to the sub-steps 1-4 in the normal 
algorithm in Section 4.5.2. The difference is that the current algorithm uses discrete 
decision variables DZ, and discrete constraints, which can either be unilateral:            
f zud (DZ) ≤ 0, d = 1, 2, 3…, or bilateral: fzba (DZ, Dz_supplier_offer(i-1)) ≤ 0 , a = 1, 2, 
3… Exhaustive search is carried out to find the maximum utility. We apply a 
resampling technique as a refinement process on discretization to improve the 
computation efficiency. The details will be explained shortly.  
 
       Step 2: supplier designs and proposes 
The goal of the supplier at stage i is to maximize his utility (incremental profit) 
subject to his constraints. He then makes the decision and communicates with the 
user.  
 
The sub-steps are similar to the sub-step 1-4 in the normal algorithm in Section 4.5.2. 
The current algorithm uses, however, discretized decision variables DX and discrete 
constraints, either unilateral g xul (DX) ≤ 0, l= 1, 2 , 3… or bilateral g xbe (DX, 
Dx_user_requesti) ≤ 0, e=1, 2, 3… Exhaustive search is carried out and resampling is 
also applied.  
 
Recursion: the recursion rules are identical to the normal algorithm in Section 4.5.2  
 
Resample: we update the feasible boundary of the decision variables according to the 
negotiation results of the previous round; thus the representative value of each discretized 
variable will be re-generated at each iteration. See the dashed-arrows in Fig. 4-4. The 
resample serves as a refinement process on the discretization resolution to improve 
computational efficiency. When a variable’s usage range and sampling for meaning 
interpretation are reached, we do not resample that variable. If variable can have real 
values, then fractional convergence is stopped by the decision rule on the stability of the 
optimization results.  
 
4.6 Prototype implementation (I) 
 
In this section, we introduce a proof-of-concept implementation of the computational 
design described in Sections 4.2-4.5. The implementation serves as a design tool; it 
automates the numerical calculation of the negotiation equilibrium between the user and 
the supplier when the user sets his service and price requirements to the supplier. We will 
present an extension of this prototype implementation in Section 5.2.3. A real 
implementation of the computational design in the existing communications systems will 
be discussed in Section 7.3. 
 
The prototype implementation has two separate parts (see Fig. 4-5). One statistical analysis 
part computes the mapping relationship between the service design space and the service 
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perceptual space. The other negotiation part determines if an equilibrium/equilibria exists 
based on the algorithms, utility functions, constraints and decision rules set by both players 
(Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5). The design tool is implemented in a MATLAB environment1. 
  
The statistical analysis part consists of two functional blocks: the “principle component 
analysis” block and the “display” block. The principle component analysis block conducts 
principle component analyses by the MATLAB function princomp(). The input data are 
the PCA learning survey results (Section 4.2) from users regarding their ideal values of the 
service design attributes (a.k.a. user target points in design space, see Section 4.3). The 
output is the principle component coefficients ranked in order of decreasing component 
variance. The number of principle components to be retained can either be decided based 
on the percentage of variance they account for (e.g. 80% as a rule of thumb); or can be 
based on the methods mentioned in Lattin et al. (2003, p. 113). The reductionist principal 
component coefficient P and its pseudo inverse P-1 are saved for later use in the “direct 
mapping” and “reverse mapping” (Section 4.5.1) during the negotiation and for the 
purpose of display. Regarding the implementation details, the PCA is performed based on 
correlations; thus the data are normalized by mean shifting and rescaling. The means and 
standard deviations are saved for a later usage in mapping the data from the service 
perceptual space back to the service design space.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4-5: Prototype implementation of the computational design (I)  
 
The “display block” visualizes the result of the PCA by showing each design attribute's 
contribution to a chosen pair of principal components, as described in Section 4.2. The 
                                                          
1 The MATLAB environment was chosen for the prototype building because it allows easy 
matrix manipulation, implementation of algorithms, visualization of functions and data, 
and interfacing with other applications (e.g. MS Excel).       
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visualization by MATLAB function biplot() facilitates the interpretation of the principle 
components as user-perceived service attributes. 
 
The negotiation part plays an n-stage Stackelberg game between one user and one supplier: 
it consists of several blocks (see Fig. 4-5). As has been discussed in Section 4.5.1, there are 
two cases regarding information structure. We implemented the first case where the user 
alone owns the PCA mapping P and its pseudo inverse P-1, and thus both the players 
communicate in the design space X about the values of the service attributes during the 
negotiation. 
 
Before each optimization iteration, constraints are updated based on the adversary’s 
service request. The “utility determination” block calculates the utility of each player 
during the negotiation process from the user model (Section 4.3) and the supplier’s 
operational models (Section 4.4). The “maximization” block searches for the maximum 
utility under the specific constraints for each player using the MATLAB, or the NAG1 
optimization functions, or the exhaustive search of Section 4.5.3.1. After each 
maximization, the player makes a decision. The “decision block” contains decision rules 
upon which the players decide whether to continue, or to stop with or without an 
agreement (equilibrium). The player then sends the decision to the counterpart. The reverse 
mapping or direct mapping (see Section 4.5) is done when necessary using the results of 
the statistical analysis block. The “display” block visualizes the negotiation process by 
showing the computed utility of the players during each round of the negotiation, including 
the starting point and the equilibrium point, if it exists (e.g. see Fig. 4-6). The user’s 
choices over a three-dimensional perceptual space can also be plotted.   
 
Regarding the implementation details, the optimization block has two instances of 
implementation. The first one is based on the algorithm of Section 4.5.2, which assumes 
the variables in the computation to be continuous and take real values; NAG optimization 
routine e04ucf() is used, which minimizes an arbitrary smooth function subject to linear 
and nonlinear constraints (a similar MATLAB function fmincon() can also be used). The 
second implementation is based on the discretized negotiation algorithm of Section 4.5.3. 
We use exhaustive research instead of a non-linear optimization routine. The exhaustive 
search does calculations from all possible feasible combinations of the discretized values 
of each variable, and ranks the outputs according to the computed values. If the maximum 
value corresponds to multiple identical outputs, we randomly choose one input that leads 
to the maximum value; priority can also be given to certain variables or to certain 
constraints. 
 
Regarding the computational time, the negotiation computation of the prototype 
implementation of the algorithm in Section 4.5.2, using non-linear optimization routines, 
takes seconds to complete. The computational time of the algorithm with exhaustive search 
(Section 4.5.3) is much longer and depends on the complexity of the supplier’s operational 
model and the discretization rate of the variables. Furthermore, our main program is 
written in MATLAB and the supplier’s operational model is built using MS Excel with 
                                                          
1 Numerical Algorithms Group, a company specializing in the provision of software for the 
solution of mathematical, statistical and data mining problems. 
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lookup tables, IF-THEN rules, plus additional modules such as Erlang traffic calculator, 
the communications between the two software applications consume most of the 
computation time. Thus for the mSinging v2.0 case in Section 4.8, it takes 2-3 minutes on 
average to complete a negotiation computation on a normal desktop pc (2GHz processor, 
1GB RAM). Note that this means a long computation time when Monte Carlo simulation 
is carried out where thousands or tens of thousands of negotiations need to be run (see 
Section 5.2): it may take days to complete. However in real practice, the whole 
computational design can be implemented solely using C or Fortran, which can improve 
computation efficiency and eliminate the communications between different application 
interfaces. Furthermore, the suppliers (e.g. telecom operators) often have or share high 
performance computing facilities, thus the computational time will be significantly 
reduced. 
 
4.7 Case mSinging v1.0: fictive users vs. a fictive supplier  
 
We have created a mobile service with limited service attributes to illustrate the 
computational design and to test the prototype implementation. Our service is called 
“mobile singing classroom” or “mSinging”: it is an extension to the many mobile music 
services and belongs to that category1.  
 
The service allows the users to improve their singing performance by following the 
courses, getting instructions and receiving content chosen by themselves. Users are 
supposed to be just individuals with interests in singing and/or music; the supplier is a 
mobile operator assisted by teachers from music colleges. This is an interesting case for 
this research as it combines wireless bandwidth needs, wireless data traffic, content and 
additional professional services. For experiment and testing purposes, we take the 
approach of having a “simple” working service first and then extend it to much more 
complex situations. We tag the service developed in this section as mSinging v1.0, A much 
more complex version 2.0 will be introduced in Section 4.8.  
 
4.7.1 Individual service description: mSinging v1.0  
 
The mSinging service provides music and vocal training to users via mobile technologies. 
The prerequisite of the service is a mobile device which supports high-end audio functions 
both for recording and listening, and has multiple wireless interfaces (e.g. 2G/3G/WiFi).   
 
To initiate the service, a user first needs to carry out a search (via e.g. Enhanced SMS) in a 
music content database located at the operator’s network, and find out which music lessons 
he would like to follow. After the selection, he can download the music as well as other 
instructional materials via the mobile device to learn and to practice his singing. 
 
Each song has background information such as a brief introduction to the composer, 
introduction to the specific types of music, stories and anecdotes about a particular song, 
                                                          
1 Many operators have already begun to offer mobile music services (Manes, 2005); some 
can even be personalized (e.g. the “Radio DJ” service by Vodafone: 
www.vodafone.de/music), but none of them offer yet individual tariffs. 
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scores and lyrics (supported by music fonts displayed on the mobile device); and an 
interpretation of the song (an example of performance). 
 
Text and audio-based instructions are associated with each song. The content of an 
instruction includes: description of general techniques when interpreting certain music 
“genres”; techniques for building one’s own style; homework or assignment for users to 
practice.  
 
A user can ask questions to a real teacher regarding how to perform a specific part, or he 
can ask a more general question regarding the styles of songs (via e.g. voice call or 
Enhanced SMS). He will receive prompt professional answers from the teachers. 
 
A user can sing to the background music and record it with his high-end mobile device. He 
can send in a recording of his performance for the teacher to evaluate and provide 
feedback. 
 
The service is individual in many ways: type of music, extent of the tutoring, number of 
practices, number of submissions, and contract length.  
 
4.7.2 Fictive supplier and service design attributes 
 
The supplier is a fictive converged fixed and mobile operator who offers both basic 
(generic) and value-added services, where both services can be made individual (see 
Section 4.9 for generic service individualization). In this case, we focus on the 
individualization of the value-added mSinging service.   
 
4.7.2.1 Service design attributes 
 
The mSinging service has nine service design attributes exchanged between the user and 
the supplier: each of the service design attributes corresponds to a decision variable of the 
supplier. Let the decision variables be X = [x1, x2, …, x9]. The service design attributes are:   
 
• x1, the size of the song database, which is measured in thousands of songs.  
• x2, the number of text instructions for each song. Additional instructions provide 
more details on the subject. 
• x3, number of songs to receive and learn per month. 
• x4, length of contract, in months. 
• x5, number of questions user intends to ask teachers during the whole contract 
period. 
• x6, number of evaluations user intends to receive from teachers during the whole 
contract period. 
• x7, download/upload method (pure fixed broadband/mixed/pure wireless, 1-10). 
A user can choose to download the content via fixed or mobile network or a mix 
of them. This option is in line with the current converged service offerings. The 
user can choose from a scale between 1 and 10. The value 1 corresponds to the 
case where all the content is downloaded through the operator’s fixed network 
and 10 all through the operator’s wireless networks. 
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• x8, sound quality of the music (coding rate: 144 - 400kbps). Sound quality of 
music can be indicated by the coding rate of songs; measured in kilobits per 
second (kbps) and ranges from 144 to 400 kbps. Higher coding rates have better 
sound quality but also larger file sizes: they will generate more traffic and will 
cost more.  
• x9, a user’s bid for the individual service in €. The bid is for all the service 
attributes with user-individualized values; the amount is for the whole contract 
period.   
 
4.7.2.2 Supplier constraints and a feasible solution 
 
The supplier’s constraints are all expressed in design space X. In turn, these design 
constraints serve to determine the many detailed engineering constraints which are only 
seen and used by the supplier. We provide more details in mSinging v2.0 in Section 4.8. 
 
The supplier has boundary constraints, which represent the supplier’s region of tolerance 
regarding extreme requests from the users. The supplier also has linear and nonlinear 
constraints, which are mainly concerned with the quality of service (QoS). The operator 
must balance the relationship between the values of the design attributes and other 
engineering attributes (link capacities, etc.) to guarantee a minimum QoS. For example, for 
the mSinging service, the supplier has constraints regarding raw content diversity, teaching 
content diversity, wireless share in the “converged” (wireless, fixed broadband) service 
offering and costs. The supplier must also update some of these constraints based on the 
requests from the user during each round of the negotiation. A feasible solution for the 
supplier is defined as any decision vector in X which satisfies all the supplier’s constraints.  
 
4.7.2.3 Supplier utility function 
 
The supplier’s utility is defined as the incremental profit from serving an additional user 
who has an individual service and tariff request, on top of a pre-existing base of customers 
buying generic services. The incremental profit is decided by the user bid price minus the 
incremental costs from provisioning the infrastructure, the traffic, the content, the 
incremental human resources, and the management and billing according to user-requested 
service characteristics. The incremental human resources include the teachers for 
providing instructions, answering questions and providing feedback to the students.  
 
Since the mSinging service is based on the generic services such as SMS and mobile data, 
the user also has to have a basic subscription with an operator to ensure connectivity. 
Although technically it is feasible to have basic services from another operator, few 
operator are willing to do so: usually the generic service subscription and the optional 
value-added service subscription are sold by the same operator. For the basic subscription, 
the user pays a monthly subscription fee for a bundle of basic services such as voice 
minutes, SMS, MMS and some data traffic. There are several generic service bundles for 
the user to choose from, all with different usage ceilings (e.g. see Table 4-3). To represent 
this effect here in a simplistic way, we assign a coefficient k to the user’s generic service 
bundle: this coefficient represents the fraction of the generic service bundle capacity that 
the user will use for the mSinging service. When calculating the operator’s cost, we first 
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subtract k×(user bundle amount) of usage from the calculation because they have already 
been paid in the generic service bundle (k is set to be 0.3).  
  
Let X’ = [x1, x2,…x8]. As a simplified estimation, let the incremental costs of 
individualized SMS search, data transmission, database maintenance (cost related to the 
size of song base), instructions and individual coaching via questions and evaluations be a 
function of X’, denoted as Δc_SMS(X’), Δc_data(X’), Δc_DB(X’), Δc_instr(X’), 
Δc_question(X’), and Δc_evaluation(X’)1. The supplier’s utility function U_supplier(X), 
to be maximized, is defined as the incremental profit Δ π:  
 
U_supplier(X) = Δ π (X) = x9 - Δc_SMS(X’) - Δc_data(X’) - Δc_DB(X’) - 
Δc_instr(X’) - Δc_question(X’) - Δc_evaluation(X’)   (4-5) 
 
4.7.3 Fictive users 
 
For testing purposes, three different user groups (A, B, C) were created based on the 
different preferences for the mSinging service design attributes. The main characteristics 
of the preferences of these three types of users are shown in Table 4-1.  
 
User type A: Just wants to listen to the music and wants to know how to perform or 
improve his background knowledge of certain types of music. He asks few questions to the 
teacher. The number of songs available is important to him. Due to the fact that it takes 
much less time just to listen to the music than actively learn how to perform, the user can 
download many songs each day. 
  
User type B: Studies actively and spends a lot of time on practicing according to the 
instructions. He is eager to ask questions to improve his performance skill. He would like 
to focus on a certain type of songs. The number of songs the user will download each 
month is small, but at the same time, the user tends to ask a lot of questions. 
  
User type C: Represents the type of user who wants an average level of service attributes 
when compared to the other two types of users. He downloads a moderate number of 
songs, subscribes to a moderate number of instructions and asks a moderate number of 
questions.  
  
Table 4-1: Preference characteristics of the three fictive user groups  
 
User group type Number of songs Number of instructions Number of questions 
A high low low 
B low high high 
C medium medium medium 
 
                                                          
1 There are also internal decision variables in these functions. To keep the explanation 
concise, we omit them here.  Similar examples will be provided in Section 4.8.1.3 
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Each fictive user has a target point, which consists of the jointly chosen values for the 9 
service design attributes, denoted as x0=[ x10, x20, …,x90]. For pilot testing purposes, we 
created 50 fictive users for the mSinging v1.0 case. We will report a large-scale user 
survey that elicits real user preferences in the mSinging v2.0 case (Section 4.8); the survey 
has more than 360 respondents.      
 
4.7.3.1 User perceived service attributes 
 
The user target points were used to compute the principle component analysis mapping 
coefficients. The first three principle components cover 81.07% of the total variances of 
the data, and were chosen as the reductionist mapping coefficient P. For that data set, the 
first component can be interpreted as the price performance of customized content, which 
is the teaching intensity in terms of personal instructions and evaluations. The second 
component can be interpreted as the price performance of raw content (i.e. the content is 
same to everyone) in terms of quantity (i.e. number of songs) and quality (i.e. sound 
quality). The third component can be interpreted as the degree of the service comfort in 
terms of sound quality and mobility. Each of the components corresponds to a perceived 
service attribute of the user for the mSinging service v1.0. 
 
4.7.3.2 User constraints and a feasible solution 
 
The user’s constraints are expressed in the service design space X and later transformed 
into the service perceptual space Z for a given mapping P (see Section 4.3). Some of the 
user’s constraints are unilateral; others will be updated based on the supplier’s offers. We 
describe the constraints using the categorization of the optimization software we use1, 
which classifies the constraints into boundary constraints, linear and non-linear constraints.  
 
1. Boundary constraints in the service design space 
The lower bound and upper bound represent the user’s region of tolerance regarding 
values of the design attributes. These values do not change during the negotiation 
process for a specific user2. When transformed into perceptual space, these boundary 
constraints become linear constraints.  
 
2. Linear and nonlinear constraints in the service design space 
Each user has his own budget constraint and time constraint. At the same time, each 
user has his unique preferences about the service design attributes which may be 
represented by linear or non-linear constraints.  
 
The user’s budget constraint is that the total cost must be less than his available 
budget. The total cost of usage includes: 
1.) basic bundle subscription fee;  
2.) cost of the individualized mSinging v1.0 service;  
                                                          
1 NAG foundation toolbox, non-linear optimization routine e04ucf(). 
2  This condition applies in the normal algorithm introduced in Section 4.5.2. In the 
algorithm with discretization (Section 4.5.3) when resampling is used, the boundary values 
are updated in each iteration.  
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3.) investment in access units (e.g. a mobile device that supports high-end music 
functions). 
We consider the first two factors in our case and the third to be amortized inside the 
generic service bundle, as is the case with most mobile subscriptions (see Section 
4.9.1).   
 
Time constraint: the time the user spends on the mSinging service must be less than 
his available free time. Different attributes of the service take the user different 
amounts of time. For example, it takes on average 5 minutes to listen and comprehend 
one instruction; the length of each song is 10 minutes, etc. If the user’s free available 
time to spend on each song is less than 15 minutes, he cannot pick both attributes but 
may still pick one of them. We have estimations of time consumption of all relevant 
design attributes. 
 
Regarding the individual specific constraints, they can be related to the preferences for 
songs, instruction, questions, etc. Due to space limitations, the constraints are not 
listed here, but they are similar to the constraints listed in Section 4.7.5.  
        
A feasible solution for the user (za) is defined as any decision vector in Z which satisfies 
all the user’s constraints.  
 
4.7.3.3 User utility function 
 
The user’s utility function is defined in the service perceptual space. Let the user’s 
decision variables be Z = [z1, z2, z3], each corresponds to a perceived attribute identified in 
Section 4.7.3.1. The user’s target point t0 in the design space, is mapped into the perceptual 
space by the reductionist mapping coefficient P. Let the mapped target point be z0 = [z10, 
z20, z30], z0 = t0 P.  
 
The assumed behavior, as discussed in Section 3.3, makes the user use implicitly the 
distance-based function as his utility function. The user’s utility function, to be maximized, 
is defined as a function of the Euclidean distance between a feasible solution (za) and the 
target point z0:  
 
U_user(Z) = exp (- || za – z0||) = exp (- sqrt [(z1a- z10)2 + (z2a- z20)2 +(z3a- z30)2])        (4-6) 
 
This utility function is simple and straightforward and can, to a certain degree, reflect the 
irrationality in the user’s behavior. But this function also has its drawbacks. In an 
operational environment, it is advised to use logarithm form utility functions, which have 
higher sensitivity and can lead to a rapid convergence in numerical computations. 
Furthermore, the scale of the utility function is bounded and independent of the user. A 
user-specific constant may be introduced as a multiplier to bring the user’s utility to the 
same level as the supplier’s. Although this does not affect the Stackelberg game outcome, 
where the user and the supplier optimize in their own decision space, it may affect the 
results of the Pareto computation, which we discuss later in Section 4.7.5.   
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4.7.4 Numerical results of Stackelberg negotiation game 
 
The supplier’s public offer of the mSinging v1.0 service is listed in Table 4-2. The generic 
service bundles upon which the mSinging v1.0 is based are listed in Table 4-3. The 
coefficient k (Section 4.7.2.3) is set to 0.3. We use the normal negotiation algorithm 
presented in Section 4.5.2 in the computation. 
 
Table 4-2: Supplier’s public offer, mSinging v1.0 
 
Service attributes Pubic offer 
Database size (thousand songs) 1.5 
Number of instructions/song  3 
Number of songs/month  4 
Length of contract (in months) 4 
Number of questions (contract period) 8 
Number of evaluations (contract period)  4 
Download/upload method (fixed/mixed/mobile, 1-10) 6 
Sound quality of the music (coding rate: 144 -  400kbps) 210 
User’s bid for the service in € (contract period) 200 
 
Table 4-3: Generic service bundles upon which the mSinging v1.0 service is based 
 
Basic bundles Max. voice minutes Max. data traffic (MB) Max. sms €/month 
1 100 20 100 20 
2 150 40 150 30 
3 200 70 200 40 
4 300 100 300 50 
 
Fig. 4-6 shows a negotiation process between a user and the supplier. The user starts the 
negotiation and his requests are represented by the points with odd numbering; the 
supplier’s counter-offers are represented by crosses with even numbering. The coordinates 
of each point/cross are the values of the utilities that the user and the supplier have reached 
from the request and counter-offer. A point (e.g. point 1) and a cross (e.g. cross 2) make up 
of one stage of the game. The equilibrium of this Stackelberg negotiation game is reached 
at point 11 (stage 6 of the game). It is a win-win outcome for both players when compared 
to the pay-offs derived from the initial public tariff. Fig. 4-7 shows how the user’s requests 
evolve in the perceptual space Z. 
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Fig. 4-6: The Stackelberg negotiation game between a fictive user and a fictive supplier, 
mSinging v1.0  
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Price performance of
personalized content
Public offer
← Target point
← Stackelberg EQ6
5
4
3
2
1
Price performance of
 raw content
 
D
eg
re
e 
of
 
se
rv
ic
e 
co
m
fo
rt
Public offer (initial point)
Target point
user choices
 
Fig. 4-7: User’s requests at different stages of the Stackelberg negotiation game in 
perceptual space, mSinging v1.0 
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We have created three representative users (a, b, c) whose preferences are close to the 
three types of users identified in Section 4.7.3.2. These users are, however, not the 50 
fictive users created for the PCA learning survey (Section 4.7.3). The users’ (a, b, c) 
respective target points and final Stackelberg negotiation equilibrium points are shown in 
Table 4-4. N.B. this table gives equilibrium results which are not always integers when 
they should be: see Section 4.8 and Table 4-10.  
 
Table 4-4: User target points, Stackelberg negotiation game equilibrium points, mSinging 
v1.0 
 
Service attributes Initial points Final equilibrium points 
 
 user 
   a           b        c 
user  
     a             b              c 
Database size (thousand songs) 5 1 6 5.3 0.8 5.1 
Number of instructions/song  1 6 2 0 5.7 1.7 
Number of songs/month  20 3 15 24.6 2.2 13.9 
Length of contract (in months) 3 6 5 2.2 5.7 5.1 
Number of questions (contract 
period) 
5 18 10 2.4 22.1 14.8 
Number of evaluations 
(contract period)  
0 6 5 0 7.8 5.1 
Download/upload method 
(fixed/mixed/mobile, 1-10) 
8 3 5 6.2 3.9 7.1 
Sound quality of the music 
(coding rate: 144 -  400kbps) 
224 330 196 189.8 291.9 227.7 
User’s bid for the service in € 
(contract period) 
150 360 350 112.4 377.7 320.8 
 
Table 4-5: Stackelberg negotiation game results when compared to the public offer from 
different users, mSinging v1.0 
 
User Services and tariffs Utilities Results 
  user supplier user supplier 
a public offer (initial) 0.33 46 
 individual service & tariff (final) 0.78 76.88 
win win 
b public offer (initial) 0.05 40.87 
 individual service & tariff (final) 0.61 66.85 
win win 
c public offer (initial) 0.34 46 
 individual service & tariff (final) 0.77 1.01 
win lose 
 
The negotiation, when comparing the final utilities to those derived from the initial public 
offer, can lead to win-win or win-lose situations for the user and the supplier respectively. 
Table 4-5 shows the comparisons for the three representative users a, b and c. The user, as 
the leader of the game, always achieves gain. The differences in gains between different 
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users stem from their different preferences and constraints. The supplier achieves better 
results in two cases but a worse result in one case. In these negotiations, the operator uses 
the same constraint update mechanism and therefore treats all the users similarly.  
 
4.7.5 Pareto equilibrium calculation 
 
The user-supplier Stackelberg negotiation game is an incomplete information game that 
has a non-cooperative nature (Section 3.4), which usually prevents full Pareto-efficiency. 
For comparison purposes, we calculate the Pareto equilibrium set (also called Pareto 
frontier) by assuming the user and the supplier have full information about each other.  
 
It is well known that the Pareto equilibria, if they exist, belong necessarily to the compact 
set of solutions of an optimization problem which has, as a goal function, a convex 
weighing of the two players’ utilities (assumed to be continuous) (Mas-Colell, Whinston & 
Green, 1995). We introduce a convex allocation coefficient λ, ranging from 0 to 1. The λ 
dependent combined goal can be written as: 
 
total_utility(X) = λ× U_user(Z) + (1- λ) × U_supplier(X)                              (4-7) 
 
In our conceptual framework and computational model, the supplier optimizes in the 
design space X with the decision variables x1, x2,…, x9 (see definitions in Section 4.7.2.1). 
The user optimizes in perceptual space Z with the decision variables z1, z2, z3 (see 
interpretations in Section 4.7.3.1). In order to calculate the Pareto optimal set, the two 
players’ utilities must be optimized in the same space. Given the mapping relationship P 
between the two spaces (Section 4.7.3.1), we use linear combinations of x1, x2,…, x9 to 
represent the user’s decision variables z1, z2, z3.  Let the mapping of the user’s feasible 
point za in the service design space be xf. We assume that the players have full information 
about each other (see Section 4.5.1 for discussion on the information structure). 
 
The user’s utility function has the numerical range of (0,1], while the supplier’s utility 
level is unbounded. This will cause problems during the optimization, where the supplier’s 
utility will dominate the solutions. One solution is to equalize the players’ utility functions 
by multiplying the user’s utility with a coefficient (here 160). Given formulae 4-5, 4-6 and 
4-7, the target function can be written as:  
 
total_utility(X) = λ × 160 × exp (- || xa – x0||) + (1- λ) × Δ profit(X)                      (4-8) 
 
We randomly select a negotiation in the mSinging v1.0 case that reaches a Stackelberg 
equilibrium, and use the constraints and decision rules of that user to calculate the Pareto 
equilibrium set. N.B the constraints need to have slight modifications when used in the 
Pareto calculation. The result is shown in Fig. 4-8. The frontier is not continuous, which 
means there is no feasible solution for certain allocation coefficients meeting the 
conditions of the theorem cited above. The Stackelberg game equilibrium is an 
improvement over the public service and tariff, but it is not on the Pareto frontier and 
therefore not Pareto efficient.  
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Fig. 4-8: Assumed Pareto set derived by convex optimization, for the negotiation game 
between a fictive user and a fictive supplier, mSinging v1.0 
 
Lagrange multipliers  
The Lagrange multiplier values (shadow values) can, among other uses, help to show 
which constraints are binding, which in turn can be used to adjust the parameters in the 
constraints. Table 4-6 gives a list of Lagrange multipliers at the Pareto equilibria solutions 
when λ takes values of 0.0001, 0.4501 and 1 respectively. See Table 4-7 for the 
explanations of the constraints.   
 
Table 4-6: Lagrange multipliers of different constraints at Pareto equilibria solutions of the 
parametric optimization of equation (4-8)  
 
λ binding constraints 
 
Lagrange multiplier value at optimum 
λ=0.0001   
 n2 -2.336 
 n5 -0.6841 
 l1 -0.3598 
 l2 -0.283 
 b2 0.2443 
 n1 3.01E-02 
 b8 -1.63E-03 
λ =0.4501   
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 n2 31.49 
 l2 4,735 
 n7 -2,230 
 l1 -0.6793 
 n1 -0.40 
 n5 5.09E-02 
 n6 1.91E-02 
λ =1   
 n2 70.06 
 l2 10.84 
 n7 -4,903 
 l1 -1,131 
 n5 0.95 
 n1 0.0247 
n: nonlinear constraints; l: linear constraints; b: boundary constraints 
 
Table 4-7: List of constraints in the Pareto equilibrium computation of equation (4-8) 
 
Constraints lower bound upper bound 
Boundary constraints  
b1 Size of the database (measured in Ksongs) 0.1 15 
b2 Number of instructions student requests for each 
song  
0 15 
b3 Number of songs per month  1 10 
b4 Length of contract (month) 1 20 
b5 Number of questions the student asks during the 
whole contract period 
0 100 
b6 Number of performance evaluations the student 
intends to have during the whole contract period  
0 100 
b7 Download/upload method (mobile/fixed/mixed, 
1-10) 
1 10 
b8 Sound quality of the music downloaded (coding 
rate: 144-400 kbps/s) 
144 400 
b9 User’s bid for the individual service in € (contract 
period) 
5 500 
Linear constraints   
l1 User’s budget constraint 0 400 
l2 Minimum number of evaluations from the teacher 
per month 
0 4 
Nonlinear constraints   
n1 More content is distributed via the mobile 
terminal when student wants to have more 
instructions from the teacher  
-4 0 
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n2 Size of database is proportional to how many 
songs the user wants in total for his contract 
period 
0.08 0.21 
n3 The level of personal tutoring (questions, 
evaluations) should be set according to the 
requirements from the student 
1.15 2 
n4 Number of songs to download should be set 
according to user's requirement 
16 25 
n5 Price should less than 1.5 × cost -30 0 
n6 User's time constraint (minutes): the time 
consumption of the service should not exceed the 
user’s available time but can be less than it. 
-138 0 
n7 Price per song should be set according to user's 
requirement 
16 23 
 
4.8 Case mSinging v2.0: realistic users vs. realistic supplier 
 
In this section, we present the negotiations between a group of realistic users and a realistic 
supplier. Based on the mobile singing classroom service described in Section 4.7, we 
create an updated version. The updated mSinging (v2.0) modifies the design attributes 
according to some of the comments we received from the previous version. We carried out 
a large-scale survey to elicit the real users’ preferences during the service design. The most 
important change is that we developed a close-to-real supplier’s incremental cost and 
revenue model, which quantifies the consequences of an individual user’s service requests.  
  
4.8.1 Realistic supplier and the service design attributes 
 
The supplier of mSinging v2.0 is an operator, as it is in the mSinging v1.0. The close-to-
real supplier’s model is based on estimates from a real telecommunication system 
supplier’s data, and additional parameters were fitted to a real mobile operator’s operations 
(more details will be discussed later this section).  
 
4.8.1.1 Service design attributes 
 
The mSinging v2.0 has seven design attributes X=[x1, x2, …, x7], and each of them 
corresponds to a decision variable of the supplier. The seven design attributes in turn drive 
the values of about 70 engineering design parameters for the supplier. The seven individual 
service design attributes are:  
 
• x1, contract period (1-). The user can specify his ideal contract length for the 
mSinging service; the unit is months. 
• x2, degree of use of a mobile terminal from a converged operator (1-10). A 
converged operator offers fixed, broadband and mobile services in one service 
contract. The user can choose a number from 1-10, where 1 indicates that he 
wants all the content of the mSinging service to be downloaded via fixed 
internet (which means no mobility and cheapness). The value 10 indicates that 
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all the content is downloaded using a mobile terminal (which means higher 
mobility and expensiveness). A number from 2-9 means a mixture of fixed and 
mobile usage, with a larger number indicating a higher degree of wireless usage. 
• x3, sound quality of music (1-10). The user can choose a number between 1-10. 
The value 1 indicates the lowest sound quality of music (e.g. normal mp3) and 
the smallest music file size. The value 10 indicates the best sound quality of 
music (e.g. CD quality) and the biggest music file size. 
• x4, number of evaluations to have during the contract period (0- ). The user can 
choose not to have any evaluation by setting the parameter to 0. 
• x5, number of questions to ask during the contract period (0- ). The user can 
choose not to ask any question by setting the parameter to 0. 
• x6, number of songs to download in total during the contract duration (1- ). The 
user can specify how many songs he wants to learn or download in total for the 
whole contract period. 
• x7, user’s bid tariff for the individual service in € for the whole contract period.  
 
4.8.1.2 Constraints and decision rules 
 
The constraints of mSinging v2.0 are similar to those described in the mSinging v1.0 
service, which are listed in Table 4-7. There are linear, nonlinear, static and dynamic 
constraints for the supplier. We use the decision rules described in Section 4.5.2 and set the 
supplier’s minimum profit threshold θ to 0. 
 
4.8.1.3 Supplier model and utility function 
 
The supplier model is an instantiation of the realistic supplier’s model developed in 
Section 4.4.2. The model is tailored to the mSinging service v2.0. The inputs of the model 
are the decision variables that represent the service design attributes. The output is the 
supplier’s incremental operational profit from the provisioning of that individual service 
design before overheads. As explained earlier in Section 4.4.2, we distinguish between 
decision variables, parameters and constants in the supplier’s model: 
 
• Decision variables: each variable represents a service design attribute, the value 
of which is exchanged between the supplier and users. In the mSinging service 
v2.0, these are: X=[x1, x2, …, x7]. Let X’ = [x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7], and x1 
represents contract length, x7 represent the user’s bid price (Section 4.8.1.1). 
• Parameters: other than the explicitly stated input X, there are also implicit 
engineering parameters that need to be set during the service design phase1. 
Such engineering parameters are often computed on the basis of the service 
design attributes, and their number is about 70 in the mSinging v2.0 case. Such 
parameters include the assumed subscriber base (N) for the mSinging service; 
the content diversity factor, which is the number of different content catalogs of 
minimum song database size; the user diversity factor, which is the expected 
ratio of diverse users of diverse songs; the coefficient k, which is the generic 
bundle capacity proportion used (see Section 4.7.2.3); and the service 
                                                          
1 They are also called the “internal decision variables”. 
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provisioning speed, which is the effective access bandwidth available to the 
user. Some parameters are static, which means they must be decided in advance; 
other parameters can be decided based on user-specific demands. 
• Constants: Constants can generally be divided into three categories: 
infrastructure, content and service. In the infrastructure category, the data 
include access technology-specific capacity constants; the capacity of core 
network components; charging and billing data formats; and content storage 
costs. In the content category, the data include the estimated file size of the 
content: this can be used, for example, in estimating the download time over the 
air interface, or can be used in estimating the storage cost; the content 
distribution fee; and the royalty fee. The service category includes the 
minimum/maximum wage of the teachers. In total, we have about 60 constants. 
The data is either obtained from industry specifications, or from vendors’ 
proprietary products, or from common practices (e.g. music coding 
format/coding rate).  
 
To provide the mSinging service, the supplier needs to make various investments and pay 
for the operational costs (Section 4.4.2). Table 4-8 summarizes the investment objects and 
service operations objects that are modeled in the mSinging v2.0 service.  
 
Table 4-8: Investment and service operations objects, mSinging v2.0 
 
Investment objects Service operations objects 
1. communication infrastructure 1. tutoring                                    
2. storage (content) 2. CRM and billing 
3. content (initial music + new music) 3. content (management) 
4. content (instruction) 4. infrastructure 
5. application software  
 
Investment objects  
 
• Infrastructure, C1(X’): The estimation of the infrastructure-related investments 
is based on the assumed subscriber base (N); the investment is technology 
dependent. We assume access to four different wireless technologies: 
2G/2.5G/3G/B3G. Each has an effective bandwidth, and each access technology 
needs an incremental investment for serving the assumed user base, which 
includes the BTS, BSC, MGW, routing and the transmission investments. The 
specific wireless technology provided by the supplier is decided as a function of 
the user’s desired music quality (x3) and user’s bid price (x7). The principle is 
that a user who has a higher willingness to pay can access networks with higher 
bandwidth, which have also shorter download times. Certain combinations are 
eliminated: for example, when the user requires the best quality of music while 
bidding very low price. This implies that large files must be transferred over low 
bandwidth networks (according to the principle mentioned above); for the 
supplier, this may cause network congestion in the low bandwidth networks; for 
the user, the long download time may be an unpleasant experience; therefore 
this combination is not offered to the user. Congestion and blocking are 
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explicitly computed via Erlang formulae inside the model. Communication 
equipment usually lasts for quite a long period when compared to the contract 
length of a value-added service. In our model, the life spans of the investment 
objects that belong to the infrastructure category are set to be 15 years. Because 
there are many objects inside this class of investment in infrastructure, to 
facilitate a clear presentation, we use a simple notation to represent this whole 
class of investment objects, denoted as C1(X’).  
• Content storage cost, C2(X’): The content storage-related investment is 
decided by the needed storage capacity and the basic storage infrastructure. 
Storage capacity cannot be increased in continuous increments, but only by 
adding servers with a fixed minimal capacity. We model this and the declining 
necessary incremental storage unit investment by assigning a basic storage 
capacity to the mSinging service, which has a higher tariff per storage unit: the 
tariff for the capacity exceeding the limit is set to be lower. The needed storage 
capacity is decided by size of the music content catalog, the size of each song 
before compression for mobile distribution and the size of the audio 
instructions. The music content catalog size is decided by the content diversity 
factor and the user diversity factor, and can also be affected by the expected 
number of songs the user wants to download. We set the life span of storage 
equipment to be 5 years and represent this class of investment by C2(X’). 
• Content music, C3(X’): The music content related investments includes the 
initial content setup investment and new content acquisition investments. The 
initial content setup includes a certain number of songs accessible to the initial 
assumed subscriber base. The needed new content is decided by the content 
catalog size. Because the total investment in a new song can be very expensive 
and also because music production is not the core business of an operator, we 
assume that the supplier will only invest a share in the song creation (e.g. 5%). 
In this way, he can have full access to the latest content. Furthermore, the 
supplier needs also to pay the royalties for the songs. Some types of music 
content (e.g. pop) depreciate quite fast. Here we assume the life span of the 
content to be 2 years, and let this class of investment be C3(X’). 
• Content instruction, C4(X’): This category consists of two investment objects: 
the investment in producing instructions for each song in the catalog and the 
investment in developing special software for instruction purposes. (e.g. to read 
music scores on a mobile phone); the former is decided by the catalog size and 
the cost of producing one instruction. We assume the life span of this 
investment class to be 5 years. The investment class is represented by C4(X’).  
• Income from the share of investment, D1(X’): The supplier’s investment in 
music content will generate income in the format of royalty fees. Typically, the 
royalty fee is settled on a yearly basis. This is a rather long period when 
compared to the expected length of contract from the users (see Section 7.2.2) 
and is thus categorized as a CAPEX. Because this is an income for the supplier, 
it should be subtracted from the cost, denoted the yearly income as D1(X’).  
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Service operations objects 
 
• Tutoring, O1(X’): The supplier needs to hire music teachers to answer specific 
questions from students and to evaluate their singing performance. The time 
spent on one user can be estimated by the number of questions (x5), the number 
of evaluations (x4) the user requests, the average time to answer a question and 
the average time to perform an evaluation. We also consider that there are 
differences in the teachers’ wages due to their experience; we assign a higher 
probability to the condition that low-wage teachers will be hired. The total cost 
of the tutoring is decided by the time a user demands and the expected wage of a 
music teacher. Let the cost of this class of service operations objects be O1(X’).    
• CRM and billing data storage, O2(X’): This operational cost is technology 
dependent because the different access technologies use different call record 
formats (i.e. Call Data Records - CDR, Internet Protocol Detailed Records - 
IPDR), which have different sizes and require different storage space. Inside 
each technology, the cost is proportional to contract length (x1). Due to EU 
regulations1, the data must be kept for a period between 6 and 24 months, which 
adds to the storage cost. Let the monthly cost of this class of service operations 
objects be O2(X’).   
• Content management fee, O3(X’): There are increasing costs associated with 
the number of songs that the user requires (x6) regarding the management cost 
of the content (the cost per song increases as the number of songs the user 
requires increase). Denote the monthly cost of this class as O3(X’). 
• Infrastructure O4(X’) The supplier needs to pay for the maintenance of the 
incremental transmission capacity cost in the core network; there are also 
possible incremental maintenance costs in the media gateway, switches, routers, 
and civil engineering. Most of the costs are wireless communication standards 
dependent; they are also proportion to contract length (x1). Let the monthly cost 
of this class of service operations objects be O4(X’). 
 
The detailed relationship of the parameters, the constants, the service design attributes and 
the cost objects mentioned above is illustrated in Fig. 4-9. Note that the decision variable 
“contract length” is related to costs of most of the investment and service operations 
objects because the supplier’s incremental cost needs to be attributed to contract length. 
But due to space limits, we do not draw this variable as frequently as it should be but only 
show it when it is related to certain internal decision variables.   
 
The supplier’s incremental profit 
 
We assume that the user base of the mSinging v2.0 service (N) to be 104. According to 
formula (4-1) and the different depreciation rates given above, the incremental investment 
from serving an additional individual user of mSinging v2.0, denoted as ΔCAPEX (X), is 
estimated as: 
 
 
                                                          
1 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 15 March, 2006. 
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ΔCAPEX (X) = 
(dep(C1(X’)) + depC2(X’)) + dep(C3(X’)) + dep(C4(X’)) - dep(D1(X’))) × x 1 /104    (4-9)  
 
Let the marginal production elasticity associated with each investment object class be α1 
=0.65, α2=0.4, α3=0.41, α4=0.5. The scaling factor β is set to be 0.01. Based on formula (4-
2), the incremental infrastructure and content-linked operational costs of mSinging v2.0 
can be written as:   
 
Δ infrastructure and content-linked operational costs (X) = 
          (βC1(X’)α1 × β C2 (X’)α2 × β C3 (X’)α3 ×  β C4 (X’)α4) / 104                      (4-10) 
 
According to formula (4-3), the incremental service operations provisioning costs are 
estimated to be: 
 
Δ service operations provisioning costs (X) =  
          O1(X’)+ (O2(X’)+ O3(X’)+ O4(X’)) × x1                                                                             (4-11) 
 
The supplier’s utility is the incremental profit (Δπ) from serving an additional user of 
mSinging v2.0, which can be estimated based on formulae 4-9, 4-10, 4-11 as:   
 
Δ π (X) = x7 – ΔCAPEX (X) - Δ infrastructure and content-linked operational costs (X) – 
          Δ service operations provisioning costs (X)                                             (4-12) 
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4.8.2 Realistic users 
 
In contrast to the case of mSinging v1.0 with fictive users (Section 4.7.3), a large-scale 
survey was carried out in the mSinging 2.0 case among the students at RSM. The survey 
provided a realistic characterization of user preferences. The obtained data have been 
divided into two sets. We use one set of the data to generate the PCA mapping coefficients 
P (the data set is called “PCA learning data set”, see Section 4.2); we use the other set of 
data later in Section 5.2.4 to randomize the data points as a preliminary step to carrying out 
the Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the supplier’s value at risk (the data set is called 
“target point distribution data set”).  
 
The survey procedure is as follows: we first familiarized the participants with the concept 
of individual services and tariffs by giving them examples of existing personalizable 
mobile services provided by operators. We also pointed out the limitations of these offers. 
Next, we presented an experimental setting similar to the popular “Idol” show in which 
students were signed up by their friends. The students needed to train themselves but they 
had very limited time and budget, and their singing techniques were at different levels. In 
the third step, we introduced the mSinging service (v2.0) to the students as a solution to the 
above problem they were facing. A public offer by a supplier was supplied. Students who 
were not satisfied with the offer were given the opportunity to have individualized services 
and tariffs; they were asked to state their desired values of the service attributes in service 
design space (a.k.a. user target point x0 in design space). A detailed survey setting and 
service description is in Appendix II.  
 
We collected 599 valid results, of which 88 participants indicated no interest in individual 
services and tariffs and therefore were eliminated from the data set. We randomly divided 
the remaining 511 valid results into two data sets: the PCA learning set (with 150 valid 
student results) and the target point randomization set (with 361 valid student results).  
 
4.8.2.1 Perceived attributes of surveyed users 
 
We perform a principle component analysis on the 150 students’ target points of the 
service design attributes. The result is shown in Table 4-9. The first three principle 
components explain 67.3% of the variance of the student’s preferences; the first four 
components explain almost 80% of variance. We need to decide whether to retain the first 
three or four components. Besides the total accounted variance, another rule of thumb 
method to determine the number of principle components is the “scree plot” method (see 
Lattin et al, 2003, p. 113). This method involves plotting the variance accounted for by 
each component in a decreasing order. We then look for an “elbow” in the curve: a point 
after which the remaining eigenvalues decline approximately linearly, and retain the 
components prior to the elbow. On this basis, (see also Fig. 4-10), we decide to take only 
the first three components. 
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Table 4-9: Variance explained by each principle component, mSinging v2.0 
 
Principle components 
 
Eigenvalues 
             Total          % of Variance      Cumulative variance % 
1 2.284 32.631 32.631 
2 1.399 19.982 52.613 
3 1.026 14.652 67.265 
4 .885 12.645 79.910 
5 .652 9.308 89.218 
6 .513 7.324 96.542 
7 .242 3.458 100.000 
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Fig. 4-10: Scree plot of the Eigenvalue of each principle component, mSinging v2.0  
 
The interpretation of the principle components was carried out following the procedure 
described in Section 4.2. We also held some joint discussions with the survey respondents 
regarding their perceived service attributes. Fig. 4-11 shows the projection of the service 
design attributes onto the coordinate system formed by the 1st and the 2nd principle 
components. Each design attribute is represented by a vector; each user target point (here: 
target points from the 150 students) is also projected onto this new coordinate system and 
is represented by a dot.  
 
Figures 4-12, 4-13 and 4-14 provide a detailed zoomed view of the projection of the design 
attributes onto the coordinate systems formed by the 1st and 2nd, 1st and 3rd, 2nd and 3rd 
principle components respectively.   
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Fig. 4-11: Projection of the service design attributes onto the coordinate system defined by 
the 1st and 2nd principle components, with all 150 data points 
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Fig. 4-12: Projection of the service design attributes onto the coordinate system defined by 
the 1st and 2nd principle components  
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Fig. 4-13: Projection of the service design attributes onto the coordinate system defined by 
the 1st and 3rd principle components  
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Fig. 4-14: Projection of the service design attributes onto the coordinate system defined by 
the 2nd and 3rd principle components  
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Based on Figures 4-12, 4-13, 4-14, we have the following interpretation of the first three 
principle components as the perceived service attributes:  
 
1. price performance of the teaching content in terms of personal instruction and 
evaluations;  
2. service comfort in terms of ubiquity and sound quality together; 
3. service flexibility in terms of contract length and quality of raw music. 
 
Compared to the preference data and the interpretation of the perceived service attributes 
of mSinging v1.0, the data of v2.0 exhibit higher heterogeneity. And the interpretation for 
v2.0 is slightly different and much more difficult. This is expected because the former data 
are fictive while the latter data are from the real world.   
 
4.8.2.2 Constraints, decision rules and utility function  
 
The user’s constraints are similar to those in the mSinging v1.0 described in Section 
4.7.3.2 and listed in Table 4-7. There are linear, nonlinear, static and dynamic constraints 
for the user. The user sticks to the decision rules given in Section 4.5.2. 
 
Let the user’s decision variables be Z = [z1, z2, z3], and each corresponds to a perceived 
attribute identified above. The user’s target point t0, which was specified in the design 
space, was mapped into the perceptual space by the reductionist mapping coefficient P 
determined in Section 4.8.2.1. Let the mapped target point be z0 = [z10, z20, z30]. Note that 
the decision variables will be discretized in the computation.   
 
The assumed behavior as discussed in Section 3.3 makes the user select implicitly the 
distance as the basis of his utility function. Thus the utility function, to be maximized, is 
defined as the function of the Euclidean distance between a feasible point (za) and the 
target point z0 in the perceptual space. The maximum/minimum value of the function is 
1/0. The same remarks on this function as in Section 4.7.3.3 apply here. 
 
U_user(Z) = exp (- || za – z0||) = exp (- sqrt [(z1a- z10)2 + (z2a- z20)2+ (z3a- z30)2])       (4-13) 
 
4.8.3 Numerical results of Stackelberg negotiation game 
 
For a user whose preferences for the mSinging v2.0 service are close to those leading to 
the mapping P in Section 4.8.2.1, we compute the equilibrium of the Stackelberg 
negotiation game using the prototype implementation (Section 4.6) with the algorithm 
presented in Section 4.5.3.2, and the supplier’s incremental cost and revenue model 
developed in Section 4.8.1.3.  
 
Fig. 4-15 shows the negotiation process between such a user and the realistic supplier. The 
starting point is the public offer. The notations are similar to those in Section 4.7.4. The 
equilibrium of the Stackelberg game is reached at point 19 after 9 rounds of negotiation. It 
is a win-lose outcome when compared to the pay-offs from public offer: the user achieves 
a gain while the supplier is slightly worse off.  
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Recall that in the mSinging v1.0 case, we distinguish three types of users (Section 4.7.3.1): 
type A users are mainly interested in the music content and they pay little attention to the 
teaching materials; type B users learn in an active mode and are eager to ask questions and 
have evaluations to improve their performance skill; type C users are interested in both the 
music and teaching content. Such different types of users can also be found amongst the 
surveyed users in the mSinging v2.0 service. We randomly generated three users whose 
preferences represent the three types of users respectively (see Section 5.2.1 for the 
approach by which we generate the user preference). We compute the Stackelberg game 
negotiation equilibria of the users. The users’ revealed preferences, the supplier’s public 
offer and the final negotiation equilibria are shown in Table 4-10. 
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Fig. 4-15: The Stackelberg negotiation game between a realistic user and a realistic 
supplier, mSinging v2.0 
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Table 4-10: User revealed preferences, public offer and final game equilibrium points, 
mSinging v2.0 
 
Service attributes  Initial user 
requests 
Initial 
public 
offer 
Final 
negotiation EQ 
points 
 User 
 a          b         c  
 User  
 a         b        c  
Contract duration in month(s)  3 6 4 4 5 8 5 
Degree of use of mobile terminal (1-10)  7 7 7 6 9 7 6 
Sound quality of the music (1-10) 10 9 5 5 7 7 6 
Number of evaluations to have during 
contract period 
3 15 5 4 2 14 5 
Number of questions to ask during 
contract period 
6 25 8 8 5 23 7 
Number of songs to download in total 60 30 16 16 81 54 34 
User proposed bundle price (€) 200 280 210 150 176 284 184 
 
The negotiation results can be a win-win or win-lose situation when compared to the 
public offer (Table 4-11). The users, as leaders of the games, achieve gains. The relative 
improvements over the initial public offer utilities differ significantly, as the users’ 
requests are heterogeneous. The supplier is better-off in one negotiation but worse off in 
two. The supplier’s worst payoff is actually limited by the minimum profit threshold θ, 
which is set to 0.  
 
Table 4-11: Stackelberg negotiation game results when compared to the public offer from 
different users, mSinging v2.0 
 
User Services and tariffs Utilities Results 
  user supplier user supplier 
a public offer (initial) 0.07 10.23 
 individual service & tariff (final) 0.21 16.35 
win win 
b public offer (initial) 0.02 9.65 
 individual service & tariff (final) 0.27 3.49 
win lose 
c public offer (initial) 0.55 9.55 
 individual service & tariff (final) 0.80 8.03 
win lose 
 
4.9 Generic mobile services 
 
4.9.1 Introduction 
 
A typical mobile operator offers 5-30 service bundles: each bundle has a set of bounded 
standardized service usages and a tariff for some duration, plus excess usage conditions. 
The bundle may cover usage within ceilings for voice minutes, SMS, MMS and/or a 
certain amount of data traffic, plus limited customer support. A user chooses a service 
bundle, signs a contract (minimum duration is often fixed by supplier lasting 1 or 2 years), 
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receives possibly an upgrade to an existing mobile terminal, and pays a fixed monthly fee 
corresponding to the chosen bundle. Additional tariffs for usage exceeding the “bounded” 
ceilings of the chosen bundle vary slightly among bundles, but usually an overprice applies 
to the excess usage, unless sometimes unlimited usage of a certain service is offered within 
specified hour/date/destination combinations. As discussed in Section 1.2, the limited 
segmentation often leaves a significant number of demands from the users unsatisfied 
 
This section deals with the individualization of a common generic mobile service bundle. 
Generic mobile services differ from value-added mobile services by usually having a much 
larger number of customers, so that the pre-existing installed base is much larger than the 
ones used in Section 4.4. The result of this research setting can be used by users who want 
only individualized generic services, or it can be used in connection to the negotiation of a 
value-added service which uses some of the generic service attributes, as in the case in 
Section 4.8.   
 
4.9.2 Behavioral models 
 
In the same way as with the user behavioral model in Section 3.3, the user is characterized 
by having both economic and social concerns when designing an individual generic service 
bundle. He has bounded rationality and uses a simplified decision model with satisficing 
decision rules. 
 
To reduce the complexity for the user in service design, we introduced earlier the concept 
of a service perceptual space (Section 3.3), which is a reductionist mapping of a service 
design space. The reductionist mapping is, however, not necessary when the user and 
supplier jointly design a generic mobile service bundle for the user. Most of the time, the 
service bundle consists of straightforward and well understood services such as voice, 
SMS and data. Other attributes of the service bundle include contract length and price per 
month. The number of service attributes to be individualized is only between three and 
five; therefore the service perceptual space is not used here1. The supplier and user share 
the same generic service bundle design space for the negotiation, which is also their 
decision space. However, like in Section 4.4.2, the supplier will still have for his internal 
use a large number of engineering attributes for this generic service bundle. 
 
The supplier is a mobile operator characterized by seeking a maximum profit with a 
minimum risk.   
 
4.9.3 Computational models 
 
The computational models of the user and the supplier are similar to those presented in 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4.2. The approximated supplier’s model in Section 4.4.2 and prototype 
implementation from Section 4.6 can be used directly with minor modifications, which are 
mainly to the traffic estimation and congestion aspects. It is used however with a far 
                                                          
1  Evidence from empirical research has shown that although information processing 
capability varies among individuals, the limit lies between five and nine distinctive 
information cues. See Miller (1956), “The magic number of seven, plus or minus two”. 
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greater number of users in the installed base than in Section 4.4.2: typically, the additional 
user will be an increment to an existing base of many millions.  
 
The supplier usually publishes a list of generic service bundle offers (see an example in 
Table 4-12). Each bundle has consumption ceilings of the generic services, contract 
duration and a unique bundle price. Let the bundle that is closest to the user’s wish 
(targeted situation) be the initial public offer for the negotiation, denoted as s0. The 
closeness is determined by the Euclidean distance from the offer to the user’s target point 
t0. If the user’s target point has equal distance to two offers, he randomly picks one offer. 
 
4.9.4 Negotiation algorithm  
 
The negotiation algorithm is similar to the algorithms introduced in Section 4.5, and the 
user and the supplier use the same decision rules as in Section 4.5. The main difference is 
that in the generic service bundle negotiation, the user’s constraints, maximization and 
decisions are all in the same service design space as the supplier; thus mapping between 
the different spaces in the algorithms in Section 4.5 is not necessary.   
 
Let i = 1,2 , …, k represent the round of negotiation (i-th stage of the game). The 
negotiation algorithm with discretization but without service attribute mapping is 
illustrated in Fig. 4-16. 
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Fig. 4-16: The Stackelberg negotiation game algorithm for individualization of a generic 
mobile service bundle 
 
4.9.5 Case 
 
We develop a case to evaluate the computational design for the negotiation of individual 
generic mobile service bundles. The key difference with current practices as described in 
Section 4.9.1 is that now there is no need to choose between discrete bundles of the same 
basic services (e.g. voice, SMS, MMS, data), but the user negotiates instead with a supplier 
a tailored bundle meeting his individualized usage, price and duration demands. This 
means that unused service quotas because of discrete bundle design and choices can be 
vastly reduced and that the user does not pay for things he does not use. Also a dynamic 
adaptation can take place, as the user can adapt his service demand ceilings each time a 
new contract is renegotiated (e.g. a contract for the holiday months and another one for the 
usual working months). Furthermore, the user also can avoid tying himself up to long fixed 
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durations like one or two years; however, he may still choose to do so if the supplier has an 
built-in incentive in the offer. 
 
In the analysis below we eliminate the effect of a possible upgrade or supply of a new 
mobile terminal to the user. This does not change the approach, as the possible 
amortization of terminal costs borne by the supplier, or other costs for the same terminal 
borne by the user, are traffic and usage independent. 
 
The supplier’s offer consists of three generic services: voice, SMS and data (typically Web 
access). Let the decision variables for an individual bundle of such generic services be X = 
[x1, x2,…,x5], and each corresponds to an individualized  bundle design attribute: 
• x1, max voice minutes for contract duration   
• x2, max number of SMS for contract duration 
• x3, max amount of data download in MB for contract duration  
• x4, contract length in months. 
• x5, price in € paid to the bundle for contract duration.   
 
Based on the information retrieved from one of the major operator’s websites1 (with no 
terminal included) on 3rd December 2006, we compile a public offer list. What needs to be 
emphasized is that these discrete bundles give the possibility of only an acceptance or 
rejection decision by the users, and the contract duration is also a supplier condition with 
no choice.  
  
Table 4-12: An operator’s public offer list of generic mobile service bundles (terminal not 
included) 
 
Price 
plan 
Max. 
voice 
minutes 
Max. 
number 
of SMS 
Max. data 
download 
(MB) 
Contract 
length 
(month) 
Price 
per 
month 
in € 
Total contract 
cost excluding 
excess usage in 
€ 
1 75     100 0.5 12 20 240 
2 200    150   0.5   12 30 360 
3 500    200   2 12 40 480 
4 800    250   4 12 50 600 
5 1200   250   10 12 75 900 
 
User’s constraints 
The user’ constraints for an individualized generic service bundle are mainly of two types: 
the budget constraints, and the time constraints (e.g. he cannot spend all his time talking on 
the phone). There are also boundary constraints which are the user’s region of tolerance 
regarding the value of a design attribute (e.g. a user wants between a and b voice minutes 
as max ceilings).   
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Vodafone UK http://shop.vodafone.co.uk/index.cfm?go=paymonthly.selectaplan 
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Supplier’s constraints 
The supplier has constraints on the price he charges for the contract duration, i.e. the 
contract revenue. He may also want to differentiate incentives between the different 
service categories, by giving better treatment e.g. to data traffic vs. voice traffic. He may 
also want to put in contract duration-based incentives by offering cheaper voice, SMS and 
data download when the user is willing to sign a longer contract. Furthermore, his offer in 
each round of negotiation should not be radically different from the user’s request.     
 
All in all, the supplier will have to better adapt the service mix and usage request to his 
own technical and operational efficiencies, as well as making better use of his competitive 
advantages in these subjects. 
 
Numerical results 
The generic services are offered to a large population of users: their preferences for the 
service design attributes follows a distribution, which could be found out by a user survey. 
What needs to be pointed out is that in reality, in a competitive environment, user survey 
may be of limited use, as survey results are only valid until a competitor undertakes a new 
campaign, which happens frequently. 
 
Due to lack of user survey results of generic service usage and conditions, we assume the 
user preferences for “voice minutes”, “data download” and “price per month” to follow a 
multivariate normal distribution. Although real user preference distributions can only be 
conjectured to differ from it, the means/variances of the user preference multivariate 
normal distribution are approximated by the means/variances between the discrete bundles 
offered by a supplier (see Table 4-12). It should be stressed that in practice the assumption 
of a multivariate normal distribution is far from correct, but it is used here for lack of a 
better and simpler option. We assume the user’s preference for contract length/ and SMS 
usage to be independent of other design attributes and that each of them follows a normal 
distribution. The mean and variance of the preference distribution for SMS are 
approximated from the public discrete bundle in Table 4-12. For the mean and variance of 
the preference distribution for contract duration, we use the data obtained from the global 
user survey in Section 7.2 (mean =7, standard deviation =5): see also Appendix III. We 
randomly generated some user preferences obeying the distributions described above. The 
generated values are mostly monthly based due to the nature of data in Table 4-12. We 
approximate a user’s total demands of each generic service by multiplying the generated 
user preference values by the generated individual contract length.  
 
We feed the randomized user preferences into the prototype implementation of the 
negotiation algorithm described in Section 4.6. We assume the subscriber base N = 106. 
We set the number of sub-intervals, which is a discretization related parameter (Section 
4.5.3), to 5. We set the supplier’s “minimum profit threshold” θ to 0. The supplier will not 
sign a contract if the incremental profit from the individual user is below θ (Section 4.5.2). 
Some randomly selected individualized users’ requests (a, b, c, d), public offers and 
negotiation results are shown in Table 4-13. Note that the public offer is selected from 
Table 4-12 as the one that is closest to the user’s request. The value of each service 
attribute is shown for contract length.  
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In the negotiation game, the user maximizes his utility by minimizing the distance to his 
target point. The supplier maximizes his utility, which is the incremental profit from that 
user. When there is a game equilibrium, which means an agreement is reached, we 
compare the utilities of the user and the supplier at the final equilibrium with their initial 
utilities from the corresponding initial offers. The user always achieve gains; the supplier 
in some negotiations makes less profit than in the public initial fixed bundle situation, but 
nevertheless, he still makes a positive incremental profit in all three negotiations. If we 
decrease the threshold θ, the supplier may have losses from some users. This will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Table 4-13: Individualized user requests, initial fixed bundle offers, and negotiation results 
of individualized generic service bundles 
 
User  Service design attributes Utilities Results 
  x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 user supplier user supplier 
a Request  3486 1140 18 6 264     
 Public 6000 2400 24 12 480 0.92 103.86 
 EQ 4235 1400 20.7 7 329 0.59 41.82 
win lose 
b Request  10656 1488 108 12 708     
 Public 14400 3000 120 12 900 0.54 19.21 
 EQ 11700 2990 117 13 754 0.65 37.42 
win win 
c Request  2295 1160 25 5 195     
 Public 6000 2400 24 12 480 0.51 103.86 
 EQ 1900 960 14.6 4 164 0.86 19.06 
win lose 
d Request  5873 1393 56 7 399     
 Public 9600 3000 48 12 600 0.54 2.15 
 EQ 5600 1295 51.1 7 434 0.89 60.23 
win lose 
 
The negotiation process of user-b is shown in Fig. 4-17. The result is a win-win situation 
for both the user and the supplier. 
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Fig. 4-17: The Stackelberg negotiation game between a user and a supplier on a generic 
mobile service bundle 
 
4.10 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented a computational design of individual mobile services and 
tariffs. By doing this, we have partially answered the “how” question raised in the 
beginning of the thesis. The benefits to the users and the supplier were evaluated through 
three computational cases using a prototype implementation of the design.  
 
Section 4.2 proposed to use a user survey and the principle component analysis method to 
determine the mapping relationship between the user’s service perceptual space and the 
supplier’s service design space. This mapping relationship is service and user group 
dependent. A method to interpret the obtained principle components as perceived service 
attributes was also provided. 
  
Section 4.3 described a computational model of the user with decision variables, 
constraints, and a distance-based utility function. It also introduced the concept of user 
target point z0, which is represented by a vector that contains the set of ideal values that the 
user wishes to reach for the perceived service attributes.  
 
Section 4.4 first introduced a fictive simplified supplier’s computational model with 
decision variables, constraints and a utility function. This section then described a detailed 
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and complex close-to-real model of a wireless and mobile service supplier which addresses 
the mobile communications services’ specific features. It is built as an incremental model 
that is able to quantify the consequences of the individual user’s service requests. 
 
Based on the models of the users and the suppliers, Section 4.5 provided two negotiation 
algorithms for the Stackelberg game between the two players when designing a 
complicated value-added mobile service. The first algorithm is designed for the negotiation 
between fictive users and a fictive simplified supplier, where the decision variables can 
take real values and the optimization can be resolved algorithmically using existing 
software routines. In view of the non-linearities and possible discontinuities in the close-
to-real supplier model and constraints, there is no way non-emptiness or convergence of 
the feasible sets for the two players can be established mathematically. Furthermore, in 
reality, some of the decision variables must take only integer or discrete values in order to 
be meaningful (e.g. contract length, data rate). Thus the second algorithm is established 
based on the first one, but allows the discretization of the variables and uses exhaustive 
search as the maximization method. 
 
Section 4.6 described a prototype implementation of the computational design as a tool. 
The design tool can automate the numerical calculation of the negotiation equilibrium 
between the user and the supplier when the user sets his wishes for the service attributes in 
the beginning.  
  
We presented two cases relating to one service (i.e. mSinging) but with different 
complexity, in Sections 4.7 and 4.8, respectively to demonstrate the feasibility and 
evaluate the benefits of the computational design. The mSinging service combines wireless 
bandwidth needs, wireless data traffic, content and additional professional services, and 
thus serves as a good representative case. The individual service and tariff negotiation, 
when comparing the final utilities to those derived from the initial public offer s0, can lead 
to win-win or win-lose situations for the user and the supplier respectively. The user, as the 
leader of the game, always achieves gains for his utility over the public offer s0. The 
supplier achieves better results in some cases but worse results in the others.  
 
In Section 4.9, we provided a negotiation algorithm for the design of a common generic 
mobile service bundle, involving, for example, voice, SMS and data download. Because of 
the limited number of straightforward design attributes, the user would use the same 
service design space as the supplier. This is the main difference between this algorithm and 
the aforementioned two algorithms. We studied the Stackelberg game equilibria of a large- 
scale case and obtained similar results to those of the mSinging cases: the user always 
gains while the supplier sometimes loses.   
 
This chapter has provided the details of a computational design of individual services and 
tariffs. The implemented design tool allows us to compute the equilibrium of individual 
negotiation games. Given the results of the above numerical cases of the supplier, it is 
natural to ask if the supplier can make an overall profit from offering individual services 
and tariffs, to what extent and how. More importantly, how to quantify the risks and 
minimize them? These questions will be answered in the next chapter where we carry out 
analyses at a user group level. 
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Chapter 5 
Risk pooling and assessment at supplier 
level  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 4, our main focus was on the computational design and the tool that facilitate 
the automated computation of the negotiation game equilibria. The design and analysis 
was carried out at individual game level. In this chapter1, our goal is to help the supplier 
(typically a mobile operator) of individual services and tariffs to design his individual 
contract acceptance decision criteria when facing the uncertainties brought by the various 
needs of a group of users, so that he could achieve his goal of obtaining a maximum profit 
with a minimum risk (Section 3.2). This chapter, together with Chapter 4, constitutes the 
complete computational design for individual services and tariffs.   
 
Recall that in Chapter 4, the numerical case analyses showed that the supplier makes 
different profits and sometimes losses from different individual users when compared to 
the public tariff situation. This higher volatility in profit means higher risk to the supplier 
at individual contract level. However, a supplier often has a large user-base even for a 
specific value-added service. The risk from individual users can be mitigated by pooling 
the profits and losses from individual users across a user-base for that (class of) service 
offer2. Furthermore, the supplier can set certain parameters in his decision rules, which 
decline extreme requests from users, but at the expense of possibly losing customers from 
the potential user base. It is important to notice that the changes in the parameters of the 
decision rules will not only affect the expected profit and risk from the individual contracts, 
but also the rate of deals, which is defined as the proportion of negotiations ending in a 
mutually accepted contract. Together, the changes in these three aspects affect the 
supplier’s total expected profit (corporate profit) and total risk from the potential user base 
of the individual service, and ultimately affect the supplier’s final decision. 
  
Based on the above discussion, it is necessary to have a set of methods and a tool that 
computes the expected profit, risk, and rate of deals, so that analysis can be carried out at 
the individual user level and, most importantly, at the corporate level. This helps the 
supplier to intelligently adjust the parameters in his decision criteria according to the 
corporate policy. This chapter serves this purpose and is organized as follows. In Section 
5.2, we focus on Value at Risk (VaR), and related computations and analyses. We first 
present the Monte Carlo method to calculate the supplier’s VaR. Second, we analyze the 
supplier’s profit and risk at corporate level when he offers individual services and tariffs. 
Third, we describe an extension to the prototype implementation presented in Section 4.6 
which can carry out statistical computations and analyses. We finally illustrate the 
concepts with two numerical cases, which are based on the mSinging v2.0 service and the 
                                                          
1 This chapter is partially based on Chen & Pau (2007a) 
2  The assumption here is that the uncertainties in profits from individual users are 
uncorrelated or have a low degree of correlation. 
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individual generic mobile service bundle. In Section 5.3, we focus on extreme value theory 
and analyze the possible application areas of this theory in the context of individual 
services. We describe a systematic statistical method in dealing with the extreme data. This 
is followed by a numerical case on the estimation of the extreme risk in supplier’s profit 
and loss distribution at the individual contract level. Section 5.3 concludes the chapter. The 
linkage between the content at section level is shown in the Table below. 
 
Value at Risk and related computations 
Based on  Section 3.2 on supplier behavioral model, Section 4.2 on mapping, Sections 
4.8, 4.9 on numerical cases. 
 
5.2 
Results used in  Section 5.3 in extreme value computations 
Extreme value theory & its applications to individual services and tariffs 
Based on  Section 5.2 on VaR computation results, Section 4.8 on the surveyed user 
preferences distribution and the numerical case.  
5.3 
Results used in  Section 8.3 as the further research issues 
 
5.2 Value at Risk and related computations  
 
There are many definitions of risk in different contexts and for different application areas 
(e.g. credit/market risk). In general, risk is proportional to the perceived degree of 
uncertainty of an event: it does not always imply merely negative outcomes. In economics 
and finance, risk is often defined as the volatility of the return on an investment/asset over 
a certain period.   
 
A standard benchmark of risk is Value at Risk (VaR), which offers a statistical summary of 
risk. In essence, it answers one simple question: “how bad can things get?” (Hull, 2003). 
VaR was first used in the late 1980s by major financial firms to measure the risks of their 
trading portfolios. During the 1990s, it became widely spread in the risk analysis 
community. The concept is quite simple: for a given time horizon t, and the confidence 
level α, the VaR at confidence level α is given by the smallest number l such that the 
probability that the loss L exceeds l is no larger than (1- α) (McNeil, Frey, & Embrechts, 
2005, p. 38): see also Fig. 5-1.  
 
VaRα = inf { l∈R: P( L>l ) ≤ 1- α }                 (5-1) 
 
In the context of individual services, we define the supplier’s VaR of a specific class of 
value-added service as an estimate of the supplier’s loss across the assumed base of 
subscribers, at a given confidence level for a given contract period1  
 
The calculated VaR can have a positive or a negative value, with the negative value 
corresponding to a loss to the supplier. When the value is positive, it should be interpreted 
as the minimum profit at a certain confidence level from an individual service contract of 
stated duration. For example, given a contract period and a confidence level of 95%: 
 
                                                          
1 N.B. as individual service contracts have different durations, strictly speaking sensitivity 
should be carried out vs. contract duration. 
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1. if the VaR = - 4, the supplier can expect with 95% confidence level that the loss 
from one randomly selected individual contract from the subscriber base will not 
exceed 4 (€);   
2. if the VaR = 4, the supplier can expect with 95% confidence level that the profit 
from one randomly selected individual contract from the subscriber base will 
exceed 4 (€).  
 
In general, there are three methods to calculate VaR. The main difference lies in the 
generation of the statistical distributions of the risk factors. A risk factor is a random 
variable whose value will be realized during the time (0,t] and will affect the value being 
measured (return, profit, etc) at time t.  
 
1. Historical simulation 
This method assumes that risk factors in the future will have the same statistical 
distribution as they had in the past; and therefore the distributions of risk factors are 
generated based on historical data. The advantage of this approach is that it is 
straightforward and requires few assumptions about the distribution of the risk factors. 
See Linsmeier and Pearson (2000) for more details.  
 
2. Variance-covariance 
This method assumes that the risk factors can be approximated by a multivariate 
normal distribution and that the change in the return is linearly dependent on all risk 
factors. The means, variances and covariance can be obtained from historical data, or 
can be generated based on certain assumptions (Linsmeier & Pearson, 2000). The 
advantage of the method is that it is easy to implement and easy to examine alternative 
assumptions about the standard deviations and covariance. However, the actual 
distribution of risk factors often has a “fat” tail when compared to the normal 
distribution (e.g. a t-distribution); therefore the high risk is often underestimated.  
 
3. Monte Carlo simulation 
The Monte Carlo method requires the specification of the probability distribution 
function (PDF) of each risk factor. These distributions may be, or can be, 
approximated by relatively well-known distributions (e.g. Pareto distribution, Poisson 
distribution), as well as by distributions derived from empirical data only. The Monte 
Carlo method generates scenarios based on the joint distribution of the risk factors, 
and feeds them as inputs to calculate the returns. VaR can be calculated based on the 
empirical distribution of the returns. Detailed steps can be found in Linsmeier and 
Pearson (2000). Compared to the other two approaches, the freedom to pick the 
distributions of risk factors from non-tradition distributions allows a better 
approximation of the reality. But this is at the expense of computational intensity and 
it usually takes a long time.  
 
In the context of an individual service, there are several concerns in choosing the method 
to calculate the supplier’s VaR. In the service design phase, especially when designing a 
new service, there are limited records about users’ preferences over the service attributes, 
therefore the historical simulation method can be of limited use in our case. The variance-
covariance method assumes that the risk factors are distributed following a multivariate 
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normal distribution. This may not be the case for users’ preferences in reality. More 
importantly, the variance-covariance method assumes that the change in the final result is 
linearly dependent on the risk factors, so that the supplier’s profit distribution can be 
resolved by mathematic formulas. Because of the non-linearities and discontinuities inside 
the supplier’s cost-revenue model (see Sections 4.4 and 4.8), the negotiation result, i.e. the 
supplier’s profit from an individual contract, does not have a linear relationship with the 
risk factors. Therefore the variance-covariance method is not suitable here. 
 
Compared to the first two methods mentioned above, the Monte Carlo method satisfies all 
the requirements of the VaR calculation of individual services. The probability distribution 
functions of risk factors can follow any distribution. The supplier’s profit distribution is 
obtained through intensive computation by feeding all the risk factors into the individual 
negotiation game model developed in Section 4.5. VaR and other risk metrics can be 
computed based on the empirical distribution of the negotiation outcomes: see Fig. 5-1. 
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Fig. 5-1: Using Monte Carlo method to calculate supplier’s VaR  
 
5.2.1 Monte Carlo method to calculate supplier’s VaR from individual 
service contracts 
 
In the context of individual services, there are several factors that contribute to the 
uncertainty of the supplier’s profit: 
 
1. the nature of the distribution of users’ preferences; 
2. the variability in the operator’s cost and revenue structure; 
3. the selection of negotiation constraints and decision rules. 
 
We first assess the risk which stems from the first factor. To calculate the supplier’s VaR 
when offering a specific class of individual services and tariffs, we employ two methods: 
“user survey” and “Monte Carlo simulation”. We use the former to obtain users’ 
preference distributions on one specific class of service; the results will be used by the 
latter to compute VaR. 
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The user survey polls the users from the same potential user group from whom the 
reductionist mapping P was obtained (see Section 4.2). This is to ensure that the mapping 
relation P holds for the “newly” surveyed users. The content of the survey is the same as 
the “PCA learning survey” (see Section 4.2), which asks the users to state their individual 
preferences of the service design attributes (a.k.a. target point t0) of a specific service, and 
thus obtains the preferences distributions in the design space. We then use the reductionist 
mapping coefficient P to obtain the user target point distribution in the perceptual space. 
The detailed process will be explained in the first step of the Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
To distinguish the two surveys, we shall call the second one target point distribution 
estimation survey to emphasize its purpose. We call the survey result target point 
distribution set. In practice, the two surveys can be combined into one, while the obtained 
data will be randomly divided into two sets that serve different purposes. Fig. 5-2 
illustrates the different usages of the surveys.  
  
Survey on user preferences for 
the service design attributes 
PCA learning survey
Target point distribution 
estimation survey
Reductionist mapping 
coefficient P
User target point distribution 
in perceptual space
 
 
Fig. 5-2: The summary of the usages of the user surveys 
 
The Monte Carlo method to calculate the supplier’s VaR has four steps, as explained 
below:  
 
Step 1: obtain the empirical distribution of z0 (sample target points) from the distribution 
estimation survey when mapped into the user’s perceptual space. 
 
Let the number of service design attributes be n, and the number of perceived service 
attributes be m. Let the reductionist mapping between the design space and perceptual 
space, which is obtained through the PCA learning survey, be P (see Section 4.2). Let h be 
the sample size of the “target point distribution estimation survey”; let E be the survey 
result, which is a h-by-n matrix in the service design space. Let G be the mapped survey 
result in the service perceptual space, which is an h-by-m matrix. Let Z0= (Z10, Z20,…,Zm0) 
be the multivariate random variable that represents the user’s preferences for the perceived 
service attributes z1, z2, …,zm jointly. Each row in G represents a user’s target point z0; 
each column of G is the sample distribution of preference for the perceived attributes.  
 
First, map the sample target points from the service design space to the service perceptual 
space. This is done by multiplying the target point distribution set E with the reductionist 
PCA loadings P, G = EP (see Fig. 5-3).  
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Fig. 5-3: The reductionist mapping of target points from design to perceptual space 
 
Next, we need to check the correlation between the random variables Z10, Z20,…,Zm0 in the 
reduced data set G. This can be done by examining the off-diagonal elements of the 
covariance matrix of G. There can be three results: 
 
1. If the random variables Z10, Z20,…,Zm0 are independent of each other, the multi-
dimensional empirical distribution of the target points can be represented by 
several statistically independent one-dimensional empirical distributions: each 
perceived attribute corresponds to a distribution.  
2. A less favorable situation occurs when some of the random variables are 
independent, while some others are correlated. In this case, the multi-dimensional 
distribution can be decomposed into lower-dimensional distributions.  
3. The worst case occurs when correlation exists between all the random variables 
(perceived attributes). Thus the multi-dimensional distribution cannot be reduced 
to simple forms.  
 
Finally, a characterization of the distribution is necessary. For one-dimensional 
distributions, both parametric and non-parametric methods can be used. For higher 
dimensional joint distributions, distribution fitting using software tools is suggested. 
 
Step 2: randomize target points (z0) based on their estimated distributions in perceptual 
space 
 
The implementation of this Step 2 depends on the characteristics of the distributions 
obtained in the previous step. The purpose of the randomization is to create more target 
points, by generating them to comply with the distributions obtained in the first step.  
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If the random variables Z10, Z20,…,Zm0 are independent (result 1 in Step 1), we can use the 
1-dimensional empirical distributions estimated from data set G to generate more multi-
dimensional target points. Each dimension of the target point takes a value generated from 
the empirical distribution of the user’s preference over a perceived attribute. The method to 
generate these values is as follows: first create a random number generator that provides 
floating point numbers that are uniformly distributed between [0, 1]. Then treat each 
randomly generated number as a probability and map the probability to the empirical 
cumulative distribution. The quantile in the cumulative distribution is the random value 
generated for that perceived attribution by randomization.     
 
If the random variables Z10, Z20,…,Zm0 are dependent (result 2, or 3 in Step 1), the 
randomization of the target points become more complicated. Depending on the specific 
distribution (e.g. multivariate normal), software tools (e.g. MATLAB or SPSS) can be 
used.  
 
Step 3: calculate supplier profits from individual contracts 
 
The generated target points from Step 2 are fed into the negotiation game computational 
model developed in Section 4.5 (see Fig 5-1). For a given supplier’s computational model 
including constraints and a cost-revenue model, and an assumed equilibrium type with 
decision rules by both players, we can obtain an empirical distribution of the supplier’s 
profit from individual contracts. Note that it is also important to analyze negotiation games 
that do not reach an equilibrium (e.g. by analyzing the Lagrange multiplier, see Section 
4.7.5 ). 
 
Step 4: calculate supplier’s VaR from individual service contracts  
 
Sort the supplier’s profits from individual contracts, and we can obtain their cumulative 
distribution (CDF). VaR at a particular confidence level α can be calculated using the (1- 
α) percentile (quantile) of the CDF (Linsmeier & Pearson, 2000). For example, if 105 
target points are generated to represent the potential users, the estimate of the 95% 
percentile would correspond to the 5000th largest loss, i.e. (1- 0.95) × 105. 
 
In practice, more target point distribution estimation surveys as needed in Step 1 can be 
carried out during the life-cycle of the service so as to capture the (slowly) changing 
preferences of the subscribers.  
 
5.2.2 Supplier’s profit and risks at corporate level 
 
Of the three factors that affect the randomness of the supplier’s profit when offering 
individual services and tariffs, the first two (see Section 5.2.1) cannot be controlled by the 
supplier. What the supplier can do is to choose the equilibrium type and change the 
parameters in the constraints/decision criteria. The effect of the supplier’s adjustments will 
be shown in the percentage of equilibria (called rate of deals), the expected profit and the 
VaR from the individual contracts. Here the percentage of equilibrium gives an indication 
of potential subscribers from the targeted user population. The expected profit can be 
interpreted as the profit amount from a randomly selected individual contract from the 
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potential subscriber base. Given a set of decision criteria, and a confidence level, if the 
value of VaR is positive, the supplier bears no risk of losing money from the potential 
subscribers obeying the chosen target point distribution. The value can be interpreted as 
the minimum level of profit that the supplier can expect from an individual contract. 
However, a positive VaR does not imply that the supplier always makes a positive profit 
from an individual contract. When VaR is negative, the supplier has a risk of losing money 
from the potential subscribers obeying the chosen target point distribution; the risk 
increases as the value of VaR decreases.  
 
If the supplier’s decision rules and parameters are set to represent a greedy manner in the 
negotiations, there will be fewer successful negotiation outcomes (which means a lesser 
number of contracts), higher expected profit, and lower risk across the subscriber base. An 
opposite strategy will result in more deals, lower expected profit from individual contracts 
and higher risk. How should the supplier decide? 
 
The supplier of individual services and tariffs makes decision based on the expected profit 
and risk at corporate level. Let N be the assumed number of potential subscribers (for a 
given service, it is assumed to be a constant). E(R) the expected percentage of equilibrium 
(rate of deals); E(Δπ)1 the expected incremental profit from an individual contract; and 
VaRα the Value at Risk at confidence level α of an individual contract. The supplier’s total 
expected profit E (π) can be defined as: 
 
E(π) = N ×E (R × Δπ)                      (5-2) 
 
Under a primary assumption that the percentage of equilibrium is independent of the 
expected profit from the individual users, we have 
 
E(π) = N × E(R) × E(Δπ)                   (5-3) 
 
Similarly, under a similar assumption, the supplier’s total expected risk can be estimated as 
 
E(total risk) = N × E(R) × VaRα         (5-4) 
 
Of all the parameters in the supplier’s constraints and decision criteria, the most important 
is “minimum profit threshold” θ (see Section 4.5.2): the supplier will not sign the 
individual service contract when the negotiation result leads to an incremental profit less 
than the threshold value. Fig. 5-4 gives a simple illustration of how the parameter can 
affect the expected profit and the VaR from individual contracts. Fig. 5-5 (a) illustrates 
how θ will affect the percentage of equilibrium. Based on the assumption that the 
“percentage of equilibrium” and the “expected profit” from an individual user are 
independent, we can calculate the total expected profit and total risk of the supplier: see 
Fig. 5-5 (b). In practice, the shape of the curves may be much more complex (see Figures 
5-15, 5-16 and 5-17). The supplier then must decide the setting of the parameters based on 
the computed curves and his profit-risk policies. 
                                                          
1 For convenience purpose, let Δπ be the random variable that represent the supplier’s 
incremental profit from a user.   
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Fig. 5-4: Effect of minimum profit threshold θ on VaR and expected profit at individual 
contract level for the supplier 
 
Fig. 5-5: Effect of minimum profit threshold θ on percentage of equilibrium; and expected 
profit and risk at corporate level for the supplier 
 
Small sample effect: In the VaR computation, the nature of the distribution of users’ 
preferences is assumed to be obtained from the “target point distribution estimation 
survey” (Section 5.2.1). It would be ideal if the survey were carried out among all the 
potential users of the value-added individual service. In reality, such practice is not 
feasible because of all kinds of constraints. A smaller group of people needs to be selected 
and the survey will be carried out among these people. Such a small sample introduces 
errors. The magnitude of the error is a function of the sample size and the homogeneity of 
the population. Thus, in different contexts, the sample-size needs to be carefully decided so 
that the error is within certain limits. There are several approaches. For example, one can 
specify the desired confidence level and determine the sample size that achieves that goal; 
or a Bayesian approach can be used where one can balance the sampling precision and the 
actual cost (Lenth, 2001). The determination of the sample size is outside the scope of this 
research.    
 
Error estimation from the Monte Carlo method: It has been proved that under the 
normality assumption, the Monte Carlo method has an absolute error of estimate that 
decreases as T-1/2; here, T is the number of runs (Holton, 2003). If we quadruple the 
number of runs by feeding a quadruple number of generated target points into the game 
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computational model, we will halve the error. In reality, the number of runs is also 
constrained by the available computational resource. 
 
5.2.3 Prototype implementation (II)  
 
Based on the risk measurement methods provided in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, we extend 
the prototype implementation (Sections 4.6.) by adding the Monte Carlo simulation and the 
risk analysis functions to the statistical analysis part: see Fig. 5-6. The “distribution 
analysis” block analyzes the data from the “target point distribution estimation survey” and 
provides distribution characterization to the “user preferences randomization” block. The 
latter generates randomized user target points that are used in the Monte Carlo simulation. 
The “risk analysis” block computes the supplier’s expected profit, percentage of 
equilibrium, VaR and extreme VaR (see Section 5.3.1) from the data generated by the 
Monte Carlo simulation.  
Constraints 
update
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Decision
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continue
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randomization
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Fig. 5-6: Prototype implementation of the computational design (II) 
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Regarding the implementation details, the distribution analysis block uses the distribution 
fitting tools provided by Matlab. It is suggested to use other tools (e.g. SAS1) to perform a 
similar analysis, due to the limited number of available distributions of Matlab. We 
implemented the methods described in Step 2 of the Monte Carlo simulation in the user 
preference randomization block. In the risk analysis block, we used the block maximum 
method to calculate the extreme VaR.  
 
5.2.4 Case: Operator’s profit and risk from mSinging v2.0 
 
Based on the mSinging v2.0 case developed in Section 4.8, we apply the Monte Carlo 
method described in Section 5.2.1 to estimate the supplier’s profit and risk (VaR) at both 
individual contract level and corporate level, when he offers individual services to a 
population of potential subscribers assumed to exhibit homogeneity at survey level.   
 
5.2.4.1 User preference characterization 
 
The data used to obtain the user’s target point (t0) distribution come from the survey that 
we conducted amongst RSM students (see Section 4.8.2). Recall that out of the 511 valid 
answers, we randomly selected 150 results to perform the principle component analysis 
and picked the first 3 principle components as the reduced mapping coefficients P. The 
remaining 361 results were mapped from the 7-dimensional design space into the 3-
dimensional perceptual space by multiplying by P (see also Fig. 5-2). 
   
Fig. 5-7 shows the actual distribution of the 361 target points in the service perceptual 
space Z: most of the points cluster together but there are also outliers.  
 
Let Z0 = (Z10, Z20, Z30) be the multi-dimensional random variable of the students’ target 
points in the service perceptual space. Z10, Z20, Z30 are one-dimensional random variables 
that correspond to the students’ goals expressed in terms of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd perceived 
attributes. We try to reduce the complexity of analysis by first analyzing Z10, Z20, Z30 
separately instead of Z0.  
 
The (marginal) distribution of Z10, Z20, Z30 can be obtained by projecting the target points 
on each of the perceived attribute axes. Figures 5-8, 5-9, and 5-10 show the histograms of 
the 361 sample target points when projected on each of the perceived attributes. Clearly 
there are outliers in each histogram. The problem with the outliers is that they will affect 
the estimation of the distributions of Z10, Z20, Z30 significantly. At this stage of the study, 
we will eliminate the outliers only to simplify the VaR calculation. The outliers will be 
treated in Section 5.3. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Statistical Analysis System is an integrated system of software packages of the SAS 
Institute that provides, among other functions, statistical and mathematical analyses. 
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Fig. 5-7: Scatter plot of user target points in perceptual space from the survey described in 
Section 4.8.2, mSinging v2.0 
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Fig. 5-8: Histogram of users’ target points from the survey in Section 4.8.2 when projected 
on the 1st principle component 
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Fig. 5-9:  Histogram of users’ target points from the survey in Section 4.8.2 when 
projected on the 2nd principle component 
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Fig. 5-10: Histogram of users’ target points from the survey in Section 4.8.2 when 
projected on the 3rd principle component 
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Judging from the histograms, we conjecture that Z10, Z20, Z30 may follow normal 
distributions when the extreme points are cut off. In order to validate this suggestion, we 
shall first discuss a procedure to identify outliers of each sample univariate distribution and 
then perform univariate normality tests respectively.  
 
Cut-off values need to be determined for each univariate distribution. The minimum and 
maximum cutoff values can be used to separate outliers from the main data. The 
histograms and the descriptive statistics (see Table 5-1) show that Z10 and Z30 are highly 
skewed. In this case, using the mean and the standard deviation of the sample distribution 
to identify the outliers is not recommended because these two measures are sensitive to the 
outlying values. Instead, we use the median and inter-quartile range (IQR) to identify the 
outliers of the univariate distributions (Hoaglin, 1983). IQR was originally defined from 
Tukey’s hinges (Hoaglin, 1983, p. 35), which can be approximated by quartiles. Let the 
25% lower quartile be FL and the 75% upper quartile be FU, the inter-quartile range dF is 
defined as dF = FU - FL. The chosen cutoff values for outliers are FL – 1.5dF and FU + 
1.5dF (see Fig. 5-11). 
 
Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics of the user target point distributions, from the survey 
described in Section 4.8.2, mSinging v2.0 
 
Distributions  Z10 Z20 Z30 
Skewness  10.7 (-0.1) 13.2 
Number of outliers (out of 361 points) 29 12 8 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5-11: The Inter-quartile range method to identify outliers of a univariate distribution  
 
The numbers of outliers among the 361 user target points in each univariate distribution 
are listed in Table 5-1. There are overlaps among the identified outliers in the three 
distributions; the joint outliers in two or three distributions are identified and excluded. In 
total, 41 unique users from the 361 respondents are identified as outliers and are excluded 
from the data sample. We then run the Jarque-Bera test for the univariate normality of Z10, 
Z20, Z30; the null hypothesis is that the sample data come from a normal distribution. At a 
significant level of 0.05, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (the p-value for each 
distribution is p1= 0.0660; p2= 0.4097; p3= 0.4315). 
 
Given Z10, Z20, Z30 are univariate normal distributions, it is natural to ask if their joint 
distribution Z0 is a multivariate normal distribution. To verify this, we shall conduct a 
multivariate normality test. But before doing this, we need to identify the multivariate 
outliers. Unlike univariate outliers, which are data that are very far from the mean, 
multivariate outliers are data that have strange patterns. It is possible for a multivariate 
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outlier not to be an outlier with regard to any one of the underlying univariate distributions 
(Jobson, 1992, p.150). A common method to identify multivariate outliers is to use the chi-
square quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot of the squared Mahalanobis distances of the sample 
data from the mean vector. As a rule of thumb, the multivariate outliers are those whose 
Mahalanobis distance exceed the chi square value with i (here i=3) degrees of freedom. 
Using this method, we cut out another 26 points.  
 
We then conduct a multivariate normality test based on the (361-41-26 = 294) samples, 
measuring the multivariate skewness and kurtosis (Mardia, 1974). The null hypothesis is 
that the sample data follows a multi-normal distribution. At a significance level of 0.05, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
Thus the 294 sub-sample of the user target points can be characterized by a multivariate 
normal distribution, and its mean vector and covariance matrix can be estimated:  
 
Mean(Z0) = [-0.2568   -0.0149   -0.0597] Cov(Z0) = [ 0.6630    0.0207    0.1139 
                   0.0207    0.7153   -0.0833 
                   0.1139   -0.0833    0.6562] 
 
5.2.4.2 Effects of minimum profit threshold θ on supplier 
 
Recall that in Section 5.2.2, we discussed how the setting of the “minimum profit 
threshold” θ may affect the percentage of equilibrium, the supplier’s expected profit and 
VaR, both at individual contract level and at corporate level. We now carry out numerical 
computations based on the mSinging v2.0 developed in Section 4.8 using Monte Carlo 
simulation.  
 
We compute six scenarios: the minimum profit threshold θ is set to be +2, 0, -2, -4, -6 and 
-8 respectively. In each scenario, we carry out 5000 runs of computation: each run is a 
negotiation between a user and the supplier. In addition to the supplier-related indices, we 
also obtain user-related data at group level from the Monte Carlo simulation.  
 
Fig. 5-12 shows the distribution of the user’s utility of successful negotiations (i.e. a 
contract is mutually agreed) when θ = 0. The thin line in Fig. 5-12 represents the average 
utility of the users. When compared to the initial non-negotiable public service and tariff, 
the users achieve an average improvement of 163% in utility (closer to their wishes), while 
the supplier is 9% better-off in expected profit at individual contract level.   
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Fig. 5-12: User’s utility distribution of successful negotiations when θ = 0, mSinging v2.0 
 
Fig. 5-13 shows the distribution of the supplier’s profit from successful negotiations when 
θ = 0, and the thin line represents the supplier’s expected profit, 11.07: see also Table 5-2. 
Because θ is set to be 0, there is no negative profit in the figure. 
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  Fig. 5-13: Supplier’s profit and loss distribution of successful negotiations when θ = 0, 
mSinging v2.0 
 
Fig. 5-14 shows the supplier’s profit distribution when θ = - 6, and the thin line represents 
the supplier’s expected profit, 10.17: see also Table 5-2. Compared to the scenario of         
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θ = 0, the supplier accepts small losses in the current scenario, which is shown in Fig. 
5-14, and that also leads to a minor difference in the expected profit (10.17-11.07 = -0.9).         
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  Fig. 5-14: Supplier’s profit and loss distribution of successful negotiations when θ = -6, 
mSinging v2.0 
  
The results of the different computational scenarios are summarized in Table 5-2. The total 
expected profit and the total risk is calculated by assuming the potential users of the 
mSinging service v2.0 (N) to be 104.  
 
Table 5-2: Summary of Monte Carlo simulation results of mSinging v2.0 
 
Equilibria statistics Supplier’s minimum profit threshold θ 
   -8            -6            -4            -2              0             +2 
Percentage of equilibrium (%) 57.29 56.50 55.72 55.00 53.40 49.87 
User expected utility  0.4794 0.4770 0.4742 0.4730 0.4719 0.4716 
User avg. utility improvement (%) 167.37 166.03 164.47 163.80 163.18 163.02 
Supplier expected incremental profit*   10.14 10.17 10.61 10.71 11.07 11.44 
Supplier avg. profit improvement* (%) 0.21 0.51 4.85 5.84 9.40 13.06 
VaR @ 95% confidence level* 0.03 0.03 0.94 1.35 3.61 4.33 
Total expected profit for supplier (105) 5.81 5.74 5.91 5.89 5.91 5.70 
Total risk supplier (105) 0.02 0.02 0.53 0.74 1.93 2.16 
* at individual contract level 
 
By decreasing the minimum profit threshold θ from +2 to -8, the percentage of equilibrium 
(rate of deals) increases by 7.42%; the users’ expected utility increases by 1.66%. The 
disadvantage is that the supplier’s expected utility (profit) at individual contract level 
decreases by 11.36%. The VaRs at 95% confidence level are all positive, which indicates 
that the supplier bears little risk of making a loss from an individual contract (n.b. it is 
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possible to make a loss from an individual user when θ<0). The VaR is decreasing much 
faster than other parameters with θ. (see Table 5-2). The supplier’s total expected profit 
increases by 2%; however, the total risk increases also by 99%.     
 
Fig. 5-15 shows how the percentage of equilibrium (rate of deals) changes with the 
supplier’s minimum profit threshold θ (= +2, 0, -2, -4, -6, -8) in the mSinging v2.0 case. 
Fig. 5-16 shows how the supplier’s expected profit and VaR at individual contract level 
change with θ in the mSinging v2.0 case. Any suggestion of convergence is invalid as they 
are using different vertical axes. The percentage of equilibrium, the supplier’s expected 
profit and VaR at individual contract level changes at different speeds; these lead to a non-
linear total expected profit (assuming 104 potential users) curve and a non-linear total risk 
curve: see Fig. 5-17. Judging from Fig. 5-17, a θ that can lead to maximum total expected 
profit and at the same time has minimum risk does not exist. The supplier then must make 
a decision based on the computed curves and his own risk policy.     
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Fig. 5-15: Effect of minimum profit threshold θ on percentage of equilibrium, mSinging 
v2.0 
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Fig. 5-16: Effect of minimum profit threshold θ on expected profit and VaR at individual 
contract level for the supplier, mSinging v2.0 
 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
5.60
5.65
5.70
5.75
5.80
5.85
5.90
5.95
1 2 3 4 5 6
To
ta
l V
aR
x 
10
00
0
To
ta
l e
xp
ec
te
d 
pr
of
it
x 
10
00
0
Minimum profit threshold θ
Total expected prof it Total VaR
 
Fig. 5-17: Effect of minimum profit threshold θ on expected profit and VaR at corporate 
level for the supplier (assuming 104 potential users), mSinging v2.0  
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5.2.5 Case: Operator’s profit and risk from individualized generic 
service bundles 
 
Recall that in Section 4.9.5, we developed a case to evaluate the game negotiation 
algorithm designed for the individualization of a generic mobile service bundle. User 
demands were approximated based on the published service and tariff list from a real 
mobile operator. In this sub-section, we carry out a Monte Carlo simulation to compute the 
equilibria statistics of this case following the procedure described in Section 5.2.1.  
 
Similar to Section 4.9.5, we set the subscriber base N to 106, which corresponds to a 
normal generic service user base, the number of sub-intervals to 5, and the number of runs 
to 104. For illustration purposes, we compute two scenarios, with the supplier’s minimum 
profit threshold θ set to 0 and -5000 respectively. θ is a parameter that safeguards the 
supplier from making too much loss from an individual contract. The case θ = 0 
corresponds to a decision that no incremental loss is allowed in a negotiation. Besides, 
because of the supplier’s expected profit level (see Table 5-3), the case of setting θ to         
-5000 represents actually allowing any incremental profit or loss; it also means that the 
supplier (implicitly) allows a user to propose a price to the service, although he would pay 
nothing for it. This scenario allows the supplier to achieve a maximum rate of deals 
(market share) at the expense of other business performance indicators, the values of which 
are shown in Table 5-3.   
 
Table 5-3: Summary of Monte Carlo simulation results of generic mobile service bundle 
individualization (assuming a large user base N=106) 
 
Equilibria statistics Supplier’s minimum profit 
threshold θ 
      -5000                        0               
Percentage of equilibrium/rate of deals (%) 93.19 57.50 
User expected utility  0.82 0.84 
User average utility improvement (%) 51 37 
Supplier expected incremental profit* 38.66 90.60 
Supplier average improvement in expected profit*(%) 49 142 
VaR @ 95% confidence level* -79.51 3.96 
Total expected profit for supplier  (107)  3.6 5.21 
Total risk for supplier (107) -7.41 0.228 
* at individual contract level 
 
For the users, setting θ to 0 allows them to achieve an average gain in utility of 37%; the 
average gain increases to 51% when θ is set to -5000. This difference between the 
improvements in average user utility can be explained by the fact that in the θ = -5000, 
more user-specific requests which were not addressed in the θ = 0 setting are now allowed. 
This is also reflected in the significantly increased rate of deals. 
 
For the supplier, changing θ from 0 to -5000 significantly increases the rate of deals 
(market share), but this is at the expense of a much higher risk: VaR at 95% confidence 
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level changes from 3.96 to -79.51 at individual contract level. The supplier’s average 
improvement in expected profit at individual contract level decreases with θ. This is 
because lowering the value of θ allows the acceptance of requests that bring large losses.  
 
5.3 Extreme value theory and its applications to individual 
services and tariffs  
 
In the previous Section 5.2, there are extreme deviations from the median of a probability 
distribution (Fig. 5-8). We labeled them as outliers and ignored them in the computation. 
In this section, we introduce extreme value theory, which enables us to deal with these 
outliers. We first provide some examples in the context of individual services and tariffs 
where extreme value theory can be applied. We then introduce the block maximum method 
that enables us to carry out extreme value computation, and illustrate with a case based on 
the mSinging v2.0.  
 
As defined in Section 5.2, the supplier’s VaR is the lower quantile (usually the 1% or 5% 
quantiles) of the profit and loss distribution. Good estimates of VaR depend on an accurate 
model of the distribution. In Section 5.2.1, we based our estimation of VaR on the 
simulated profit and loss distribution of the supplier using the Monte Carlo method. The 
main advantage of the method is that we do not need to make distribution assumptions of 
the profit and loss data. The main drawback is that it is impossible to extrapolate beyond 
the sample. For example, in the generic service bundle case in Section 5.2.5, the scenario 
of setting θ to -∞ could lead to the acceptance of extreme requests that have small 
probabilities (outliers) which may not be simulated by the Monte Carlo method. This leads 
to an underestimation of the risk. 
 
In the Monte Carlo method used to calculate the supplier’s VaR, an important step has 
been the characterization of the multi-dimensional user target point (z0) distribution, which 
is derived from, for example, a survey of user goals in a specific individual service 
(Section5.2.1). There are often unusual and rare user demands, which show up as outliers 
in the survey data set (e.g. see Fig. 5-7). The existence of outliers reflects the non-
homogeneous nature of service and quality of service preferences amongst users. In the 
previous calculation in Section 5.2.4, these extreme requests were, however, eliminated to 
ease the characterization by fitting the data to well-known distributions. This approach was 
to some extent justified, as the percentage of outliers in the survey was around 15% and 
also θ was set in such a way as to eliminate the extreme requests. These extreme requests 
may cause large losses (but maybe also revenues) to the supplier when the minimum profit 
threshold θ is set to -∞. How can we model the extreme user requests?  
 
Other problems leading to extreme statistics that we could possibly encounter in the 
context of individual services and tariffs are: 
 
• How the supplier decides what amount of content to acquire when designing 
individual services to be offered to a potential user group (e.g. in terms of 
number of songs, as in the case in Section 4.8). Each user has his own needs; 
but because of some homogeneity of the users, their demands will have a 
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significant overlap. Thus the amount of content needed can be significantly 
reduced. There are, however, users who ask for “rare content” which is not 
normally acquired by the supplier. The supplier then needs to make sure that 
the probability that a user’s uncommon content request cannot be satisfied 
lies below a certain level.  
• How to handle the uncertainties derived from the supplier’s service 
provisioning cost model. The model (see Section 4.4) was built upon an 
aggregate view of the infrastructure in stable conditions without failures or 
congestions: in this way it is an approximation. Missing data, extreme traffic 
peaks or valleys, failures or congestions represent real extremes which are 
not captured, but still affect the provisioning model as well as its use in 
individual service tariffing. 
 
All the problems above are caused by rare events which may have considerable impacts on 
the subjects being studied. Extreme value theory (EVT) can be a useful tool if we assume 
these rare events do follow a certain distribution. Just as the central limit theorem deals 
with the sum of many independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) variables, EVT 
concerns itself with the extreme deviations from the medians of probability distributions.  
 
The first problem with regard to estimating the extreme VaR when θ is set to -∞, and the 
third problem with regard to estimating needed content, are univariate extreme problems. 
The second problem with regard to characterizing extreme user target point (z0) 
distribution, and the fourth problem with regard to estimating the extremes in the cost and 
revenue model, may involve multivariate extreme value theory. It would be ideal that we 
could analyze the first two problems together because they are closely related. However, 
for practical matters, we decided to focus on the univariate extremes in this research and 
leave the multivariate extremes to further research. Specifically, we focus on the first 
problem, as the answers to it have a direct impact on the supplier’s decision making 
processes relating to offering individual services.   
 
5.3.1 Block maxima method to analyze extreme values   
 
Extreme value theory was first used in hydrology. It became widely used in finance, 
insurance, engineering, and other areas in the 1960s. Currently, there are two systematic 
statistical methods in dealing with the extremes of real data: the block maxima (BM) 
method and the peak over threshold (POT) method (McNeil et al., 2005).  
 
The BM method divides the data into blocks. Each block contains the same or a similar 
number of observations. In certain applications, there are natural ways of dividing the data. 
For example, in hydrology, the daily measurements of water level are divided into yearly 
blocks. In financial applications, the stock market returns are divided into yearly or 
quarterly blocks. The BM method only retains the maxima/minima in each of the sub-
blocks.  
 
The POT method focuses on the observations that exceed a given threshold, which are also 
called “exceedances”.  
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Fig. 5-18 gives a simple illustration of the extreme data selection processes by the two 
methods; the selected observations are also marked with black dots. Given the same set of 
data, the extreme observations selected by the BM method are {b, f, i}, while the 
observations selected by the POT method are {b, e, f, h, i}.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5-18: Extreme data selection by the block maxima and the peak over threshold 
methods 
 
In choosing the appropriate method to be applied in the individual tariffs context, our main 
concern is the assumptions that each method requires. The POT method requires that 
(Embrechts et. al 1997, p. 366):  
 
1. The exceedances follow a homogeneous Poisson process over time;  
2. The excess amounts over threshold have a generalized Pareto distribution; 
3. The excess amounts over the threshold are i.i.d and independent of exceedance 
times.  
 
The BM method only assumes that the maxima/minima are i.i.d (and this assumption can 
also be dropped: see Gencay (2003)). This weaker assumption led us to select the BM 
method in this specific research because the first and third assumptions in the POT method 
do not hold, as dynamics are not studied in this research.  
 
5.3.1.1 Generalized extreme value distribution and block maximum method 
 
The BM method is based on the theorem of Fisher and Tippett (1928), and on the theorem 
of Gnedenko (1943): “Divide the data into j blocks of size k, let the block maximum of the 
ith block be Mki; the block maxima Mk = [Mk1, … Mkj]. Let Xk be a sequence of i.i.d 
random variables. If there exist real constants ck, dk, where ck > 0, and some non-
degenerating limiting distribution functions H such that the normalized (Mk – dk) / ck 
converge to H; then H must be a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution, denoted as 
Hξ .   
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The parameter ξ is called the shape parameter of the GEV distribution.” When ξ > 0, the 
distribution is a Fréchet distribution; when ξ = 0, it is a Gumbel distribution; when ξ < 0, it 
is a Weibull distribution. Fig. 5-19 shows the shapes of three probability density functions 
of Hξ when ξ = -1 / 0/ 1. 
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Fig. 5-19: The shapes of the probability density functions of generalized extreme value 
distributions (GEV) for different values of the shape parameter ξ 
 
For well-known underlying distributions, their GEV limit can be obtained by choosing 
appropriate normalizing sequences ck and dk. For example, if the underlying data 
distribution is an exponential distribution with distribution function F(x) = 1- ce(-γx) for c, γ 
> 0 and x ≥ 0, then by choosing ck = 1/γ and dk = ln(ck)/γ, we can obtain the limiting 
distribution of maxima as exp(-e-x), x∈R. This distribution of maxima is called the 
Gumbel distribution (see Embrechts et. al (1997) for more details). This method can be 
useful when the extreme observations are few, while at the same time we can identify the 
underlying distribution from the data. 
  
For unknown underlying distributions, we do not know the normalization constants ck and 
dk, and we need to use the three-parameter specification of GEV Hξ,μ,σ(x): 
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μ and σ are the location parameter and the scaling parameter respectively (Embrechts et. al 
1997, p. 294). 
  
The use of BM method involves several steps: 
 
Step 1: Generate the block maxima (Mk), verify if Mk are i.i.d   
 
Let the underlying data be Yi, divide the data into j blocks of size k. The block maxima 
vector is Mk = [Mk1, … Mkj]. Verify if Mk is independent and identically distributed. As 
mentioned before, in certain applications there are natural ways to divide the data. In other 
cases, the block size k must be carefully selected. On one hand, a large k will give a more 
accurate approximation of the extreme distribution and low bias; it will also lead to a lesser 
number of block maxima and therefore high variance in the estimation. On the other hand, 
a small k may take in data that are not large enough to be considered as true extremes, 
which will lead to skewed analyses; at the same time the higher number of block maxima 
will lead to a low variance in the parameter estimation. In practice, the block size k is set to 
be quite large, so even if there are dependences between the data within a block, the block 
maxima can still be taken as independent (McNeil et al., 2005).  
 
Step 2: Parameter estimation ( σμξ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ )  
 
The parameters can be estimated by fitting the GEV distribution to the data vector Mk. We 
use the maximum likelihood estimation1 (MLE). Let L be the log-likelihood estimator of 
the GEV distribution Hξ,μ,σ(x) in Equation (5-6), which  can be written as (McNeil et al., 
2005, p. 272): 
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We maximize L subject to the constraints σ > 0 and 1+ ξ (Mki – μ) / σ > 0 (i.e. the 
constraints from the logarithm). Differentiating L with respect to ξ, μ, σ yields the 
                                                          
1 For the alternative methods see Embrechts et. al (1997, p 321-323)  
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likelihood equations with the estimates σμξ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ as solutions. But often there is no explicit 
solution to the likelihood equations (see Embrechts et. al, 1997, p. 318). Thus the solution 
is found out by numerical procedures. Furthermore, Smith (1985) showed that the 
consistence and asymptotic efficiency properties of the MLE hold when ξ > -1/2. Let the 
MLE estimated shape/location/scaling parameters be σμξ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ . 
 
Step 3: Return level (Rk,t) and return period (tk,u) estimation  
 
Given H, the true distribution of the k-block maximum, the t k-block return level Rk,t is 
defined as the (1-1/t)-th quantile of H (see Equation 5-8). The t k-block return level can be 
interpreted as the level that is exceeded in one out of every t k-blocks on average.  
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For example, if the distribution under study is the right tail of a profit and loss distribution; 
let k=50, t = 30, if the return level R50,30 = a, this means that the expected profit from a 
randomly selected individual user will exceed a once every 1500 users.     
 
Given the true distribution of k-block maxima H, the return period of the event {Mk > u} is 
defined as tk,u = 1 / (1- H(u)). This means that in every tk,u k-blocks we can expect an 
observation in a single block that exceeds level u.   
 
For example, if H is the right tail distribution of supplier’s profit and loss; let k=50, u=100, 
if the return period t50,100 = b, this means that we can expect to observe the profit from an 
individual user to exceed the level of 100 every 50×b users.  
 
Step 4: Quantile estimation of the underlying distribution 
With the estimated parameters σμξ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ from Step 2, the quantile for the k-block size 
maxima can be calculated. But the calculated quantile is not the quantile of the underlying 
data. The quantile of the underlying data can be approximated by the following method 
(Longin, 2000). Given the underlying data Yi and the block maxima Mk, and let 
Mqα be the 
α-th quantile of the block maxima Mk, if the Yi are independent, then we have: 
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Given Equations (5-9) and (5-10), we have: 
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Thus the p-th quantile of the underlying distribution can be estimated by Equation (5-11), 
which is actually the α-th quantile of the block maxima Mk. Equation (5-11) can also be 
used to estimate the extreme profit from outlying users. 
 
For example, if we have 5000 data samples of the underlying distribution of the supplier’s 
profit and loss; given the estimated parameters σμξ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ of the distribution of the maxima, 
we can calculate the 0.9999-th and the 0.99999th quantile of the underlying distribution and 
we will obtain different results; while the method based on the fractional part of the 
empirical data will produce the same result for the 0.9999th and the 0.99999th quantile.  
 
5.3.1.2 Extreme VaR 
 
The above analysis concerns the limiting distribution of block maxima. However, in some 
application areas, such as finance and insurance, losses are the main concern and the 
analysis needs to focus on the minima. The above analysis can be applied to the block 
minima by assuming that the limiting behavior of the minima has the following property:  
min(X1,…Xk) = - max(-X1,…,-Xk) 
If Hξ(x) is the limiting type of distribution for maxima, then (1 - Hξ(-x)) is the limiting type 
of distribution of minima (McNeil et al., 2005).  
 
Extreme VaR 
VaR is defined as the lower quantile of the profit and loss distribution (Section 5.2). In 
finance and insurance applications where extreme VaR is used, the concern is over losses 
and therefore the computation focuses on the minima. In the context of individual tariffs, it 
is possible that the 95% confidence level VaR has a positive value (see Sections 5.2.1 and 
5.2.4). But when considering the extreme situations (e.g. remove “minimum profit 
threshold” θ from the supplier’s decision rule in the mSinging case), we must consider 
losses. Therefore the computation of the extreme VaR from individual services focuses on 
fitting the GEV distribution to the negative values (losses) from the individual contracts.  
  
Given the underlying data Bi  < 0 to be analyzed, we analyze the negated values of these 
underlying data  -Bi (which are then positive). Divide the data into j blocks of size k; the 
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block maxima vector is Mk = [Mk1, …,Mkj] and verify if Mk is i.i.d. We then fit the GEV 
distribution from Equation (5-6) to Mk and obtain the parameters σμξ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ by the procedure 
in the above Section 5.3.1.1. Let Mqα be the α-th quantile of the block minima.  
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Thus the p-th quantile of the underlying loss data can be estimated by (5-11), which is the 
VaR of the underlying data Bi by the definition in Section 5.2. An example of extreme VaR 
calculation will be given in the next Section.  
 
5.3.2 Case analysis: Operator’s extreme VaR at individual contract level 
of mSinging v2.0 
 
In the mSinging case in Section 5.2.4, we calculated the supplier’s expected profit and 
VaR at individual contract level under different scenarios when the minimum profit 
threshold θ changes from +2 to -8. In this section, we set the θ to be -500 (<<-8) to 
approximate the scenario when θ is set to - ∞ in the supplier’s decision criteria. Note that 
the inputs (i.e. the randomized user target points) follow the same multivariate normal 
distribution that we characterized in Section 5.2.4.1.   
 
The supplier’s equilibria statistics (θ = -500) are shown in Table 5-4. Compared to the 
other scenarios where θ= 2, 0, -2, -4, -6, -8 (Section 5.2.4), the percentage of equilibrium 
shows a considerable increase, but not as significant as that in the generic service bundle 
case when θ was set to be very low (Section 5.2.5). This could be explained by the loss 
control function of θ in the negotiation. In the generic service bundle case, cost-related 
constraints are the main constraints in the negotiation (see Section 4.9), thus changing θ 
would have a considerable impact on the negotiation outcome. In the value-added 
mSinging case, cost constraints are among many other service-specific constraints in the 
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negotiation. Thus in the mSinging case, changing merely the value of θ would not lead to a 
significant change in the rate of deals.   
 
The VaR at 95% confidence level is negative, which means that the supplier may bear loss 
from a randomly selected individual contract. The total expected profit is even higher than 
the scenario where θ =-8, but this is at the expense of higher total risks.   
  
Table 5-4: Supplier’s equilibria statistics when minimum profit threshold θ = -500, 
mSinging v2.0 
 
Equilibria statistics θ = -500 
Percentage of equilibrium/rate of deals (%) 62.85 
User expected utility 0.4812 
User average utility improvement (%) 168.43 
Supplier expected incremental profit* 9.40 
Supplier average profit improvement* (%)  -7.1 
VaR @ 95% confidence level* -4.08 
Total expected profit for supplier (105) 5.91 
Total risk for supplier (105) -2.56 
                              *at individual contract level 
 
Fig. 5-20  shows the supplier’s profit and loss distribution of successful negotiations. 
There is a long tail on the left side of the zero loss line. The tail represents losses from 
individual contracts and is formed by users who have low willingness to pay.  
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Fig. 5-20: Supplier’s profit and loss distribution of successful negotiations when θ = -500, 
mSinging v2.0  
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Dividing the data into blocks 
The number of successful negotiations is 2852. We divide the users into blocks: each block 
has the same or similar total revenue from the users. This revenue is the sum of all 
individual tariffs paid by users belonging to that block. Thus the number of users differs in 
each block: the block with higher user revenues has fewer users; the block with low user 
revenues has more users.   
  
The profit and loss distribution is generated based on the Monte Carlo method. The inputs 
to the Monet Carlo simulation are the randomized user goals following the multivariate 
normal distribution characterized in Section 5.2.4.1; they are assumed to be independent. 
Therefore the outputs (i.e. profits from individual contracts), after a deterministic non-
linear transformation, are also independent. Furthermore, because the block minima are 
drawn from the same underlying profit and loss distribution, we can assume that these 
minima have the same probability distribution. Thus the basic assumption of the BM 
method that the block minima must be i.i.d is assumed to be met. 
 
Analysis of the extreme loss situation 
We analyze the extreme loss situation which corresponds to the left tail (minima) of the 
supplier’s profit and loss distribution: 
1.) Given a total revenue volume per block of 20,000, the data is divided into 28 sub-
blocks, with block size ranging from 103 to 109. 
2.) Fitting the GEV distribution to the negated minima, we obtain ξˆ =-0.324 μˆ = 
15.01, σˆ =36.44. The fitted distribution is a Weibull distribution. 
3.) Return level R100, 5 = 54.27. This means that the supplier can expect that the loss 
from an individual contract will be more than (-54.27) once every 500 
subscribers. 
4.) Return period t100,20 = 1.08. This means that the supplier can expect the loss from 
an individual contract to exceed (-20) once every 108 subscribers.  
5.) The extreme VaR corresponding to different values of the p-th quantile are: 
  
     p 0.05 0.01 0.005 0.001 0.0001 
VaR -4.08 -36.36 -45.73 -60.79 -72.34 
The negative values of VaR represent losses.  
 
The above extreme VaR calculations provide estimations of the risks at individual contract 
level when the minimum profit threshold is actually removed (θ = -500). Although the 
probabilities of these extreme losses are low, because of their magnitude, the damage may 
still be significant. The supplier must then make a decision on whether he wants to achieve 
a higher market share (high percentage of equilibrium, see above calculation) with higher 
risks, or the opposite when setting the value of θ.    
 
5.4 Summary 
 
In order to have a robust business, the supplier first needs to have positive expected profits 
from the individual service contracts. Second, the probability of not reaching the expected 
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profit should be small and less than a given threshold. Third, there are a sufficient number 
of subscribers from the potential user population. This chapter helps the supplier of 
individual services and tariffs with the estimations of these essential business performance 
indicators with emphasis on risks, so that the supplier can adjust the parameters in his 
constraints and decision rules to achieve a favorable situation when negotiating with a 
group of users.   
 
Section 5.2 introduced the concept of Value at Risk as a risk measurement tool under usual 
market conditions. We presented a systematic method to compute the VaR for the supplier 
at the individual contract level by using Monte Carlo simulation. This includes methods to 
characterize and simulate users’ service demands that are used as inputs to the Monte 
Carlo simulation. The expected profit at individual contract level and the rate of deals can 
also be estimated using the Monte Carlo method. Based on the above computation results, 
an assumed number of potential subscribers, and under a primitive assumption of 
independence, the total expected profit from potential individual service subscribers, and 
the corresponding total risk, can be estimated.  
        
Section 5.3 introduced extreme value theory (EVT) as a risk measurement tool under 
extreme market conditions. Out of the many potential applications of EVT, we described a 
method to calculate extreme VaR, which has a direct impact on the supplier’s decision 
making processes when offering individual services and tariffs. 
 
The cases in Sections 5.2 and 5.3  were based on the mSinging case and the generic mobile 
service bundle case developed in Chapter 4. In the mSinging case, when the value of one 
of the supplier’s key parameters, “minimum profit threshold” θ, is set to 0, the users 
achieve an average improvement of 163% in utility through individual services and tariffs 
when compared to the initial non-negotiable public service and tariff; while the supplier is 
9% better-off in profit at individual contract level. Adjusting the value of θ can lead to 
different total expected profits and total risks at corporate level for the supplier. For the 
extreme situation where θ is set to -500 (as an approximation to -∞), the supplier can 
achieve maximum market share and a relatively high expected corporate profit, but this is 
at the expense of a high risk. In the mSinging case, a setting that has a maximum total 
expected profit and a minimum risk does not exist. The supplier then must make a decision 
based on the computed curves and his own profit-risk policy. 
 
In the generic service bundle case, when θ is set to 0, the user achieves on average a gain 
of 37% in utility while the supplier achieves a gain of 142% in profit at individual contract 
level. When θ is set to -5000 (as an approximation to -∞), the users achieve an average 
gain of 51%, while the supplier achieves a gain of 49% in profit at individual contract 
level. Changing θ from 0 to -5000 significantly increased the market share: from 57% to 
93%. But it is at the expense of a higher risk at individual level: the calculated VaR at 
individual contract level are 3.9 and -79 for the two scenarios respectively. 
 
Now that we have developed a complete computational design for individual services and 
tariffs, under a firm-supplied setting, in the next chapter we will broaden our research into 
community-based individual services and tariffs. 
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Chapter 6 
Community-based individual services and 
tariffs  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we focused on firm-supplied individual services and tariffs. We 
introduced a computational design that automates the service individualization and tariff 
negotiation, provided performance measurements that assist the supplier to make 
decisions, and assessed the design with numerical cases.  
 
In this chapter, we turn our attention to the setting of communities as suppliers. 
Communities are already playing a role today in wireless and mobile service provisioning 
(e.g. the FON WiFi community1). And, as we will argue in this chapter that community 
will play a more important role in the near future, it is necessary to investigate the 
community-supplied individual mobile services. Compared to firms, communities have 
more diverse goals and more social concerns to deal with. To address these aspects, much 
more complicated behavioral models (including utility functions, constraints and decision 
rules) need to be constructed, which are outside the scope of this research. As a first 
attempt to study community-supplied individual services and tariffs, in this chapter we put 
our emphasis on establishing a business model, and on analyzing the feasibility and 
benefits to the users and the suppliers.  
 
The chapter2 is structured as follows: Section 6.2 defines and characterizes community-
based individual services and tariffs and proposes a business model, followed by a supply 
and demand analysis; Section 6.3 demonstrates, through two case studies of communities 
at different development levels, that community-based individual services and tariffs can 
address both the affordability and the sustainability issues: they are beneficial to both the 
users and suppliers. Section 6.4 concludes the chapter. The linkage between the content at 
section level is shown in the Table below. 
 
Community-based individual services and tariffs 
Based on  Section 1.2 on concept and definition of individual services and tariffs 
6.2 
Results used in  Section 6.3 on case evaluation of the business model 
Case analysis in Chinese context 
Based on  Section 6.2 on the business model design 
6.3 
Results used in  Chapter 8, conclusion and further research issues 
 
6.2 Community-based individual services and tariffs 
 
Although mobile communication services are nowadays predominantly provided by firms, 
communities are increasingly emerging as an alternative provider. In the following 
                                                          
1 "FON" is a company that runs a system of shared wireless networks (see www.fon.com) 
2 This chapter is primarily based on Chen & Pau (2008) 
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paragraphs we provide a vision of the mobile services in the near future which are enabled 
by existing and developing technologies. This provides the basis for the definition and 
characterization of community-based individual services and tariffs.  
 
About ten or twenty years from now on, advanced personal communication technologies 
will enable people to stay connected any time, anywhere, with access network alternatives. 
Users’ devices will seamlessly roam between PAN, WLAN, WAN, fuelled by new 
services yet unknown (Frattasi, Fathi, Fitzek, Prasad, & Katz, 2006). With a high 
penetration rate of wireless devices in most part of a country, mobile services will be 
provided quite differently from now.  
 
While connectivity is the most cherished property, as in the year 2000 (Odlyzko, 2001), 
the key differentiating values of mobile services in the 2030s will be totally different. 
Through a combination of a large number of users, technology improvements, and operator 
productivity gains, the pure transport and access tariffs for wireless and mobile will 
plummet to very low values. Content-based service will generate certain revenue. Content 
exists in two variants: 
 
1. “static”, from data warehouses with only periodic modifications (e.g. Wikipedia, 
YouTube, Flickr etc.); 
2. “dynamic”, from real-time information sensors and other sources, including user-
originated content (e.g. weather radar map, tidal heights, etc). 
 
By profiling and data mining, besides individual selections, service providers will know in 
real time much more about users than they do now. However, in an age with information 
“overload”, static content has only low commercial value; higher commercial value 
content demands copyright licenses negotiated with the creators, or information access 
provisions. Advertisements will generate some commission revenue for service providers, 
but it will probably not be sufficient to support a whole mobile communication industry 
living from the “law of large numbers” and from very low tariffs.  
 
Mirroring the early trend in video/broadcasting industries for dynamic content 
(Huuskonen, 2006), the relative share of the intellectual property right owners in tariffs 
will be larger; and the multiplication of dynamic content channels will also add price 
pressure to tariffs. Consequently, by 2030 the true value of wireless and mobile services 
will lie in the interactions, where the services are formed as a result of multiparty 
interactions. These interactions can be divided into three categories: 
 
1. Community-based human-to-human interactions; 
2. Cluster-based machine-to-machine interactions; 
3. Human-to-machine interactions. 
 
Here we focus on the first category as the starting point of the research. Sociologist Barry 
Wellman (2001, p. 228) has defined communities as: “Networks of interpersonal ties that 
provide sociability, support, information, a sense of belonging, and social identity.” 
Because of their business, sociological or process-linked nature, the communities 
mentioned above rely on membership fees (in kind or in money, eventually free) and on 
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managed access privileges, which are essentially similar to current operators’ customer 
care administration, but in diverse forms and with more freedom in the organization 
thereof. More precisely, belonging to a community requires an identity and membership 
for a user in order to receive services; it also requires a degree of self-care and support to 
the rest of the community. The community collectively provides information, know-how, 
and services to members through interactions and access to static or dynamic content. It is 
based on this vision of a community that we define and characterize the community-based 
individual services and tariffs. 
 
6.2.1 Definition and characterization 
 
Community-based individual services and tariffs means that each individual obtains from 
a community, by a bilateral specific contract, a combination of services and related 
content, at a specific price for some duration, whether the services are user-defined or 
community-defined. Community-based individual service is the communication service 
supplied in the way stated above. Community-based individual tariff is the price paid by 
the user for such an individual service provided by a community. 
 
Even if the individual belongs, say, to an enterprise, the members of the enterprise may 
have different individual tariffs, simply because their service demands and content flows 
(contributions and receipts) are different. Even different users of an identical service (if 
any such service exists) may value it differently as they decide to belong to different 
communities of their choice. As a consequence, the users of an identical service may pay 
different tariffs.  
 
The access to services inside a community is based on prices and competition, or possibly 
quasi real-time spot service prices (Meij & Pau, 2006). There are also prices for 
community peering arrangements, or community-to-community interactions, but these may 
be on a periodic flat rate basis once a service-level agreement has been enacted between 
them.  
 
In the above definition, each community ends up supplying a number of services of which 
only some are initiated by consensus at the community level or by the service manager. A 
community does not need to own part of or the entire fixed and wireless transmission 
infrastructure. Such infrastructure can be sourced competitively from an infrastructure 
owner under a simplified MVNO scheme (Varoutas, Katsianis, Sphicopoulos, Stordahl, & 
Welling, 2006). Also these community-supplied services are not necessarily entered into 
service level agreements (SLA) with other communities or the public at large. 
 
The above definition says nothing about the transparency of prices and pricing provisions. 
More precisely, the information disclosure rules are of at least three types, with one 
between the member and his community (especially if this is managed formally), one 
within a community, and the last one between communities. The information disclosure 
rules may lead to price equalization, but this effect is limited in that it can only happen for 
the same service, while each community member will have a different and possibly 
dynamic service usage profile. 
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The above definition says nothing about the service provisioning duration the community 
commits to its members, or which communities commit to themselves. Duration of the 
service will be one attribute in the multi-attribute service demand from a user in the 
community: e.g. sporadic uses are possible, just as long-term ones, but the difference with 
current service offering is that they can be priced differently and made user-specific. 
 
Very importantly, per this definition of community-based individual services and tariffs, 
when the end user requests a service from a community, he/she is also responsible for the 
existence and survival of the community through contributions (money, but also 
information, knowledge). The individual will take and share the risk if the service is 
underfunded and ceases to exist. So, if the user appreciates the service, he may end up 
paying slightly more than other members, or even more than users of the same service 
from other communities, to ensure the existence of the service. The person can also 
consider paying an insurance premium to the community to cover against the risk of 
service loss. By paying an individually-negotiated premium, which may be only a small 
amount of money, the user maintains his access to key services and he also contributes to 
the survival of the community (Harrington & Niehaus, 2003).  
 
6.2.2 Community business model  
 
Based on the above definition and characterization of community-based individual services 
and tariffs, we propose the following business model of a community.  
 
The income base to a community could be made up of a combination of: 
 
1. membership fees; 
2. competitive specific service usage revenues within the community; 
3. service usage revenues generated from non-members; 
4. possible premium income from members who select to cover themselves against 
specific service disruption;  
5. flat fees from other communities; 
6. and, last but not least, contributions in kind (work, information, know-how, 
knowledge, innovation) by members. 
 
 On the cost side, they include: 
 
1. costs of managing community memberships; but this cost does not bear 
significant marketing and publicity costs, so it will be far less than with today’s 
public operators who, often devote 1/3 of their income to such marketing and 
CRM functions; 
2. investments in infrastructures and possibly service access devices; 
3. partial service creation expenses, possibly shared with community users or other 
communities; 
4. service provisioning and operations expenses, with in some cases community 
members being member-employees;  
5. flat fees to other communities; 
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6. and, last but not least, intellectual property right expenses for service creation and 
innovation, and from access to information or knowledge shared in the 
community. 
 
We estimate that the community management overhead share will be 25%, the community 
service creation or usage share will be 60%, and the transport plus access share (to the 
infrastructure owner) will be 15% of the total costs.  
 
6.2.3 Supply and demand analysis 
 
The supply of services will be abundant, and the price will be low, driven not only by the 
deregulation and technology advances, but above all by the freedom to define, request and 
bear a share of the risk around service and content creation. Still, backbone transmission 
will be essential, as will be different authentication/roaming/settlement/digital right 
management functions, but it remains to be seen if traditional operators can offer 
competitive services, in terms of flexibility, price, quality and scalability, compared to 
what some larger communities may do themselves. What should be kept in mind is that, 
due to exploding traffic demand and competition driven by many community-clients, the 
revenue from pure transport or access will become minimal compared to the added value 
of individualized services. 
 
The total demand will be large, as people can customize their services according to their 
means and needs, and furthermore because community proliferation may multiply this 
effect. Compared to the situation with generic public services offered in limited numbers, 
used by very many, communities offer viable alternatives in terms of revenue and demand. 
The reason is that within a community, the above two multiplicity factors are replaced by 
four: 
 
1. number of community members; 
2. overlapping sub-communities that share some common interests but have some 
interests and service demands different from others; 
3. number of specific services for and made by a sub-community;  
4. number of common services to all members in the community.  
 
These four distributions allow replacement of flat rates for all by individual tariffs, subject 
to the condition that each community has simple but efficient digital rights management 
tools, network management and monitoring tools to be able in real-time to quantify 
equilibrium break-even tariffs (Pau, 2002). People will pay the amount of money, and put 
in their individual contributions, exactly according to how they value the individualized 
service bundles offered or requested by them. 
 
6.3 Case analysis in the Chinese context  
 
In this section, we evaluate the design of a community business model in the Chinese 
context, where the community culture is deeply rooted. We study two representative cases 
which bear the embryonic form of community-based individual services and tariffs: one 
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relates to urban game communities and the other relates to rural communication 
communities. Before going into the details of the specific cases, we first present the 
relevant issues of the community culture of China and apply our analysis in general.  
 
Two important characteristics of traditional Chinese culture are the emphasis on the long-
term perspective and on collectivism (Hofstede, 2001). Since Confucius, the culture has 
stressed the enduring relationship with one’s “in-group” at different levels from family to 
nation (Fei, 1992). This serves as a guarantee of reciprocal exchange to maintain the 
relationships, or “Guanxi”, among members of a Chinese community. As a consequence, it 
discourages free riding of the community resources and makes collaboration and 
cooperation more appealing to Chinese people; furthermore, the cultural environment leads 
to much more diverse communities than western societies (Kluver & Powers, 1999). For 
example, the traditional “families and group” notions such as regionalism (xiangtu) and 
clan loyalties (zongzu) exist widely in both rural and urban areas (Wang, 2006). In 
addition to communities formed based on business, occupation, hobbies and interests, it is 
common to find communities which are formed under a common origin, or under a 
common dialect. There are abundant communities. The community-based service creation 
and provisioning mechanism can assist each community in having its own services based 
on the demands of its members, provided their skills level is sufficient. But here the 
fantastic strengthening of the skills base in China and in some groups drives this into 
reality. Furthermore, services creation, which has the largest proportion in the total service 
cost, can be linked to the affordability at community level. All these factors contribute to a 
flourishing of mobile services. At the tariff level, the pricing settlement arrangement of 
individual tariffs makes services affordable to each individual member of various types of 
communities. Take the example of a family-based community: the membership fee will be 
very low (close to zero); similarly within a rural village. But the differences lie in the fact 
that in a formally organized community, such as in a village, affordability will be higher, 
as set largely by users themselves in view of their social, economic and information needs, 
which may result in non-zero membership fees. Similar analysis can be applied to other 
aspects of the pricing mechanism of the business model.    
 
6.3.1 Case 1: Urban game communities  
 
History, Background and Stakeholders 
Lianzhong (www.ourgame.com) is a company founded in 1998. It offers online and 
mobile gaming, which mainly includes board games, card games, and arcade games. Many 
games are deeply rooted in Chinese culture in their traditional forms (e.g. Go, Chinese 
chess, Tractor) and therefore quickly gain acceptance in their electronic forms. Registered 
online members have reached 150 million, including more than 1 million paid (premium) 
members (2004). Registered mobile game members have reached 1 million, with active 
users of 130,000 per month (March 2006). By providing games and related services, 
Lianzhong has created one of the largest Chinese game communities.  
 
Besides the large community, many sub-communities have been created in Lianzhong. 
Lianzhong uses the concept “Jianghu” to provide a fictional environment for the sub-
communities. Jianghu is a unique term originating from classical Chinese “wuxia” stories. 
Metaphorically, Jianghu means a wild, romantic, or unsettled region where legends take 
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place. People inside Jianghu are usually associated with different “Menpai” to learn 
martial arts as well as other knowledge to fight for their own interests. The concepts of 
Jianghu and Menpai provide a perfect setting for sub-communities. There are over 7,300 
sub-communities (in November 2006) that are formed on various bases, which can be 
based on location, interests in games, or interests in other aspects such as poems, 
philosophy, Chinese literature, and so forth. Or some sub-communities are formed under 
catchy titles. An average sub-community has 600 members, and over 15% are paid 
premium members. 
 
Deployment, Usage and Prices 
Software needs to be downloaded and installed for each specific game. Online (fixed) 
versions are free while mobile versions charge about CNY 5-8 per month (c.a  € 0.5-0.8). 
 
A player needs to register and become a Lianzhong member to play the games. There are 
two types of membership: non-paying free membership and paid premium membership.  
Basic game services are the same for both types of memberships. Lianzhong offers virtual 
game halls and virtual tables where members can meet and play games. “Scores” can be 
earned with regard to different game results. Lianzhong keeps records of the scores as well 
as other game statistics for the members. While most of the basic game services are free of 
charge, Lianzhong also introduces some paid services/functions to let the members have 
enhanced experiences when playing games or staying in the Lianzhong game community. 
For example, a member can purchase equipment to be used in games (e.g. a tool that keeps 
track of all the cards that have been played). Or a member can pay for services offered 
outside the games (e.g. a service that sends virtual flowers to a player). Paid services are 
charged in the form of (Lianzhong) credits. Free members and premium members pay 
slightly different tariffs for the same service/function. The credits need to be bought using 
real money, which can be done via bank transfer or via mobile phones. 
 
Premium members need to pay CNY 15/35/120, for 30/90/365 days of a premium 
membership. Premium members, when compared with (nonpaying) free members, have 
certain privileges. For example, they have the privilege of entering a crowded game hall 
(the virtual game space); they can become a referee in a game. Also premium members are 
entitled to more services. For example, their names can be listed in the “Hall of Fame” 
based on the scores that they have earned in the games, while free members do not have 
this service. Furthermore, premium members can create sub-communities while free 
members can only choose to join an existing one. Some premium services are free, while 
the others require payment.  
 
A sub-community can be created by a premium member, who pays a certain amount of 
credits to Lianzhong and becomes the leader of a sub-community. Membership fees of 
sub-communities are decided by sub-communities themselves, which can also be free. 
Lianzhong offers a Web page to each sub-community to advertise itself to potential new 
members. Each sub-community can have not only fixed game halls for its members to 
gather, but also a forum to discuss internal affairs. Besides the common game services 
offered by Lianzhong, each sub-community offers to members its own specific services. 
These services, most of which are free, can be game-specific training at different levels. Or 
they can be tournaments within and between sub-communities. The winners of the 
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tournaments are often awarded with credits, which are either collected from members as 
registration fees for the tournament or donations from sub-community members. 
Organizers of a tournament have to submit detailed planning to Lianzhong. The 
tournament has to be checked and approved manually by a Lianzhong administrator (to 
prevent possible gambling and other illegal conduct). Actual matches are arranged by the 
organizers in their own game halls. Lianzhong collects the registration fee (credits) and 
donations for the tournament and later distributes the rewards to the winners automatically 
according to the results reported by the organizers. Lianzhong charges a transaction fee for 
every transfer of credits. 
 
Direct Relevance of Individual Tariffs 
The income base of Lianzhong is made up of:  
 
1. (premium) membership fees; 
2. money paid by premium members and free members to buy Lianzhong credits 
which are used to play games and to access services on the Lianzhong game 
platform;  
3. banner advertisement payments from advertising companies; 
4. payments from title sponsors of various game tournaments; 
5. revenue sharing payments from operators for generated network traffic; 
6. revenue sharing payments from operators for value-added services (e.g. SMS-
based VAS). 
 
Lianzhong’s costs include: 
 
1. investment in creating the game platform and developing new games; 
2. investment in game servers; 
3. service provisioning and operations expenses, which includes payment to staff, 
hardware running and maintenance costs, software (game) upgrade costs, access 
bandwidth leasing cost to owners of the last-mile access infrastructure, etc.     
4. CRM cost on paid premium members. 
 
The introduction of paid (premium) membership/ services since June 2000 has brought 
Lianzhong stable revenue streams. Membership fees once contributed to more than 50% of 
Lianzhong’s income. The introduction of Jianghu and Menpai in 2001 brought Lianzhong 
faithful members: the virtual settings for the sub-communities suit especially well the 
Chinese culture and traditions from a game-playing perspective as well as from daily 
social-life perspective. Members are willing to spend money, and contribute their time and 
efforts to create their own sub-community specific services, which serve as supplements to 
Lianzhong’s common services. These community-created services benefit both the users 
and Lianzhong.  
 
As a result, Lianzhong became one of the earliest Internet companies in China who made a 
positive profit: i.e. CNY 30 million in 2001. After that, it grew steadily until 2004. Due to 
managerial changes, Lianzhong introduced few new games and services in 2003. 
Similarly, not much effort was put into community building. As a result, Lianzhong’s 
growth slowed down a great deal in terms of new members and revenues. At the same 
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time, other companies like Shanda (www.snda.com) and Tencent (www.tencent.com) 
caught up. Lianzhong’s profit became negative in several quarters between 2004 and 2005. 
In 2005, the company underwent a series of restructurings. It outsourced some of its 
services; introduced a series of new games, and put more effort into community building 
by introducing more community services for the sub-communities. Lianzhong recovered 
its growth at the end of 2005. 
 
6.3.2 Case 2: Rural communication communities 
 
History, Background and Stakeholders 
Sichuan is one of the poorest provinces in southwestern China, with a farming population 
of over 76%. Mountainous areas cover 90% of the province’s territory. Due to the poor 
conditions of telecommunications and transportation, much of the farm produce cannot be 
traded in time and therefore loses its value. The economic development in Sichuan rural 
communities was lagging behind other provinces. Thus the “Tianfu agriculture 
community” was created in the spring of 2003 to help people in these rural communities to 
acquire and exchange information and to shake off poverty. 
 
The Tianfu community was created as an initiative from Sichuan Unicom (a subsidiary of 
China Unicom). Thus the communication infrastructure was initially based on Sichuan 
Unicom’s existing network resources, which includes mobile and wireless networks that 
cover about 70% of the areas in Sichuan province, and fixed networks with less coverage. 
A call center and a Web portal which integrate information from several government- 
supported agricultural-related Web sites were added as part of the core infrastructure. The 
Tianfu community also set up over 1,000 information collection sites all over the rural 
areas (December 2004). Each site is equipped with a computer and appointed with trained 
support staff. 
 
Deployment, Usage and Prices 
To join the Tianfu agriculture community, a user must be a Sichuan Unicom subscriber 
who owns a user terminal. User terminals can have diverse formats, including be mobile 
phones, pagers, or other special designed terminals attached to fixed telephone lines. There 
is no need to install additional software: services are tailored to each specific device. Users 
here can be an individual user, or a “collective user” when many individuals share one user 
terminal. 
 
The membership fee of the agriculture community is CNY 2-5 per month, depending on 
the different user terminals. Because of the immense size of the province (485,000 km²), 
21 local (sub)-communities were created based on prefecture-level cities. The purpose is to 
improve communication efficiency by having more location-dependent information. 
Members of the Tianfu community can choose to associate with one of the sub-
communities during registration.   
 
The Tianfu community provides dynamic content services to its members. There are 10 
major categories of content such as local weather forecasts, farming techniques, trading 
information, plant disease diagnostics and treatment, and so forth. Members can choose 
more specific subcategories according to their needs. The related information will be sent 
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to the user terminals each day or in real-time (e.g. weather updates). A user pays CNY 2-8 
Yuan per month for each category he/she has selected. Some content is created by experts; 
some content is selected from the agricultural Websites by the community service 
managers. Content is also created by the support staff associated with the information 
sites; very often, these support staff are members of the community themselves but are 
more experienced. They are willing to share their knowledge with other members so that 
the community as a whole will be better-off. The content generated by support staff can be 
very relevant and helpful to local people.  
 
Each member can post their supply/demand information on the community Website or can 
have their messages sent to user terminals in a specific geographical region. This can be 
done by dialing the call center and asking support staff to carry out the operations (the 
member pays only the communication fee). Or the members can go to an information 
collection site and use the computer to log on to the community Web portal and go through 
several simplified steps, with or without the help of support staff (free of charge now). The 
information will be checked by one of the Tianfu community administrators before being 
sent out. Furthermore, as a service to community members, they can also call a service 
hotline and receive professional assistance on their specific issues from agricultural experts 
(the service is free of charge now and members need only pay the communication fee). 
 
Besides the 21 sub-communities at the prefecture level, other types of sub-communities 
can be formed among members. A sub-community can be formed based on a smaller 
geographical region, which can be as small as 3-5 closely located villages. Or it can be 
formed based on interests, for example a community of peach growers. Sub-communities 
are created with the help of a system administrator from the Tianfu community, who 
groups user terminals together in the system and assigns a group account (free of charge 
now, and to be charged in a later phase). Each sub-community needs to appoint its own 
administrators for daily operations such as adding/deleting a sub-community member, 
sending information to community members, and so forth. The daily sub-community 
administration can be done either via a Web portal, or it can be done by calling the service 
center and asking support staff to perform the operations. Each sub-community is charged 
by Sichuan Unicom based on the communication services it has used (i.e., calls made and 
messages sent). Each sub-community has its own selection criterion of members; most 
sub-communities require zero membership fees. Each sub-community can have its own 
specific services, and costs are shared among members. For example, in a peach grower 
sub-community, members can give their produce the same brand name when the produce 
meets a community quality standard, and sell them together at a better price. A rice- 
growing community can arrange to share rice reapers among members during harvest 
seasons. 
 
Furthermore, the content service from the Tianfu community can be offered to users 
outside the community. A Sichuan Unicom user can subscribe to the content service of the 
Tianfu community as a value-added service to his/her normal subscription. He/she does 
not need to register himself/herself with the Tianfu community. The subscription 
procedure is similar to that of a standard value-added service. Tariffs for content so far are 
the same as Tianfu community members. 
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Direct Relevance of Individual Tariffs 
The incomes of the Tianfu community include: 
 
1. membership fees; 
2. subscription fees for content paid by members; 
3. subscription fees for content paid by non-members;  
4. administration fee for setting up sub-communities. 
 
The costs of the Tianfu community are: 
 
1. investment in information release sites; 
2. investment in a call center and a web portal; 
3. running costs of the call center, the web portal and the information sites, including 
payment to the support staff;  
4. payment for content generation to the experts (free of charge in the beginning); 
5. payment for “hotline” services to the experts (free of charge in the beginning).   
 
The community does not need to invest in communication infrastructure, as it is owned 
and run by an operator. Regarding the communication tariffs, the Tianfu community also 
has a special agreement with Sichuan Unicom. Community members pay only for the 
communications that they have initiated; receiving calls or SMS is free of charge. The 
agreement was granted permission from the Sichuan government and Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII) as a special policy to help rural people.  
 
The services from Tianfu community and sub-communities are partially provided and 
managed by the members themselves, thus the costs can be linked to the local economic 
development level and tariffs can be relatively low. This is especially true for collective 
users who share the cost of “one membership.” Secondly, because the goal of the 
community is to help rural people to shake off poverty, it has received special policies 
from the local government (e.g. the tariffs arrangement mentioned previously). The 
community has also received many contributions of this kind from society, especially the 
help and advice from the experts. Thirdly, user terminals can take various formats from 
high end (mobile phones) to low end (pagers), which means the user can choose a suitable 
one based on his income. Due to the aforementioned reasons, the services are affordable to 
most of the rural people. 
 
Created as a not-for-profit organization in the spring of 2003, the Tianfu community now 
has 1.2 million members (August 2006). The number is still expected to increase in the 
next few years. More than 3 million farmers have benefited directly from the services. As a 
result, the collective income of the agricultural community has increased and their living 
standard notably improved. The initiative also won the best e-business award in the World 
Summit on Information Society 2005. Sichuan Unicom also benefited from the agriculture 
community: the ARPU from the members are CNY 40. With 900,000 subscribers, the 
revenue was about CNY 360 million in 2005. Before the introduction of the agriculture 
community, this revenue was hardly possible. Furthermore, the churn rate of the 
community member is less than 3%, which is lower than the Unicom average. This implies 
a stable revenue stream in the coming years. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
Through the two cases that bear the embryonic form of the community-based individual 
services and tariffs, we have demonstrated its potential from both the service aspect and 
the tariff aspect.  
 
The Lianzhong case represents the communities in a relatively developed area who are 
demanding more value-added services. Although the number of services in each sub-
community is limited, the community-based service creation, provisioning, and tariffing 
can already meet the demands for value-added services. The space for new creative 
services is huge. The Tianfu case represents the communities in a less developed area, 
where many people still lack basic mobile services. The Tianfu case has shown that by 
linking service creation and management to the local economic development level, the 
pricing settlement arrangement of individual tariffs makes services affordable to each 
individual member. In both cases, while various demands are met individually by user-set 
affordability, sustainable development in the economics aspect is achieved. 
 
From Chapter 3 until now, we have been focused on various models: conceptual models, 
computational models and a business model of individual mobile services and tariffs. In 
order to bring the models into realization, we discuss the management and implementation 
issues in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
Management and implementation issues 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter1, we focus on the management and implementation issues of individual 
services and tariffs, which aim to bring the concepts and designs developed in the previous 
chapters into realization2.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 describes the design and reports the 
findings from a worldwide survey regarding general user preferences for individual 
services and tariffs; an experimental demand analysis is performed based on the obtained 
survey results, supplementing the conceptual demand drivers discussed in Section 2.4.1. 
Section 7.3 investigates the engineering implementation of the design tool (the architecture 
was described in Section 5.2.3) and proposes a systematic integration of the design tool 
into existing communication network infrastructure using existing technologies. The 
linkage between the content at section level is shown in the Table below. 
 
Experimental demand analysis for individual services and tariffs 
Based on  Section 1.2 on concept and definition of individual services and tariffs 
7.2 
Results used to  Validate the assumption of user’s demand for individual services and tariffs 
in Section 2.4. 
Existing technologies for implementation 
Based on  Section 4.6 and 5.2 on prototype implementation of the design as a tool 
7.3 
Results used in  Section 8.2 when identifying research contributions. 
 
7.2 Experimental demand analysis for individual services and 
tariffs 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we conducted quantitative evaluations of the benefits of individual 
services and tariffs to the users and the suppliers. The evaluations were carried out either 
through a specific class of value-added mobile service (mSinging), or through a generic 
mobile service bundle. In order to assess general impacts of individual services and tariffs, 
we need to conduct an analysis at a higher level. There is, however, neither prior research 
on the subject, nor any marketing studies or models which we can refer to. Therefore, we 
decided to use a user survey (Fowler, 2002), which is a rather straightforward method, to 
elicit users’ general preferences for individualized services and tariffs. And based on that, 
we conducted an experimental demand analysis. What needs to be emphasized here is that 
the survey and the subsequent analysis are only a pilot study which aims to provide a 
rough estimation, instead of a comprehensive treatment of the subject. The number of 
                                                          
1 This chapter is partially based on Chen & Pau (2007b). 
2 It is important to point out that implementation is an important issue but not the core 
issue of this research. 
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questions in the survey is limited and they only relate to the most important aspects of 
individual services and tariffs.    
 
7.2.1 User survey design and data collection 
 
We designed a draft survey questionnaire and sent it out to the members of a worldwide 
discussion group on “personalized pricing of mobile service bundles” established by RSM. 
The discussion group consists of academics, industry researchers and experts from 14 
countries. We finalized the survey questionnaire based on the comments and a few 
additions by the discussion group members. There are 13 questions in the survey, each of 
which serves a different purpose. Furthermore the questions were chosen in such a way 
that by nesting them, some estimates of key implicit indicators could be computed. The 
full questionnaire is in Appendix III. Here we provide a summary of the question types and 
elaborate the rationale behind each question.    
 
1. User type 
We distinguish different types of respondents by identifying them as end users, 
suppliers and researchers. Different types of respondents may stand in different 
positions and have contrasting views on the same topics. As there may be overlap 
between the roles (e.g. a researcher can also be an end-user), we ask the 
respondent to consider his/her primary role.  
 
2. Flat fee vs. individual services and tariffs  
This question is designed to see how the respondents will choose between the two 
options: one is simple and straightforward (flat fee) but may not serve/reflect the 
user’s actual demand very well; every user has the same service bundle and tariff. 
The individual services and tariffs may require the active involvement in service 
personalization and tariff negotiation which meet very well user demands. 
 
3. User-specific individual service demands 
This question aims to elicit the specific service demands for individual mobile 
services from the survey respondents, which may provide a useful insight for 
researchers and suppliers. Another purpose of the question is to familiarize the 
respondents with different individual mobile services and prepare them for later 
questions.       
 
4. User’s perception of the main function of individual services and tariffs  
This question asks the respondents whether they perceive individual services and 
tariffs as a cost reduction feature, a productivity feature, or a lifestyle feature. The 
rationale behind this question is that the composition of a service, methods of 
service creation and the pricing strategy can be different when the users perceive 
the main function of individual tariffs differently.       
 
5. User perceived pattern changes in communications  
This question tries to measure the perceived changes in communications patterns 
brought by individual services and tariffs. These changes should be mapped into 
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traffic characteristics and should be taken into consideration in network planning. 
The changes can also affect the pricing of the services.    
 
6. User perceived usefulness of mobility  
This question asks the respondents’ concern about the mobility of a service. 
Mobility is one of the key aspects of wireless services. The answers to this 
question can provide guidance to the pricing strategy of a converged operator who 
offers individual services with different degrees of mobility.   
 
7. Simplicity    
This question tries to find out the degree of simplicity respondents want from an 
individualized service. The complexity can be measured by the number of service 
attributes. The answer to this question could help the design of individual 
services. This question can be linked to question No.4   
 
8. Ideal contract length 
Assuming flexibility in contract length, the question tries to determine if the ideal 
contract length from individual services is different from current offers from 
operators. The question is important to the suppliers.  
 
9. Individual price elasticity 
We define the “individual price elasticity” as the “% change in the demand of 
service attributes / % change in the individual price which a user is willing to pay. 
The question can be linked to questions No.4 and No.7.  
 
10. Wireless & operator-configured service vs. fixed & self-configured service 
This question measures the survey respondents’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the 
wireless services that are configured by the operator, when compared to the fixed 
broadband versions of the same services which can be self-configured by the user 
on the Web, as conventional personalized Internet services are. The small screen 
and restricted input methods of most mobile devices make service personalization 
difficult at the user side. Thus it is reasonable to ask the respondent’s WTP when 
a self-configured fixed service goes wireless.      
 
11. Self-configured vs. operator-configured wireless service & individual tariffs 
Despite the small screen and the limited input methods, self-configuration via a 
wireless mobile terminal allows the user to have more control over the service. 
This question measures the respondents’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the mobile 
services that are configured by themselves vs. configured by the operator. The 
question can be linked to questions No.4 and No.11. 
 
12. Time spent on individualizing a mobile service 
This question measures the amount of time the respondents are willing to spend 
on individualizing a mobile service of their liking, as a reward for cost savings, or 
the capability for the respondents to choose unique service aspects to differentiate 
themselves with others. The result can provide insight into the individual service 
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creation and tariff negotiation processes and about the proportion of users willing 
to do this.  
 
13. Community related question 
This question measures how “private” the respondents consider the configuration 
of a mobile service to be. The results can provide indications of how the supplier 
can make use of social networks to facilitate the diffusion of individual services 
and of the corresponding tariff negotiations.      
 
The survey was put online 1st Nov 2006 and was closed on 31st Feb 2007. Cooperation was 
established with the International Telecommunications Users Group (INTUG), which is an 
association of national telecommunications user groups and of representatives of large 
international users of telecommunications services. Through INTUG, we obtained 
responses from end-users or their representatives all over the world. Furthermore, a similar 
request was sent to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), whose Telecom 
World 2006 event attracted many experts in the area. Unfortunately the request was turned 
down by ITU due to policy reasons. Moreover, the survey request was sent to several 
mailing lists (e.g. AISworld list 1 , RSM mailing list) and also to the contacts in the 
discussion group member’s personal social networks. The mailing list consists mostly of 
academics.       
 
7.2.2 Findings  
 
There were 102 respondents worldwide. The full results and detailed analyses are 
presented in Appendix III. The major survey findings are summarized below: 
 
• Equal numbers of people prefer flat rates and individual tariffs. (Q2)  
• Regarding user-specific demands for individual wireless services, there is a 
wide variety of needs but also a significant overlap (in terms of proposed 
applications and services) amongst individual users. (Q3) 
• Cost reduction and service simplicity are the main drivers of users. Individual 
services and tariffs are considered by the respondents mainly to be a cost 
reduction feature (51%), a lifestyle feature (28%) and a productivity feature 
(10%). The majority of the respondents want a simple version of the individual 
services. Regarding the pricing, when the number of service features in the 
individual service is reduced by 50%, 47% of the respondents would pay less 
than 50% of the original price, 39% of the respondents will pay exactly half, and 
14% of the respondents are willing to pay more than half. (Q4, Q7, Q9) 
• In terms of number of contacts, communication frequency and session duration, 
about 1/3 of the respondents think that individual services will not change their 
current behavior. About 60% of the respondents consider a slight increase of up 
to 50%. On average, the increase will be 17% (in number of contacts), 20% (in 
communication frequency) and 35% (in communication duration). (Q5) 
• The majority of the respondents (99%) prefer a contract length of less than 
(including) 1 year. The average is 6.9 months. (Q8) 
                                                          
1 Association for Information Systems. 
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• Self-configured, and possibly self-negotiated, wireless individual service 
features and individual tariffs are preferred. (Q6, Q10, Q11) 
• About 3/4 of the respondents are willing to spend from 5 minutes to 1 hour 
individualizing a service. The majority choose 30 minutes (21.6%) and 1 hour 
(41.2%). (Q12). 
• An individual service bundle configuration is mostly perceived as being private 
information which may be shared within a small circle of less than 5 persons. 
(Q13) 
 
7.2.3 Implications on demand structure 
 
In this section, we provide an analysis of the general implications of individual mobile 
services and tariffs to the users and the suppliers. The analysis is based on the estimations 
of some key indicators derived from the survey results.    
 
Changes in “price/bit” 
Changes in price per bit can be approximated by the following formula around given 
service design attributes:  
 
ə(price/bit)  = [ə(price)×bit - price× ə(bit)] / bit2 = ə(price)/bit – price × ə(bit) / bit2 
 
Consider a scenario which, as a result of the individualization of the service configuration, 
reduces the number of service features to 50% when compared to the number of features of 
the complete version of the service (as a result of users’ wishes for simplicity). According 
to the processed answers from Q9, the expected price the user is willing to pay will change 
to 0.4450 of the original price (of the complete version). The user-initiated traffic under 
this (feature poor) scenario will change to 93% of the original service and content bundle 
traffic (see Table 7-3). A rough estimation of the changes in the (price/bit) ratio by 
compounded derivatives is thus:  
[(-0.5550×price/bit –price× (-0.0643)bit/bit2 = - 0.4907× (price/bit)]. 
The result can be interpreted as that the price/bit drops almost by half to the users’ 
advantage after the service is individualized according to the users’ wishes.  
 
User’s perception of the main purpose of individual services and tariffs 
The users’ perceptions relating to individual mobile services and tariffs as a “cost 
reduction feature”, “lifestyle feature” or “productivity feature” have different implications 
for  service design (service attributes),  service individualization strategy and pricing 
strategy. The supplier should be able to apply different strategies to different user groups 
with different perceptions. Table 7-1 provides some suggestions on this issue.   
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Table 7-1: Different strategies for individual services and tariffs provisioning 
 
 Service design Service Individualization  
strategy 
Pricing 
strategy 
Cost 
reduction  
Offer abundant features 
(service attributes) to the 
users so that they can 
choose and combine. 
Reduce redundant 
unnecessary features 
Cost-saving 
measure for 
users 
Lifestyle Offer features (service 
attributes) that can express 
the user’s uniqueness. 
Help or allow users to 
differentiate  
Prestige 
pricing 
Productivity  Offer abundant features 
(service attributes) to the 
users so that they can 
choose and combine. 
Help or allow users to 
improve work efficiency  
Business- 
oriented value-
addition 
 
Total traffic change 
The increases in the number of contacts, communication frequency and session duration 
(Q5) by the users will lead to increased individual service usage and network traffic 
demands. Ceteris paribus, if we assume that network traffic will change linearly with each 
of the changes in communication patterns, then the increases in the number of contacts 
(16.31%), communication frequency (19.78%) and session duration (34.33%) will lead to 
an increase in the network traffic demand, due to individual services, of:  (1+ 16.31%) × 
(1+19.78%) × (1+34.33%). i.e. 187 %. 
 
On the other hand, individualization of service design put eventually in the hands of the 
users will drive simplification of the services. If we assume that the amount of network 
traffic is proportional to the number of features of the individual service configuration, 
simplification due to demands for simplicity could lead to a decrease in network traffic. 
From the answers to Q7, there are 70% of respondents who considered that an individual 
service should be simpler when compared to a complete version of the service as found 
e.g. in broadband; 20% of respondents would keep it unchanged and 10% wanted more 
features. The expected change in the number of service features is estimated in three 
different scenarios. The number of service features of individual services in the scenarios 
is set to be low, medium and high respectively: see Table 7-2. (Here, 25% means that the 
individual service configuration will keep 25% of the features of the original service, 
100% means unchanged, 175% means the individual service configuration will add 75% 
more features to the original service). As shown in Table 7-2, in the feature-poor scenario, 
the result of individual service configuration is a reduction of 50% of the original service 
features.  
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Table 7-2: Different scenarios regarding the number of service features and traffic changes  
 
Scenarios Relative changes in the number of service 
design features 
Feature-poor        Medium         Feature-rich 
Respondents want simplification 
(70%) 
25% 50% 75% 
Respondents want to keep the service 
design unchanged (20%) 
100% 100% 100% 
Respondents want more features 
(10%) 
125% 150% 175% 
Expected change in the number of 
individual service features  
50% 70% 90% 
 
Total traffic change can be estimated as the joint effect of the changes in communication 
patterns (revealed by Q5) and changes in the number of service features due to individual 
configurations. In the feature-poor scenario, the total amount of network traffic will 
decrease by about 7% when compared to the situation of the non-negotiable public 
services and tariffs. In the other two scenarios, there will be a growth in network traffic. 
See Table 7-3. 
 
Table 7-3: Total network traffic due to individual services and tariffs under different 
scenarios  
 
Scenarios Feature-
poor 
Medium Feature-
rich 
Traffic changes due to changes in communication 
patterns  
187 % 187 % 187 % 
Traffic changes due to changes in the number of 
features after individual service design  
50% 70% 90% 
Total network traffic due to individual services and 
tariffs when compared to public service and tariff  
93% 131% 168% 
 
If we assign a probability to each of the scenarios from Table 7-3, i.e. feature-poor (0.3), 
medium (0.4) and feature-rich (0.3), the expected network traffic will be 131%, which is a 
31% increase from the previous situation with no service design configuration and no 
individual tariffs.      
 
Number of subscribers 
By allowing flexibility in the length of individual service contracts, the supplier may have 
a shortened average contract length with the users compared to the current dominant 12 or 
24 month terms (with or without a new mobile terminal). From the questionnaire, the 
average length of an individual service contract is 6.9 months (Q8), which is in sharp 
contrast with today’s practices. On one hand, it becomes easier for the users to switch 
network operators. But on the other hand, individualization can greatly improve user 
satisfaction, which in turn will reduce churn. This could mean that more users would like 
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to prolong or renew the contracts with the same supplier for an individual service when the 
old one expires.  
 
The churn rate can be defined as the percentage of subscribers who leave their contractual 
relationship with one supplier during a given period (e.g. 1 month) (ITU, 1999). There are 
several different measures of churn. “Net churn” is the overall loss of subscribers, while 
“Gross churn” is the absolute loss. Net churn (%) = [Gross churn (%) - New contracts 
(%)]. Here we only consider “Gross churn”. 
 
According to Wireless Intelligence (Wieland, 2006), and spot data from wireless operators 
worldwide, the churn rate for mobile subscribers or prepaid users usually falls in the 
interval 1.5% - 3%/month, with operator, bundle and country specifics. We estimate the 
gross churn rates under two scenarios: see Table 7-4, with 1.5 % (low) and 3 % (high) 
monthly gross churn rates for all users. The corresponding yearly gross churns are 
calculated for reference purposes. Using the results of the survey, which indicated an 
average individual service contract length of 6.9 months, the 7 months gross churn 
(rounded up from 6.9) can be calculated.  
 
These data can be assumed to be the upper boundary of churn rate for individual services: 
the users of individual services and tariffs would NOT fall in the category of users 
churning for 7 months. The reason is that they have contracted for 7 months by their own 
wishes. This means that for that sub-category of mobile subscribers using individual 
services, when compared to others, gross churn rate over 7 months is certainly less than 
10.4 % under a low churn rate scenario, and less than 19.2 % under a high churn rate 
scenario. 
 
Table 7-4: Churn rate estimations for all users 
 
 Scenario low churn Scenario high churn 
Monthly gross churn rate 1.5% 3% 
Yearly gross churn rate 16.59% 30.62% 
7 months gross churn 10.04% 19.20% 
 
What still needs to be investigated is the specific churn rate for users of individual tariffs 
alone, once compounded back to a monthly churn rate for such specific users, over a 
number of cycles of individual service contracts. This analysis should clarify how much 
smaller the specific churn rates would be for these specific users than the common ones 
under the two scenarios. Some early reports from the industry (Wieland 2006) showed that 
by allowing very preliminary levels of personalization, much simpler than the individual 
services studied here, operators can already greatly reduce churn.  
 
Service configuration & tariff negotiation 
From the survey (Q11), 23% of the respondents will pay less when they are offered to 
undertake the service design individualization themselves, when compared to the same 
service design managed by the operator. Suppliers can earn extra revenue by offering 
service configuration for this group of subscribers. About half of the respondents would 
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like to be actively involved in service design and tariff negotiation (Q11). The high 
willingness to spend about 1 hour on self-configuration (Q12) shows eagerness to 
differentiate and save if cost savings can be generated and/or unique service features can 
be chosen. Suppliers can also save costs from those who configure themselves. In both 
cases, it is necessary for the supplier to have an individual service design and tariff 
negotiation tool to automate the process. The tool should function either in a simplified 
mode without much involvement by the users (e.g. users only provide simple service 
feature, acceptable price and contract duration wishes), or in an interactive mode where 
users actively participate in the service design and tariff negotiation. We will have further 
discussion on this topic in the next section.  
 
7.3 Existing technologies for implementation 
 
Recall that in Sections 4.6 and 5.2.3 we presented a prototype implementation of the 
service design and tariff negotiation tools based on the Matlab platform and suggested that, 
in real practice, the design tools can be implemented (coded) in high performance 
computing languages such as C or Fortran. However, to bring individual services and 
tariffs into realization, the design tools alone are not enough. First, the design tools need to 
be integrated into the communication systems and second, corresponding changes need to 
be made to the systems. Already today technical means exist for the full realization of 
individual services and tariffs, and the wireless infrastructure industry together with the 
billing platform industries, have shown that the complexity and costs involved in 
individual user multi-service and multiple-access monitoring and control are surmountable 
(Karunamurthy, Khendek, & Glitho, 2007). In this section, we propose a systematic 
implementation of individual services and tariffs by leveraging these existing technologies.  
 
The full implementation should consider the following aspects: 
 
• Information collection by the users and the suppliers in view of possible 
individual services; 
• Preemptive service design and related changes in communications and content 
management infrastructure; the term “preemptive” refers to a normal service 
capability design and process management prior to sales to customers.  
• Interactive tariff agreement through negotiation and related changes in the 
business support systems and the rating system; 
• Settlement of SLA for individual service and tariff; 
• Post processing at operational level, including billing, CRM, etc;  
• Notification of end of service and renegotiation via the CRM system. 
 
Information collection 
 
Prior to a new service and/or tariff design, information on users’ preferences are collected. 
For example, when designing a generic mobile service bundle that can be individualized, 
users’ preferences over the bundle attributes need to be acquired (Section 4.9). For a 
complicated value-added service, in addition to the preferences distribution, the mapping 
relationship (P) between users’ service perceptual space and the supplier’s service design 
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space needs to be determined (Section 4.2). Mapping exists by broad user groups based on 
supplier-specific segmentation thereof. The collection of information can be done by either 
user surveys within certain interest groups, previous customer information from CRM data 
records, and/or from actual service usage and traffic measurements, as communications 
networks offer unique monitoring capabilities (usually embedded in the infrastructure and 
in the network management platform integrating capabilities) not found in other 
application areas1. 
 
Preemptive service design and related changes in communications and content 
management infrastructure 
 
The supplier then identifies broad service classes, each characterized by sets of service 
attributes and content/resource needs (e.g. Mobile TV, Mobile music, tracking, etc). The 
supplier thereafter runs pre-emptively the individual services and tariffs design tool using 
the collected data to design different individual services and corresponding tariffs for 
different average users of each service class; the average user data and preferences are 
determined by the sources mentioned above; the service classes are those chosen by the 
supplier. The resulting default individual service results, subject to supplier’s decision 
rules, could be public offers that are used to set individual service classes. The results are 
stored in look-up tables until required by potential subscribers: see Fig. 7-1. 
 
The supplier must make sure that the individual specific service attributes and tariff 
information is carried along in the communication and content infrastructure. Means for 
such purposes are derived from engineering platforms, research and standards in the 
following fields, and include (among others): 
 
• Active Networks, which allow network services to be programmed to some 
extent when the packet processing is distributed and performed by the routers 
along the path (or tree) to a destination (IST, 2000). Senders at active nodes 
expecting special processing of their packets by the network simply address the 
packets to their destination, and routers recognize them as special packets and 
process them according to a given code. In this code may reside the label or tag 
representing the individual services and tariffs attributes; and the code can be 
distributed to the active nodes at which individual service features are 
provisioned. The propagation of the tariff labels can be either via the node 
hierarchy control or via additional fields in the routing tables. While active 
networks as defined above are quite complex and costly, simplified versions of 
the same concepts are found in some service creation environment (SCE) 
functionalities tied to the core infrastructure, but subject to the willingness of the 
suppliers to let users re-program the SCE (directly or indirectly). 
 
• Flow Label In the IPv6 protocol, and not in IPv4, a field is reserved in all packets 
for a label on each packet. Whereas some have proposed using this field for QoS 
features, others (Pau, 2001) have proposed its use in part to encode the individual 
                                                          
1 The up-to-date research in this area is being discussed in the IFIP/IEEE International 
Symposium on Integrated Network Management. 
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tariffs information for this packet. This approach offers the added advantage over 
the previous approaches in that the packet to which the individual tariff code 
applies does not have to originate in some service node, but only in those which 
have the decoding key to this field. The key itself would be distributed via IPv6 
protocol’s IPSEC feature with PKE. A standard would have to be designed for the 
coding of this flow label, when used for this purpose. Some skeptics criticize the 
data overhead, failing to note that the flow label must be carried anyway in IPv6 
unless compression is used. 
 
• SIP. Session Initiation Protocol is a text-based IP-based control protocol intended 
for creating, modifying and terminating sessions with one or more participants; it 
is designed to be independent of the lower-layer transport protocol (Johnston, 
2004). In SIP, a P-Charging-Vector header (Garcia-Martin, Henrikson, & Mills, 
2003)1 is defined to convey charging-related information. The information inside 
the vector can be filled in and retrieved by multiple network entities during the 
establishment of a dialog or standalone transaction outside a dialog. In this way, 
charging-related data processing is reduced to session-based. Regarding the 
individual service attributes and tariff information, they can be carried by the 
extension protocols to SIP. For example, Marshall & Andreasen (2003)2 proposed 
an SIP extension to exchange in a secure way customer-specific information 
amongst service provisioning parties (within or across administrative domains). 
This extension can be used to convey individual service attributes and tariff 
information.        
 
Interactive service design and tariff negotiation and related changes in the CRM and 
rating systems 
  
When a potential user decides to engage the supplier, he has several interaction 
possibilities: 
 
1. either he can select from the operator’s default individual service and tariff 
designs, and then choose/personalize some discrete service attribute values  inside 
the service of interest; 
2. or a negotiation takes place between the user and the computer agent (based on 
the individual service design and tariffing tool) representing the supplier. The 
agent uses the parameters and decision criteria decided in advance by the supplier, 
weighing expected profit, risk, market share information provided by the design 
tools. This negotiation is implemented in tight connection with the rating engine 
of the supplier, and with the service creation environment of the supplier (located 
e.g. in the SGSN or in an SCE tied to it).  
3. Or a real “live” negotiation is carried out between a user and a salesperson from 
the supplier: the salesperson uses the results provided to him by the individual 
service and tariff design tool during the negotiation. The user then does not need 
                                                          
1 The document is also known as RFC 3455: the Request For Comments (RFC) document 
from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the series number is 3455.  
2 The document is also known as RFC 3603. 
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to have a user interface (UI) to the tool nor spend much time. But in this case the 
profit of the supplier is reduced by the negotiation cost, which is proportional 
roughly to the number of negotiation iterations multiplied by the number of 
potential subscribers choosing this approach. 
 
Most of the existing contracting function in the supplier’s billing and support system 
(BSS) can already support the third option. The first two options can be implemented in a 
web-based self-service system, which can be easily integrated into the existing BSS and 
CRM. As the telecommunication industry is evolving to embrace the structural style of a 
service delivery platform, the service and tariff negotiation function can be added as a 
default capability to the CRM support. 
 
The rating systems need to be extended to accommodate the individual services and tariffs 
information (i.e. individual tariffs lookup tables). The information is linked to the customer 
profile database and is ultimately connected to the customer identity record, see Fig. 7-1.   
 
Settlement of an SLA for individual service and tariff 
    
When reaching an agreement with a supplier, the user wants the details to be specified in 
text or a specification form. Service Level Agreements (SLAs), which used to be a way to 
ensure QoS, are becoming increasingly common to set the commercial and business terms 
of service provisioning (Pau 2005). An SLA generally takes the form of a structured 
template: it specifies the service components offered (e.g. via a UML or Parlay 
specification, or a pointer to such specifications), the QoS metrics, the QoS range values, 
the individual tariff, and penalties on the provider if he fails to provide the individual 
service as stated. Thus an SLA can be used in the contract between the user and the 
supplier to specify the detailed service design attributes and the individual tariff.     
 
Post processing at operational level 
 
After signing each individual contract based on the SLA, the supplier needs to provide the 
agreed individual service, record the actual usage of those service attributes subject to 
ceilings, and bill the user. What should be kept in mind is that the individual service may 
be provided as the result of the cooperation/collaboration between several 
suppliers/content owner/human expertise pools/operators, and utilizes the heterogeneous 
network resources belonging to different suppliers. Thus the individual service SLA needs 
to be carried along, and this very requirement adds to the need for a formal SLA.  
 
The individual service and tariff information needs to be sent via the means mentioned 
above (e.g. using SIP) to several places in the service provisioning system, as shown in 
Fig. 7-1. The information will be sent to the rating system, where the individual-specific 
lookup tables are generated. The information will be sent to the communication and 
content infrastructure to provide the corresponding service with specified QoS. This 
information will also be sent to the OSS to record the actual usage of the specified service 
attributes. The billing system will generate one integrated bill to the user.     
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Notification of end of service and renegotiation via CRM 
 
The subscriber will be notified when the contract for an individual service is ending and 
will be prompt to renegotiate via the CRM system. This is important, as it is indicated by 
the user survey that the average contract length of individual services is about 7 months. 
The user needs to decide more frequently what individual services he needs. On the other 
hand, if the user is satisfied with the current individual service and wants only minor 
changes or no changes at all, the supplier should be able to simplify the contacting process 
in the renegotiation in the CRM system.   
 
7.4 Summary  
 
This chapter has focused on the management and implementation issues of individual 
services and tariffs.   
 
In Section 7.2, we reported the findings of a global user survey that was designed to elicit 
the general user preferences for individual services and tariffs. The survey results indicated 
that the mobile service market is ripe for the introduction of individual services and tariffs 
– as many as 50% of the respondents wanted to have these. Other messages from the 
survey were: cost reduction and service simplicity are the main drivers for users; user 
behavior will change and drive up the network traffic. By nesting the questions, we were 
able to estimate some key implicit indicators: for the users, price/bit drops by almost half 
to the users’ advantage after the service is individualized; for the supplier, the network 
traffic will increase by 31% and churn rate will be significantly reduced. Furthermore, 
there is an extra revenue and cost reduction opportunity in service configuration and tariff 
negotiation.  
 
Section 7.3 described an implementation of individual services and tariffs by leveraging 
existing technologies in the existing system, and demonstrated that the concepts and 
designs can be readily brought into realization.   
 
It has been argued by some over the years that the administration and management 
overheads of individualization would kill suppliers’ positions. This argument does not first 
recognize that suppliers today have marketing and CRM as their first budget item in 
operational costs; by allowing to individualize in a user-centric way, a significant fraction 
of these expenses would just vanish as marketing-push is replaced by service pull. Next, 
the proposed approach finds different implementation styles: offline and online. It is to be 
expected that people with less computer proficiency or trust to IT systems will find the 
offline option attractive. While more users with higher computer proficiency will normally 
want the online interactions, for which suppliers will not have major incremental 
management costs compared to their current situation (assuming that they are willing to 
open up their CRM systems to user inputs in line with established e-business practices). In 
the future situation where Mobile Internet will be offered in a user-friendly way, the 
weight to online negotiation will increase and add a layer of loyalty to the relationship at a 
negligible cost.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and further research 
 
In this chapter, we summarize the research results (Section 8.1), identify the research 
contributions (Section 8.2) and discuss future research directions (Section 8.3). Before 
presenting the results, it may be helpful to re-state the initial research questions that we 
were trying to answer in the beginning: 
  
1. How can individual-specific mobile services and their corresponding tariffs be 
determined and built? 
 
2. What are the benefits of individual mobile services and tariffs to the user and the 
supplier respectively? 
 
8.1 Results 
 
8.1.1 Design methodology and tool for individual services and tariffs 
 
The first research question has been jointly answered by our research conducted in two 
different settings:  
 
A Firm as a supplier  
In this setting, we have established a design methodology and a tool for the numerical 
computation of individual mobile services and tariffs through negotiations. 
 
We have constructed a conceptual framework which serves as the theoretical foundation 
for the later computational design of individual mobile services and tariffs. The framework 
consists of the behavioral models of the user and the supplier (firm) and a game theoretical 
negotiation mechanism to determine the individual services and tariffs. The user is 
modeled as having “bounded rationality” and “social concerns”. We have addressed the 
bounded rationality by introducing a simplified service perceptual space as the user’s 
decision space when the mobile service has many attributes (e.g. ≥ 7) to be individualized. 
In addition, we have applied satisficing decision rules to the user during the decision 
making process. Moreover, we have employed a simple distance-based utility function 
which can reflect some irrational aspects of the user’s social dimension. The supplier is 
characterized as seeking a maximum profit with a minimum risk. We have used the 
engineering and business-based service design space as the supplier’s decision space 
because he understands all the technical design attributes and also because he needs to 
eventually implement/provide the service. The supplier’s decision rules are set in such a 
way that he may lose in some individual contracts when compared to the initial non-
negotiable offers to the public at large; but by pooling the different individualized 
contracts together, he can achieve the highest economic utility with a minimum risk at 
corporate level. The user and the supplier negotiate to have individual services and tariffs 
and the user has a dominant influence in the negotiation. The bilateral negotiation process 
is modeled by a user-led recursive Stackelberg game. 
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The computational design is one of the possible operationalizations of the conceptual 
framework. The computational design consists of user and supplier computational models, 
negotiation algorithms, risk metrics and a set of methods that capture/identify, characterize 
and simulate user demands. The design allows the computation of a negotiation result 
when the user simply states his wishes in the beginning; it also provides business 
performance indicators to help the supplier to set decision parameters and criteria. First, 
we have developed computational models of the user and the supplier based on their 
behavioral models. The models consist of service-specific utility functions and constraints, 
as well as decision rules which are rather general. Specifically, we have constructed a 
realistic supplier’s operational model which is rather complex and has considerable 
discontinuities and non-linearities. The model has been used to determine the supplier’s 
incremental profit from a user’s service request during a negotiation. Second, we have 
developed negotiation game algorithms for both complicated valued added mobile services 
and simple straightforward generic mobile service bundles. Third, we have proposed to use 
a user survey to capture user demands; and to use principle component analysis methods to 
determine the mapping relationships between the service perceptual space and the service 
design space. The mapping relationship is important because, although the user’s and 
supplier’s minds operate in different space, they still need to communicate. Fourth, we 
have provided business performance indicators such as expected profit, market share, VaR 
and extreme VaR. The last two risk metrics quantify the supplier’s risks under both normal 
and extreme market conditions. By using the indicators, the supplier could adjust 
parameters in the constraints, and decide rules when negotiating with a group of users on a 
specific class of individual services, to achieve his goal of a maximum profit and a 
minimum risk. The computations of business performance indicators are based on the 
Monte Carlo simulation method. We have proposed methods to characterize and simulate 
user demands to serve as the inputs to the Monte Carlo method.        
  
Community as supplier 
In the second setting, the supplier of individualized services and tariffs is a community. 
We have focused on establishing a feasible business model for the community. The 
difference lies in the fact that the community members may then take over some of the 
supplier duties and serve as a content creator or a service creator. The costs and revenues 
are summarized as below: 
 
The income base to a community could be made up of a combination of: 
 
1. membership fees; 
2. competitive specific service usage revenues within the community; 
3. service usage revenues generated from non-members; 
4. possible premium income from members who select to cover themselves against 
specific service disruption;  
5. flat fees from other communities; 
6. and, last but not least, contributions in kind (work, information, know-how, 
knowledge, innovation) by members. 
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 On the cost side, they include: 
 
1. costs of managing community memberships; but this cost does not bear 
significant marketing and publicity costs, so it will be far less than with today’s 
public operators who, often devote 1/3 of their income to such marketing and 
CRM functions; 
2. investments in infrastructures and possibly service access devices; 
3. partial service creation expenses, possibly shared with community users or other 
communities; 
4. service provisioning and operations expenses, with in some cases community 
members being member-employees;  
5. flat fees to other communities; 
6. and, last but not least, intellectual property right expenses for service creation and 
innovation, and from access to information or knowledge shared in the 
community. 
 
8.1.2 Benefits to users and suppliers 
 
Regarding the second research questions, we have demonstrated, through both quantitative 
and qualitative analyses, that individual mobile services and tariffs are beneficial to the 
users and the suppliers. It is however, essential to understand that for user and supplier 
alike, their benefits and risks are not just those linked to their utility functions, and also 
that the very concept of individualized services and tariffs opens up other side-benefits for 
both when compared to current practices.  
 
Quantitative evaluations and analyses  
As a first quantitative evaluation of the design methodology, we have created a “mobile 
singing classroom (mSinging)” case, which is a somewhat complicated value-added 
mobile service that combines wireless bandwidth needs, wireless data traffic, content and 
additional professional services. Thus a user’s mind would operate in the service 
perceptual space. Using a prototype software implementation of the computational design, 
we study the Stackelberg equilibria in the negotiation games and compare them to the 
initial starting points, which are the public services and tariffs offered by the supplier. 
 
As a second quantitative evaluation of the design methodology, we have studied a large-
scale case of applying the individual service and tariffs concept to a simple standard 
mobile service bundle, involving voice, SMS, and data download. This is still 
individualization because the user sets his contract length and budget, not like in current 
commercial schemes by mobile operations. In this case, the user and the supplier would 
use the same service design space. 
 
The results from the above computational cases have shown that the users, as the leaders of 
the negotiation games, always achieve gains: the average increases in utilities have been 
163% and 37% in the mSinging and the generic mobile service bundle cases respectively. 
 
The supplier achieves gains in some games and losses in others from individual users. But 
by taking a user portfolio approach and pooling the different users together, he can still 
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achieve a gain on average, with a reasonable risk. Our results also demonstrate that a 
“maximum profit with minimum risk” situation may not be achievable due to the non-
linearities and discontinuities in the computational game model. The supplier can, 
however, by changing the decision parameters and decision criteria, control and improve 
his risk-profit equilibrium points significantly.  
 
As a third quantitative evaluation, we have conducted an experimental demand analysis of 
individual services and tariffs in general through an end-user survey. There are 13 
questions in the survey, each of which serves a different purpose. Furthermore the 
questions were chosen in such a way that by nesting them, some estimates of important 
implicit indicators could be computed. The key messages from the survey are: equal 
numbers of users prefer individual services and tariffs, as compared to a flat rate; cost 
reduction and service simplicity are the main drivers for users of individual services and 
tariffs; user behavior will change and drives up the network traffic. The main conclusions 
from this analysis have been: for the users, price/bit drops by almost half to the users’ 
advantage after the service is individualized; for the supplier, the network traffic will 
increase by 31% and churn rate will be significantly reduced. Furthermore, there is an 
extra revenue and cost reduction opportunity in service configuration and tariff negotiation 
in addition to the benefits from the risk-profit equilibrium shift.   
 
Qualitative evaluations and analyses 
As qualitative evaluations of the business model design for community-based individual 
services and tariffs, we have conducted two case studies: one is on a wireless game 
community and the other is on a rural agricultural community; both bear the embryonic 
form of community-based individual services and tariffs. The case studies have 
demonstrated that community-based individual service creation, provisioning and tariffing 
can meet precisely the demands of their members and can address the affordability issue. 
Thus sustainable development can be achieved.   
 
8.2 Contributions to theory and practice 
 
Theoretically, the contribution of this research is twofold. First, it contributes to the field 
of service mass customization by establishing a conceptual framework for computational 
design of mass customized services. The conceptual framework has the following 
characteristics: 
 
1. It is based on behavioral models and is thus independent of the underlying 
technology or service. Therefore, it can be applied to a broad range of mobile 
services. 
2. It introduces interactions, thereby releasing the user from choosing among a large 
number of service options. This improves customization efficiency. 
3. It is user-centric, i.e. instead of requiring users to adopt predefined services and 
set usages thereof, it assists in tailoring services as per the user's specific 
demands.  
 
179
 Chapter 8: Conclusion and further research  153 
Second, the research provides a novel methodology to determine individualized mobile 
communication services and tariffs by combining methods and approaches from different 
disciplines:  
 
1. The concept of “service perceptual space” and “service design space” is presented 
and methods to determine mapping relationships between these spaces are 
provided. The former captures a user’s bounded rationality in dealing with 
complex issues, while the latter allows the development of sophisticated mobile 
services.    
2. Computational models of the user and the supplier that address their specific 
behavioral concerns are developed. 
3. Three different algorithms for the negotiation game between the user and the 
supplier are developed. The first two algorithms are used for the negotiation 
games of a complex value-added mobile service that has many attributes to be 
individualized. The first algorithm uses continuous decision variables while the 
second one uses discretized variables. The third algorithm is designed for the 
negotiation game of simple generic mobile service bundles.     
4. Risk metrics and computational methods to assist the supplier in making 
decisions are provided. This includes VaR calculation as well as extreme theory.   
 
Practically, the contribution of the research is also twofold. First, it provides a concrete 
tool that can automate the service individualization and tariff negotiation process. The tool 
can be used by mobile communication services providers (e.g. an operator) in both the 
negotiation of generic mobile service bundles as well as the negotiation of complicated 
value-added services. The former is at the core of the current mobile service business and 
the latter represents the trend of development in the near future. In addition, the research 
results can be readily implemented and integrated into the existing infrastructure of the 
communication service suppliers. Second, the research provides a concrete business model 
for community-based individual services and tariffs, and demonstrates its feasibility. The 
business model can be readily picked up by any community that intends to provide such 
services and tariffs.  
  
8.3 Suggestions for further research 
 
Besides the questions from the seven research dimensions that we identified in the 
beginning of the research (see Appendix I), a number of open issues emerged during the 
research that we would recommend for further research.  
 
User behavior 
 
The result of the global user survey (Section 7.2.2) indicates that half of the respondents 
still prefer a flat rate for all the services; it would be valuable to find out the reasons behind 
that preference.  
 
We have undertaken some basic research regarding the “simplification” concerns (Sections 
3.3 and 7.2.2) of the users who choose to have individual services and tariffs. We have 
introduced the concept of “service perceptual space” for the users when they need to 
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design a rather complicated value-added mobile service (e.g. attribute number ≥7). In turn, 
there is a “service design space” for the supplier. The perceptual space is a reductionist 
mapping of the design space. So far, the analysis works one way: we conduct a PCA 
analysis on the obtained user preference data in design space to determine what are the 
perceived attributes. There is, however, no immediate solution for what should be included 
in the design attributes so that the perceived attributes of a service meet the user’s 
demands. Furthermore, it would be valuable to investigate if similar concepts in the 
perceptual spaces of different value-added services are mapped to a similar set of service 
design attributes. If so, these service design attribute sets can serve as building blocks 
when designing a new individual service for the user: the user simply spells out his wishes 
for a unique new service that he needs in plain languages, i.e. stated in service perceptual 
space. The supplier will be able to map this unique combination of perceived service 
attributes into service design attributes and offer him a truly individual service.  
 
The perception of individual services and tariffs as a cost reduction/lifestyle/productivity 
improvement feature implies different user behavior during the service configuration and 
tariff negotiation process (Section 7.2.3). Our previous study used a coarse method by 
assuming all the users have a similar form of utility function (Section 4.3). Further 
research can be done by identifying different utility functions for different categories of 
users. 
 
Our user behavioral model (Section 3.3) considers a user who has bounded rationality and 
social concerns under a normal condition. In many situations and especially for teenagers, 
there are often feelings and emotions attached to their mobile devices and services (e.g. 
mobile dating, mobile gaming). Thus the challenge lies in how to incorporate the 
emotional aspects in the services and tariffs design. A good start would be the hyperbolic 
discount function on time for the utility functions (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).    
 
Multivariate extremes 
 
In Section 5.2.4, we cut off the outliers of the multivariate user target point distribution 
obtained from the user survey in Section 4.8.2. By doing so, we can use a multivariate 
normal distribution, which is rather simple, to approximate the distribution of the 
remaining target points to use in our calculation. The cut-off of the extreme values would 
lead to an under-estimation of events that have a small probability but considerable 
impacts. Therefore, the challenging research issue will be characterizing and simulating 
the multivariate extremes. A direct use of the result would be feeding the generated 
extreme data into a Monte Carlo simulation when the “minimum profit threshold” θ is set 
to be very low to simulate to a no limit (-∞) scenario (e.g. Sections 5.2.5 and 5.3.2). This 
could significantly improve the accuracy of the estimation of extreme VaR.      
 
Churn 
 
A major benefit of individual services and tariffs is probably to reduce churn as users who 
obtain individualized services from one supplier will tend to be repeat customers (on their 
own terms) rather than those shopping around much for better deals. The global user 
survey (Section 7.2.2) has indicated that the average ideal contract length for 
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individualized services and tariffs is about 7 months. What still needs to be investigated is 
the specific churn rate for users of a specific class of individual services and tariffs alone, 
once compounded back to a monthly churn rate for such users, over a number of cycles of 
individualized service contracts. This analysis should clarify how much smaller the 
specific churn rates would be for these specific users than the observed ones under the two 
scenarios in Section 7.2.3.   
 
Community behavioral model 
 
In this research, we focused primarily on the firm-supplied individual services and tariffs 
by providing a behavioral and a computational model of the firm. A further research 
avenue would be constructing the behavioral models and computational models of 
different types of communities as the suppliers of individual services and tariffs. 
Inevitability, this will involve the modeling of social concerns of the communities, which 
poses a great challenge.        
 
User-centric research  
 
The research on individual mobile services and tariffs is part of a broader research theme 
under the user-centric service provisioning philosophy. Embracing such philosophy may 
bring profound changes to the research landscape of different fields such as technologies, 
regulation, and economics. Traditionally, researchers specialize in their own world and 
seldom look at other fields, thus economic analysis often ignore important technical 
aspects or unaware of new development, and engineering models of lack of economic 
factors. To deliver a best service experience to the user, the user-centric philosophy calls 
for interactions and collaborations among the researchers from different disciplines; more 
challenges are yet to come. 
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Appendix I:  
The seven behavior and business dimensions of 
individual services and tariffs 
 
During the preliminary study which aims to provide a clear definition and characterization 
of individual mobile services and tariffs, we identified current mobile service usage trends 
and mobile industry development trends and conducted a literature survey. In the same 
process, we also identified seven research dimensions of individual services and tariffs. 
These research dimensions are closely related and, by answering the research questions 
raised within each dimension, we could have a better understanding of individual services 
and tariffs. The following text examines these dimensions.  
 
1. Freedom of Mobile Service Pricing 
 
This dimension reflects how much freedom consumers have to decide the price they 
pay for the mobile services.  
The freedom axis of mobile service pricing starts from zero (no freedom), where all 
the consumers pay the exact tariffs requested by the service provider for frozen sets of 
services and usage. At the other end of the axis is the “complete freedom”, where 
people pay what they want to pay (based on how they value the services) for services, 
benefitting from the full freedom of design and creativity empowered by software 
based systems. In between these two extreme, as the degree of freedom increases, we 
can find the limited negotiable tariffs (as offered nowadays); community-based 
individual tariffs (Chen & Pau, 2008), and auctions (Meij & Pau, 2006; Spann, Skiera 
& Schäfers, 2004). In all these, additional service options may be priced separately 
and add to the total price. There are also other intermediate possibilities between the 
current situation and complete freedom. Abundant questions rise from this dimension. 
Will pricing still serve as a method of congestion control when more pricing and 
service creation freedom is granted to consumers? What degree of freedom can 
achieve a Pareto Equilibrium among all actors under a specific social and economic 
environment? When the consumers have complete freedom, prices are set by them 
according to their valuation of the service. Then, price will no longer serve as a signal 
of supply. Will the consumers have references to get inspired by pre-existing novel 
services and set the prices? Pau and Dits (2002) identified five factors (excluding 
prices) deciding the individual value of a specific personalized service, are they 
sufficient? 
  
2. Granularity of Service Provider  
 
The research questions in this dimension concern the size of the service provisioning 
companies/organizations. The telecommunication industry thrived in the 20th century 
under economic of scale while being protected by monopolistic or oligopolistic 
regulations. But, first with the advent of advanced technology, next with the higher 
education level of the population, and third with the deregulation movement in the 
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industry, the entry barriers have been brought down to some extent. The barriers still 
exist because the fact remains that infrastructure investment and control are very 
costly and “sticky”, in the sense that new entrants must share, or end up sharing, pre-
existing networks.  Nevertheless, the services can now be provided not only by 
telecommunication giants, but also by SMEs, content owners, broadcasting 
companies, private communities and even individuals. Each party has its advantages 
and disadvantages in offering different kinds of services. The research in this 
dimension is to uncover the optimal granularity of service providers to meet 
maximally the individual demands from the users. 
  
3. Affordability 
  
The concept of affordability applies not only for a single service, but also for a bundle 
of different services; the quality and usage of services will also have to be considered. 
There are digital divides within a country and among counties. The United Nations 
created a task force in 2001 whose goal was to harness technology and make it 
accessible to all. Researchers are developing low-cost infrastructure ranging from 
cellular networks (Bjarhov & Friberg, 2004) to wireless LANs (Jain & Agrawal, 
2003), and have conducted pilot projects (Best, 2003). While these efforts may 
eventually eliminate technical differences in the access to infrastructure, little research 
has been done on providing affordable services. Too much research has however been 
undertaken on law and management relate to the “Universal Service Obligation” 
without satisfactory solutions, just because such research has never redefined the exact 
services according to the user’s choice. As has already been observed in developed 
countries, the usage patterns of services vary greatly between people from different 
income groups. 
 
Individual services and tariffs enhance affordability of services by allowing people to 
pay exactly what they can/want and not more than that. But on the other hand, the 
service providers may encounter the problem that, when payments cannot cover the 
cost of services provision. It leads to service downgrade and ultimately, both 
bankruptcy and no protection of the communications rights of the users. In the 
meantime, what developing countries are facing is the lower education level of the 
population, which may reduce needed diversity of the available services. If there are 
few services which cover all user needs, the significance of individual services and 
tariffs will be greatly reduced. Therefore, the main task according to this dimension is 
to study whether individual services can achieve sustainable service provision, also for 
developing countries and low income groups. 
 
4. Risk 
 
There are two sides of the coin of risk: the service provisioning side (including all 
possible actors) and the risk of the consumers when they commit to individual services 
and tariffs. 
  
There are four possible approaches to providing mobile services: commercially 
offered, offered in a closed community, offered in an open community and ultimately, 
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self-offered by an individual, maybe shared with selected others. This leads to risks to 
both providers and customers. Risk dynamics also change within each approach: for 
example, commercially offered mobile services can, to some extent, be re-insured 
while members in a closed community cannot re-insure against their loss.  
 
The research in this dimension will first be to characterize the risk dynamics of the 
above-mentioned four service-offering approaches. The main efforts will be put into 
the hedging of the user diversity and risk dynamics and into providing the 
corresponding tools. The design of mechanisms to hedge communication rates once 
fully deregulated (like some spot bandwidth products or bulk services like SMS) is not 
within the scope of the research. 
 
5. Policy, Regulation and law 
  
Policy, (de)regulation and law will have effects on all other dimensions, either 
negative or positive. 
  
The deregulation movement in telecommunications started in the US in the 1970s and 
spread around the world. The degree of deregulation varies among countries, but it did 
change the rigid, monopolistic industry to a better competing one (Noam, 1983; Xu & 
Pitt, 2002; Geddes, 2000). Together with privatization and liberalization, the market is 
moving toward a “contestable market” where it is characterized by having no entry 
barriers (Willig, 1980), although technical barriers and sometimes government levies 
(like licensing fees) remain as barriers.   
 
Research in this dimension will focus on how policy, regulation, and law allowing for 
and protecting individual services and tariffs, can accelerate the realization of them. 
The key emerging issues are: regulatory feasibility worldwide for individual tariffs; 
the legal treatment of price discrimination: can the service providers charge different 
prices for individual services to consumers, as they already do with companies; the 
contracts among service providers, between service providers and customers for 
individual tariffs; the legal commitments of the providers in case of a service failure; 
and the Intellectual Property Right issues which provide incentives to service creation. 
  
On the other hand, the user cannot sue the service provider if he thinks he has paid too 
much (individual tariffs) for an individual service, as it was agreed upon by a signed 
contract and SLA: the current competition law (e.g. EU Competition Act) does not 
cover such a situation.  
 
6. Social effects 
 
This dimension analyzes the social and intangible costs and benefits of individual 
services and tariffs to the whole society, communities, families and individuals. 
  
People nowadays have already changed their behavior under the influence of basically 
just two types of mobile services: voice and simple text service (e.g. SMS), and 
possibly toys like ringtones, or images. Individual services and tariffs will create great 
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incentives for service creation amongst all people. The abundance and diversity of 
mobile services will bring profound changes to the way people work, live and 
entertain themselves.  
 
Most of the academic research nowadays focuses on the impact of mobile voice and 
SMS, although suppliers and operators are ahead with more diverse services. Little 
has been done on the impacts of various mobile services enabled by individual 
services and tariffs. Key issues are: how will individual services and tariffs improve 
the efficiency of a society? Will individual services and tariffs reduce/enforce the 
hierarchical structure of the society? How will the structures and processes of formal 
organizations change when their services go mobile and are tailored for each 
customer? How will individual services affect the formation and functioning of a 
community? And, the most important, what will be the impact on each individual. 
  
7. The migration of the legacy system/ evolution of the telecommunication systems 
 
The old Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN), which had two separate layers 
(control and transport) plus management, is technically possible for individual 
services and tariffs for voice (see the Danish history reported in Section 1.1), but id 
rejected by monopolies. This is similar for the current second generation mobile 
networks (e.g. GSM).  
 
On one hand, there are organizations such as OSA/Parlay and OMG4 which are 
making standards to open up the telecommunication networks for service creation by 
third parties and make such creation interoperable. On the other hand, the migration 
toward an all-IP network is progressing slowly, which is flattening the network 
structure and reducing the barriers for third party service developers. Furthermore, 
developments in hardware, content management, storage and software technologies 
also make service creation by a third party easier. 
  
The challenges in this dimension are not to build a new communication system from 
scratch, but to evolve from existing systems, with certain goals set in advance, 
towards systems which enable individual services and tariffs. Key elements are service 
provisioning information technology, information architecture, software architecture 
and standards, and above all the willingness of suppliers to allow for individualization. 
The recent history of the reluctance of suppliers to enable open signaling is evidence 
of  the difficulty perceived by operators. 
 
The above identified research dimensions are not isolated pillars of individual tariffs. In 
fact, they are closely interrelated and together form the foundation of individual services 
and tariffs. The research questions which lie across two or more dimensions are, very 
often, the most important and urgent questions which need to be answered.  
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Appendix II: 
Case description of mSinging v2.0 
 
Your friends have registered you on a program which is similar to the currently very 
popular “Idol” show. But unlike the “Idol”, which competes only in singing expertise, the 
program asks you to show your other talents, such as dancing, acting or playing musical 
instruments.  
 
You’ll have 9 months to prepare yourself for the competition. (At the same time you need 
to finish your study at EUR). Although you are talented, you still want to attend some 
classes to improve your expertise. Because of your tight schedule, you cannot attend all the 
training classes.  
 
Your friends have seen an offer (called mSinging) from an operator who provides music 
and vocal training to users via mobile technologies. Below is the description of the 
services: 
 mSinging: a Mobile Singing Classroom service 
 
♪ Prerequisite:  
A mobile terminal which supports high-end music functions. Specifically, the mobile can 
play high-fidelity music and record the singing voice with high quality.   
 
♪ Service provider 
A mobile operator assisted by coaches and teachers from a music college. The mobile 
operator hosts the service portal and content database. The portal can be accessed both 
from mobile and fixed internet.  
 
♪ Users 
The users are supposed to be students who seek vocal training or want to listen to music 
via mobiles.  
 
♪ Service  
The service provides music and vocal training to users via mobile technologies.  
 
Each song has background information such as a brief introduction of the composer, 
introduction to the specific type of music, the stories and anecdotes of a particular song, 
etc; scores and lyrics (supported by special software to display it on the mobile device); 
and an interpretation of the song (an example of performance). 
 
An instruction is associated with each song. The content of an instruction includes: general 
techniques when interpreting a certain genre of music, techniques for building one’s own 
styles, homework or assignments for users to practice.  
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A user can ask questions regarding how to perform a specific part, or can ask a more 
general question regarding the styles of songs. He will receive prompt professional 
answers from the teacher. 
 
A user can sing to the background music and record it with his high-end mobile phone. 
(The software that comes with the service can separate the vocal performance from the 
background music of the example.) He can send in a recording of his performance for the 
teacher to evaluate and provide feedback. 
 
 Service attributes 
 
The mSinging service has several attributes. The values of the attributes can be set by a 
user according to his preferences. Below is the description of the attributes.  
 
♪Attribute description  
 
1. Contract period /in month(s) (1- ) 
A user can specify his ideal length of contract for the mSinging service. The unit is 
months. 
 
2. Degree of use of mobile terminal from a converged operator (1-10).  
A converged operator offers fixed and mobile service in one service contract. A user can 
choose a number from 1-10. With 1, indicates that he wants all the content of the mSinging 
service to be downloaded via fixed internet (which means no mobility and cheapness). 10 
indicates that all the content is downloaded using mobile (which means more mobility and 
expensiveness). A number from 2-9 means a mixed fixed and mobile usage, with a larger 
number indicating a higher degree of mobile usage.  
 
3. Sound quality of music (1-10) 
A user can choose a number between 1-10. 1 indicates the lowest sound quality of music 
(normal mp3) and smaller music file size. 10 indicate the best sound quality of music (CD 
quality) and largest music file size. 
 
4. Number of evaluations to have during contract period (0- ) 
A user can choose not to have any evaluation by setting the parameter to 0. 
 
5. Number of questions to be asked during contract period (0- ) 
A user can choose not to ask any question by setting the parameter to 0. 
 
6. Number of songs to be downloaded in total (1- ) 
A user can specify how many songs he wants to learn or download in total for the whole 
contract period. 
 
7. A user’s bid for the service in € (whole contract period) 
The user specifies his bid (price) for the values he sets for the other service attributes 
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♪ Public offer 
 
The operator offers a standard package (public offer), which is a set of standard service 
specification with a fixed price. A user who wants to accept the public offer can sign a 
contract with the operator directly. The public offer of mSinging is: 
  
Attributes Values 
1. Contract period /in Month(s) (1- ) 4 
2. Degree of use of mobile terminal from a converged operator (1-10) 6 
3. Sound quality of music (1-10) 5 
4. Number of evaluations to have during contract period (0- ) 4 
5. Number of questions to ask during contract period (0- ) 8 
6. Number of songs to download in total (1- ) 16 
7. User’s bid for the service in € (whole contract period) 200 
 
♪ Service individualization and individual tariff 
 
A user can also have an individualized service and tariff. Based on the public offer, he can 
propose the values of all the 7 attributes (including price) to the operator.  
 
However, the user can only propose ONCE. If the proposed values are too low, the 
operator may reject the request.      
 
************************************************************************* 
 
Your considerate friends think the mSinging service can help you to prepare the singing 
part and also save you a lot of time. Knowing that you already have a high end mobile 
phone, they have decided to buy you the service as a gift. Not sure about your exact 
preference, they bought you a coupon of € 200, which entitles you to use the public offer 
of the mSinging service.  
 
When you used the coupon, you learned from the operator that you can also individualize 
the service yourself. If your individual service and tariff request is accepted by the 
operator, and your bid price is less than €200, you will receive the remaining money from 
the operator; if you require more services and bid for a higher price, you need to pay extra. 
If your bid is not accepted by the operator, you have to take the public offer. 
 
Based on your singing expertise, you can decide how to make use of the mSinging service. 
You can only download songs without asking questions, or having evaluations (as a brush-
up). Or you can have extensive interactions with the teachers. You may also save some 
money from the individualized service and tariff and use the money somewhere else (e.g. 
for a dancing class).   
 
1. Please specify your preferences: 
a. I want to take the public tariff 
b. I want to have the individual service and tariff. 
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2. If your answer to the above question is b, please also specify your preference. 
Remember, you can only bid ONCE.     
  
Attributes Public 
offer 
Your 
personal 
bid 
1. Contract period /in Month(s) (1- ) 4  
2. Degree of use of mobile terminal from a converged operator (1-10) 6  
3. Sound quality of music (1-10) 5  
4. Number of evaluations to have during contract period (0- ) 4  
5. Number of questions to ask during contract period (0- ) 8  
6. Number of songs to download in total (1- ) 16  
7. User’s bid for the service in € (whole contract period) 160  
 
201
175 
 
Appendix III: 
User survey questionnaire and results 
 
Introduction: 
The research survey on “individual pricing of mobile service bundles” was conducted by 
an international group consisting of academics, industry researchers and experts from 14 
countries.   
 
Survey dates: 1st Nov, 2006 – 31st Jan, 2007. 
The survey results were made available to participants on 15th Feb, 2007. 
 
Definitions: 
 
Individual tariffs in telecommunications refer to the regulatory protected ability for an 
identified user to obtain from a service provider, by a bilateral specific contract, a set of 
service-specific prices corresponding to a request or a proposal from the user, specified 
with a service demand profile and certain duration. In short, you have a tariff unique to you 
depending on the services you require. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. Please pick one of the following roles that describes you best: 
○ End user (private) 
○ End user (company/public institution) 
○ Content owner 
○ Network operator 
○ Communications systems supplier  
○ CRM or billing vendor 
○ Researcher 
○ Other 
 
2. Which of the following do you prefer?  
○  A single flat rate for all services 
○  Personalized service features and an individual tariff for each service 
 
3. Mention the application contexts in which PERSONALIZED SERVICES would be 
especially useful to you: 
-- Access to unique third party content (e.g. music)  
-- Processing data about yourself (e.g. health related services)  
-- Your specific service needs (e.g. trip planning) 
-- OTHERS (please give examples)  
 
4. Do you consider individual TARIFFS for mobile services as a: 
○ Lifestyle feature 
○ Productivity feature 
○ Cost reduction feature 
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○ OR 
 
5. How many more people (number, frequency, intensity) would you interact with if a 
mobile service of relevance to you and them was personalized? 
Number of contacts ( ±%)  
Frequency ( ±%) 
Intensity (i.e. duration of interaction) (±%) 
 
6. How much more useful would you find personalized SERVICES to be, if delivered 
ubiquitously to you ANYWHERE, as opposed to being delivered from a FIXED access 
point? 
○ Much less useful 
○ Less useful 
○ Same 
○ More useful 
○ Much more useful 
 
7. How much simpler should a USER-FRIENDLY personalized service be vs. the 
complete version of the service for general usage? 
○ Much simpler 
○ Simpler 
○ Same 
○ More features 
○ Many more features 
 
8. What is the ideal length of contract for a unique personalized mobile service with an 
INDIVIDUAL tariff?  
(e.g. 9 months) 
 
 
9. For a given bundle of mobile services, how much would you be willing to pay with an 
INDIVIDUAL tariff, if you can select a personalized subset represented by HALF of the 
original bundled services?  
○ 30 % of the original bundle price 
○ 40 % of the original bundle price 
○ 50 % of the original bundle price 
○ 60 % of the original bundle price 
○ 70 % of the original bundle price 
 
10. It is assumed in this question that a service has two versions: a fixed broadband version 
and a mobile version. Suppose the fixed version can be configured by yourself on fixed 
broadband network. Suppose also that the mobile version is configured for you by a 
service provider (e.g. an operator). How much MORE/LESS would you be willing to PAY 
for the usage of the OPERATOR-CONFIGURED PERSONALIZED MOBILE service, 
instead of a SELF-CONFIGURED PERSONALIZED FIXED service? (e.g. -30% for less, 
+50% for more). 
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11. Suppose a personalized MOBILE service can also be configured by yourself, or 
alternatively for you by a mobile operator. How much less/more would you be willing to 
PAY via an INDIVIDUAL tariff for the usage of this personalized mobile service, when 
configured by yourself, instead of having this service configured by the operator?  
(e.g. -30% for less, +50% for more) 
  
 
12. How many hours would you spend on personalizing or configuring yourself a 
(personalized) mobile service?  
(e.g. 3 hours) 
 
  
13. With how many people would you like to share the configuration of your personalized 
mobile service? 
○ 0 -1 
○ 1 -5 
○ 5 -20 
○ 20 – 100 
○ more than 100 
 
Optional question 
 
14. Please provide your email address if you want to receive the research results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
204
178 Individual mobile communication services and tariffs 
Results and analysis 
  
There were 102 respondents worldwide. Their geographic locations could be obtained 
from their IP addresses. See Fig. AIII-1.  
 
Europe & 
Africa
67%
Asia & 
Oceania
17%
Americas
16%
 
Fig. AIII-1: Geographic distribution of the respondents 
 
Q1: User type 
 
 
 
Europe 66 
US 16 
Asia 14 
Oceania 3 
Africa 2 
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The majority of the respondents are from Europe, Asia and America (US). Regarding their 
roles, the majority are end-users (private) and researchers, who account for over 83% of 
the respondents.  
 
Q 2: Flat rate vs. personalized service and individual tariffs 
 
 
 
Slightly more than half of the respondents (53.9%) prefer personalized services and 
individual tariffs; the rest prefer a single flat rate for all services. The margin of error at 
90% confidence level is 0.0812, i.e. 8.1%. The result can be interpreted as that there will 
be an equal number of people who prefer flat rate and individual tariff.  
 
Q3: User-specific personalized service demands 
 
 
 
The respondents are not obliged to fill in all the four application areas. They can just fill in 
what they consider to be useful. Judging from the answers and response rate in each 
application area, there is a wide variety of needs but also with significant overlap between 
individual users. 
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Table AIII-1: Number of proposed applications vs. number of responses 
 
 Number of applications under 
different context 
Number of responses  
Access to 3rd party content 19 49 
Process data about yourself 10 40 
Individual’s specific needs 8 52 
Other applications 5 22 
 
Table AIII-2: User-suggested applications related to the access to third party content 
 
1. access file stored on another server  
2. access to company applications 
3. education 
4. game 
5. mobile blogging 
6. movie/movie trailers/cinema listings 
7. music 
8. news  
9. newsletter /email 
10. picture 
11. information about stores and theatres 
12. story 
13. text 
14. training 
15. travel schedules 
16. video 
17. weather reports 
18. web surfing 
19. book 
 
Table AIII-3: User-suggested applications related to processing data about oneself 
 
1. bank-related services 
2. health-related services/health care 
3. insurance/benefit selection 
4. mobile payment 
5. personal briefcase containing important personal data stored in one place 
6. personal finance 
7. real time agenda/calendar  
8. stock 
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9. weight, sizes, diet 
10. personal knowledge management 
 
Table AIII-4: User-suggested applications related to individual’s specific needs 
 
1. air ticket/hotel/car reservations 
2. facility booking 
3. follow-me data and calendar 
4. menu planning 
5. navigator / route planner 
6. personal location information 
7. real time traffic reports (road, railway, flight, ferry, etc)   
8. trip planning/ maps/ travel guides and timetables for tube, trains and ferries 
 
Table AIII-5: Other user-suggested applications 
 
1. discount information 
2. mobile chat, Skype 
3. international services in own native language 
4. call to specific subscribers at reduced rates/ personalized international calls/roaming 
tariffs 
5. jokes 
 
Q4: User’s perception of the main function of individual tariff 
 
 
 
Individual tariffs are considered by nearly half (58%) of the respondents as a cost 
reduction feature, while about 1/3 respondents consider them as a lifestyle feature, and 
about 10% respondents consider them as a productivity feature.  
 
Other than these three views, some respondents consider individual tariffs as both lifestyle 
and cost reduction features, or both productivity and cost reduction features, or all of them. 
Other answers include: marketing hype and leisure activity (NOT lifestyle). One 
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respondent considers individual tariffs are another way to make money from customers by 
the operators. 
 
Q5: Effects of personalized services on communication patterns.  
 
 
 
Table AIII-6: The perceived increase in the number of contacts brought by individualized 
mobile services 
 Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid -.30 1 1.0 1.0 
 .00 28 28.3 29.3 
 .01 3 3.0 32.3 
 .02 3 3.0 35.4 
 .03 3 3.0 38.4 
 .04 2 2.0 40.4 
 .05 12 12.1 52.5 
 .07 1 1.0 53.5 
 .10 12 12.1 65.7 
 .12 1 1.0 66.7 
 .15 2 2.0 68.7 
 .20 12 12.1 80.8 
 .25 3 3.0 83.8 
 .30 4 4.0 87.9 
 .40 2 2.0 89.9 
 .50 4 4.0 93.9 
 .75 1 1.0 94.9 
 1.00 4 4.0 99.0 
 2.00 1 1.0 100.0 
 Total 99 100.0  
Missing System 3   
Total 102   
 
About 30% of the respondents consider personalization will not bring a difference with 
regard to the number of contacts.  64.6% of the respondents consider a slight increase up to 
50% in the number of contacts. The mean is a 16.31% increase in the number of contacts.   
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Table AIII-7: The perceived increase in the frequency of communication brought by 
individualized mobile services 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid .00 25 32.5 32.5 
 .01 3 3.9 36.4 
 .02 1 1.3 37.7 
 .03 1 1.3 39.0 
 .05 4 5.2 44.2 
 .10 12 15.6 59.7 
 .15 1 1.3 61.0 
 .20 11 14.3 75.3 
 .25 2 2.6 77.9 
 .30 7 9.1 87.0 
 .50 6 7.8 94.8 
 .80 1 1.3 96.1 
 1.00 1 1.3 97.4 
 2.00 2 2.6 100.0 
 Total 77 100.0  
Missing System 25   
Total 102   
 
About 1/3 of the respondents consider personalized services will not increase the 
frequency of their communication. The majority of the respondents (62.3%) consider a 
slight increase of up to 50% in the frequency of communications. The mean is a 19.78% 
increase in the frequency of communications.   
 
Table AIII-8: The perceived increase in the duration of communication brought by 
individualized mobile services 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid -.50 2 2.7 2.7 
 -.10 1 1.4 4.1 
 .00 24 32.9 37.0 
 .01 2 2.7 39.7 
 .02 1 1.4 41.1 
 .05 5 6.8 47.9 
 .10 12 16.4 64.4 
 .12 1 1.4 65.8 
 .15 1 1.4 67.1 
 .20 10 13.7 80.8 
 .30 6 8.2 89.0 
 .50 4 5.5 94.5 
 .60 1 1.4 95.9 
 1.00 1 1.4 97.3 
 2.00 1 1.4 98.6 
 15.00 1 1.4 100.0 
 Total 73 100.0  
Missing System 29   
Total 102   
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About 1/3 of the respondents consider personalized services will not change the duration 
of their communication. The majority of the respondents (57.5%) consider a slight increase 
up to 50% in the duration of communications. The mean is a 34.33% increase in the 
duration of communications.  
 
Overall, about 1/3 of the respondents think personalized services will not change their 
current behavior. About 60% of the respondents consider a slight increase up to 50% in 
terms of number of contacts, communication frequency and duration. The average 
increases in the number of contacts, communication frequency and duration are 16.31%, 
19.78% and 34.33%.  
 
Note: some of the answers are not valid and therefore are discarded.  
 
Q6: Mobility  
 
 
 
Nearly 80% of the respondents consider a ubiquitous service offer more useful than if the 
services are available at a fixed access point. The difference between “more useful (46.1%) 
and “much more useful (31.4%)” indicates that about 1/3 of the respondents are willing to 
pay higher prices. 
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Q7: Simplification  
 
 
 
Over 68% of the respondents think a user-friendly personalized service should be simpler 
than the complete version of the service. This can be related to question No.4 in such a 
way that simpler service may reduce the cost (48% of the respondents concerned), or may 
improve productivity (11.8% of the respondent concerned).    
 
Q8: Contract length 
 
 
 
Table AIII-9: Distribution of the users’ preference for contract length 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid .00 5 5.1 5.1 
 1.00 13 13.3 18.4 
 3.00 12 12.2 30.6 
 5.00 1 1.0 31.6 
 6.00 31 31.6 63.3 
 9.00 1 1.0 64.3 
 10.00 1 1.0 65.3 
 12.00 33 33.7 99.0 
 24.00 1 1.0 100.0 
 Total 98 100.0  
Missing System 4   
Total 102   
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Fig. AIII-2: Distribution of the users’ preference for contract length 
 
The majority of the respondents (99%) prefer a contract length less than (including) 1 year. 
The most preferred contract periods are 1 year (33.7%) and 6 months (31.6%), and some of 
the respondents (about 26%) want even a shorter period (equal to or less than 3 months). 
The distribution is also shown in the graph. The mean is 6.9 months, standard deviation 4.6 
months. This is in sharp contrast with today’s operator’s offers: 1 year or 1.5 years or 2 
years.   
 
Some comments from the respondents indicate that they want to have the ability to 
change/terminate the contract at any given time: thus a fixed contract length is not 
preferred.  
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Q9: Personalized bundle price elasticity 
 
 
 
46.1% of the respondents would pay less than 50% of the original price if the services 
attributes/features are reduced by 50%; 39.2% respondents will pay exactly half; and 
14.7% of the respondents are willing to pay more for the personalized service with reduced 
features. (A possible explanation is that personalization reduces redundancy/improves 
efficiency).  
 
If we define “price elasticity of service attributes” as “% change in the demand of service 
attributes / % change in the service bundle”, then 46.1% of the respondents have elastic 
demand (>1); these respondents are sensitive to the change in the number of features in the 
bundle. 39.2% of the respondents have a demand of unit elasticity (=1): these are the “so- 
called” rational consumers. 14.7% of the respondents’ demands are inelastic (<1): these 
respondents are insensitive to a change in the number of features in the service bundle. 
 
Q 10: Mobile and operator-configured service vs. fixed and self-configured service  
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Table AIII-10: Distribution of the users’ preferences relating to mobile and operator-
configured service over fixed and self-configured service  
 
 Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid -.60 1 1.0 1.0 
 -.50 3 3.1 4.2 
 -.40 2 2.1 6.3 
 -.30 10 10.4 16.7 
 -.25 2 2.1 18.8 
 -.20 8 8.3 27.1 
 -.10 6 6.3 33.3 
 .00 22 22.9 56.3 
 .05 1 1.0 57.3 
 .10 18 18.8 76.0 
 .15 1 1.0 77.1 
 .20 10 10.4 87.5 
 .30 4 4.2 91.7 
 .40 1 1.0 92.7 
 .50 7 7.3 100.0 
 Total 96 100.0  
Missing System 6   
Total 102   
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Fig. AIII-3: Distribution of the users’ preferences relating to mobile and operator-
configured service over fixed and self-configured service  
 
1/3 of the respondents prefer to have a self-configured fixed service. About 23% of 
respondents would pay the same if their personalized fixed service had a mobile version. 
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Still, there are about 45% of respondents who are willing to pay more if their personalized 
fixed service goes mobile. On average, these 45% of respondents are willing to spend 22% 
more if their fixed personalized service goes mobile.  
 
Q11:  Self-configured vs. operator configured service and individual tariffs 
 
 
 
Table AIII-11: Distribution of the users’ preferences relating to self-configured mobile 
service over operator-configured service 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid -.60 1 1.0 1.0 
 -.50 1 1.0 2.1 
 -.30 11 11.3 13.4 
 -.20 6 6.2 19.6 
 -.15 2 2.1 21.6 
 -.10 2 2.1 23.7 
 .00 31 32.0 55.7 
 .05 3 3.1 58.8 
 .10 17 17.5 76.3 
 .20 10 10.3 86.6 
 .25 2 2.1 88.7 
 .30 4 4.1 92.8 
 .40 2 2.1 94.8 
 .50 3 3.1 97.9 
 .54 1 1.0 99.0 
 .80 1 1.0 100.0 
 Total 97 100.0  
Missing System 5   
Total 102   
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Fig. AIII-4: Distribution of the users’ preferences relating to self-configured mobile 
service over operator-configured service 
 
23.7% of the respondents would pay less if they needed to do the service personalization 
themselves, when compared to the same service that is configured by the operator. 32% of 
respondents are indifferent to the two situations. 44.3% percent of the respondents are 
willing to pay more if they can do the service personalization themselves. On average, 
these 44.3% respondents are willing to spend 21.4% more if they can take control of the 
service personalization.  
 
If we correlate the answers from questions 10 and 11, the conclusion with low error is that 
self-configuration, and possibly self-negotiation of individual tariffs, is preferred.   
 
Q12: Time spent on personalizing a mobile service 
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Table AIII-12: Distribution of the amount of time (hours) the users are willing to spend on 
individualizing a mobile service 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid .00 4 4.1 4.1 
 .08 3 3.1 7.2 
 .10 1 1.0 8.2 
 .17 2 2.1 10.3 
 .25 3 3.1 13.4 
 .33 2 2.1 15.5 
 .50 21 21.6 37.1 
 1.00 40 41.2 78.4 
 2.00 13 13.4 91.8 
 3.00 4 4.1 95.9 
 4.00 3 3.1 99.0 
 5.00 1 1.0 100.0 
 Total 97 100.0  
Missing System 5   
Total 102   
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Fig. AIII-5: Distribution of the amount of time (hours) the users are willing to spend on 
individualizing a mobile service 
 
More than 3/4 of the respondents are willing to spend ≤ 1 hour personalizing a service. The 
three most observable thresholds are 1 hour (41.6%), 0.5 hour (21.3%), and 2 hours 
(13.5%). The average is 1.1 hour.    
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Q13: Community related question 
 
 
 
 
About 1/3 of the respondents do not intend to share their configuration; about 40% of the 
respondents would share the configuration within a small circle of 1-5 people, probably 
family members and close friends. Together, the two categories account for more than 
70% of the respondents: thus, an individual configuration is mostly perceived as a private 
data structure. 
 
About 20% of the respondents would like to share the configuration information with 5-20 
people, probably a small and closed community. Note that there are about 7 percent of the 
respondents who would like to share with more than 100 people, which could indicate a 
large and open community.  
 
Q14: Optional 
 
 
 
More than half (53 vs. 49) of the respondents want to know the research results. 
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Samenvatting (Abstract in Dutch) 
 
Individuele diensten en tarieven hebben voor korte tijd bestaan in het begin van het 
telecommunicatietijdperk 150 jaar geleden, maar zijn geleidelijk verdwenen. Het 
diensten aanbod heeft zich ontwikkeld tot de huidige aanbieder-centrale situatie, die 
vele beperkingen en nadelen heeft voor gebruikers en uiteindelijk ook voor aanbieders. 
Dit proefschrift neemt opnieuw de filosofie van een gebruiker-centraal aanbod van 
diensten en tariefstelling op. Ze past deze toe op de hedendaagse situatie van mobiele 
communicatiediensten, die belangrijk verschilt van de grootte en het bereik van het 
dienstenaanbod in het verleden. Er wordt ontwerpmethodologie gepresenteerd en een 
instrument voor het vaststellen van geïndividualiseerde mobiele diensten en tarieven, en 
de voordelen voor zowel gebruikers als aanbieders worden geëvalueerd.  
Het ontwerp heeft drie specifieke onderdelen. Het eerste betreft het bouwen van een 
conceptueel raamwerk dat bestaat uit gedragsmodellen voor gebruikers en aanbieders 
(ondernemingen) en een speltheoretisch onderhandelingsmechanisme voor het bepalen 
van individuele diensten en tarieven. Het tweede is het verwerken van het conceptuele 
raamwerk tot een rekenkundig ontwerp, bestaande uit methoden, rekenmodellen, 
onderhandelingsalgoritmen, risicomaatstaven en een prototype toepassing. Het derde is 
het uitbreiden van het concept van individuele diensten en tarieven naar de situatie van 
een gemeenschap en het ontwerpen van een bedrijfsmodel voor deze gemeenschap. 
Er worden twee soorten evaluaties uitgevoerd. In de eerste plaats is een 
gebruikersenquête uitgevoerd en zijn rekenkundige toepassingen van toegevoegde 
waarde mobiele diensten en generieke mobiele dienstenbundels ontwikkeld ten behoeve 
van het onderneming-gebaseerde ontwerp. De numerieke analyses laten zien dat 
gebruikers altijd nutsvoordeel kunnen bereiken. De voordelen voor de aanbieder 
omvatten regelbare risico-winst evenwichtspunten, verhoogd netwerkverkeer en 
verminderde uitval. In de tweede plaats zijn gevalstudies uitgevoerd voor twee 
gemeenschappen met verschillende ontwikkelingsniveaus. De resultaten tonen dat de 
voorgestelde bedrijfsmodellen van gemeenschap-gebaseerde individuele diensten en 
tarieven precies kunnen voldoen aan de vraag van de leden van de gemeenschap en 
rekening kunnen houden met kwesties van betaalbaarheid en duurzaamheid.  
Ten slotte, wordt een specifieke technische toepassing en integratie van 
ontwerpinstrumenten van geïndividualiseerde diensten en tarieven in de bestaande 
infrastructuur van aanbieders van communicatiediensten voorgesteld. Ook wordt 
ingegaan op overige onderzoeksonderwerpen 
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Аннотация (Abstract in Russian) 
 
Индивидуальные услуги связи и индивидуальная тарификация были популярны 
на заре эпохи телекоммуникаций около 150 лет назад. С тех пор услуги утратили 
ориентацию на потребности отдельного абонента; сейчас их содержание 
определяется исключительно провайдерами, что приводит к существованию 
ограничений и недостатков как для абонентов, так и для самих провайдеров. В 
рамках данной диссертации предпринята попытка возродить индивидуальную 
ориентированность телекоммуникационных услуг и тарифов; диссертация 
рассматривает реализацию данной концепции в современном контексте услуг 
мобильной связи, который отличается от ранее существоваших условий как по 
спектру, так и по содержанию услуг. Мы разработали методологию и 
инструментарий для предоставления индивидуальных услуг мобильной связи и 
тарификации таких услуг, а также провели эмпирическую оценку их преимуществ 
для клиентов и провайдеров. 
Структура исследования включает три блока. Первый блок включает 
концептуальную модель, состоящую из моделей поведения клиента и провайдера 
услуг, а также основанного на теории игр механизма переговоров для 
определения содержания индивидуальных услуг и тарифов на них. Второй блок 
реализует концептуальную модель посредством математических моделей, 
разработки алгоритмов переговоров, показателей оценки рисков, а также 
посредством разработки прототипа. Третий блок охватывает реализацию 
концепции индивидуальных услуг и тарифов в контексте сообществ, включая 
разработку бизнес-модели для данного контекста.  
Эмпирическая верификация результатов включает два этапа. Во-первых, для 
случая, когда услуги предоставляются компанией, проведен опрос пользователей 
и разработаны математические примеры конкретных услуг, включающие как 
пакеты базовых услуг, так и дополнительные сервисы.  Согласно результатом 
анализа, пользователи всегда получают прирост в полезности. Для фирмы-
провайдера выгода состоит в снижении риска и/или повышении прибыли в 
условиях равновесия, росте сетевого трафика и снижении «текучести» 
абонентской базы. Во-вторых, проведено исследование двух конкретных 
сообществ на различных стадиях развития. Результаты показали, что наша 
бизнес-модель индивидуальных услуг и тарификации мобильной связи для 
сообществ удовлетворяет потребностям членов сообществ и учитывает такие 
аспекты как доступность и устойчивость услуг.  
В заключение, мы предлагаем инженерное решение для внедрения и интеграции 
индивидуальных услуг и тарифов в существующую инфраструктуру провайдеров 
телекоммуникационных услуг. Сформулированы темы дальнейших исследований.   
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内容摘要 (Summary in Chinese) 
 
早在 150 年前电信业发展之初，个性化业务及资费即已存在。但不久就由于电信业
务的国家垄断而淡出。电信产业在规模经营下蓬勃发展，业务和资费逐渐演变成以
运营商为中心的局面。对用户而言，由运营商决定业务和资费存在许多缺点和局限
性。这些缺点和局限最终也会影响运营商。本文重新倡导以用户为中心的个性化业
务及资费理念，并将其应用于当前移动通信业务环境中。与 150 年前相比，移动通
信业务的规模和范围都已截然不同。 
 
本文在用户需求多样化和移动通信业务复杂性的背景下，以保持运营商可持续发展
为前提，研究了个性化业务的定制和资费问题。为了让用户和运营商接受这种理
念，必须定量分析个性化业务和资费给他们带来的益处。同时，对于运营商而言，
必须分析盈利-风险成本。在相当长时间内，垄断运营商一直以实施定制的成本过高
为由拒绝提供个性化业务；而事实上，他们的市场营销，客户关系管理和用户转网
成本却更高。 
 
本文首先为个性化业务和资费构建了一概念框架，并将其作为进一步量化设计的理
论依据。该框架包括了用户和业务提供商（运营商）的行为模型以及他们之间为定
制个性化业务和资费的博弈协商机制。用户的行为具有“有限理性”和“社会性”
两个特征。对于用户的有限理性特征，我们引入了简化的“业务感知空间”。这个
空间由用户所感知的业务属性所构建，其均为易于用户理解的非技术性属性。当一
个复杂的，具有多种属性（如属性数≥7）的业务需要定制时，此空间将作为用户的
优化和决策空间。在决策过程中，用户采用的是“追求满意”（satisficing）的决
策规则。对于用户的“社会性”特征，我们则采用了一个简单的基于距离的效用函
数来反映其由于考虑社会层面而导致的一些非理性行为。相应的，运营商具有追求
利润最大化风险和最小化的特征。由于运营商掌握所有的技术设计属性，并且最终
负责实施/提供业务，因此我们引入了基于技术和商业属性的“业务设计空间”作为
供应商的决策空间。运营商采用如下决策规则：从个别用户的个性化合同中获取的
利润与公众业务合同相比，可能有所减少；但运营商可在整个用户群上获得最好的
经济收益和最低的风险。用户和运营商之间通过协商来定制个性化业务和资费；协
商的过程是一个以用户占主导地位的递归 Stackelberg 博弈。 
 
基于上述的概念框架，本文提出了一种量化设计以及相应的计算工具。这种设计可
以根据用户表达的简单愿望（如业务属性，预算，以及合同长短等等）来计算用户
和运营商协商的结果。同时，这种设计也提供了企业绩效指标以帮助运营商设置协
商时的决策规则和参数。具体来说，我们首先提供了决定“业务感知空间”和“业
务设计空间”映射关系的方法。这是因为尽管用户和运营商使用不同的优化与决策
空间，他们之间仍需要沟通与交流。其次，我们构建了一个逼真的运营商的运营模
型。该模型是个增量模型，用于量化单个用户的个性化业务需求所带来的影响。由
于该模型考虑了无线接入技术之间的切换，流量传输，交换路由，网络管理，内容
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获取以及增值业务等方面，因此具有大量的不连续性和非线性方程。再次，我们提
出了三个博弈算法。前两个算法用于复杂的增值业务定制时的博弈：第一个算法使
用连续决策变量，第二个算法使用离散变量，应用于具有大量的不连续性和非线性
方程的运营商模型中。第三个算法则应用于定制当前运营商提供的基本移动业务套
餐的博弈。在这种设置中，用户和运营商使用同一个业务设计空间。此外，我们还
提出了在正常和极端的市场条件下如何运用风险价值和极端风险价值来量化运营商
的风险。这包括在单个合同层面上利用蒙地卡罗方法计算运营商的风险价值，预期
的利润以及协商成功率；基于这些绩效指标，运营商在同整个用户群进行协商时，
可以调整约束条件和决策规则中的参数以实现其对于该用户群利润最大化与风险最
小化的目标。基于以上设计理念，本文同时提供了一个软件模型做为计算工具。 
 
为了初步定量评估以上的设计方法和设计工具，本文开发了“移动音乐课堂”
（mSinging）业务作为一个算例。这个业务是一个相对复杂的增值服务，它结合了
无线带宽需求、无线数据流量、内容和音乐专业服务等。此例中，用户使用“业务
感知空间”作为优化和决策空间。我们按照以上的量化设计，通过使用计算工具找
到了 Stackelberg 协商博弈的均衡点，并将它与初始点进行对照。这个初始点指的
是由运营商提供的公众业务和资费。 
 
为进一步定量评估以上的设计方法和设计工具，本文同时研究了把个性化业务和资
费理念大规模地应用于当前基本移动业务套餐中的案例。在该案例中，移动业务套
餐包括语音、短信和数据下载等业务，用户可以自由地设置所需业务的数量，合同
期限和预算。这有别于当前仅由运营商设置固定参数的情况，所以我们仍称其为个
性化定制。在此例中，用户和运营商采用同一个“业务设计空间”作为其优化和决
策空间。 
 
上述两个算例均表明，用户作为协商博弈的的主导者，始终可以获益：用户的效用
在两个算例中平均增长了 163 ％和 37 ％。在单个合同层面上，运营商在有些博弈
中获益，而在另一些博弈中则可能受损。但从整体来看，在合理的风险条件下，运
营商的整体利润在这两个算例中分别提高了 9 ％和 142 ％。两案例中，计算出的风
险价值均为正，这意味着在选定的置信区间中（如 95 %），运营商可以从随机挑选
的单个合同中盈利。计算结果还表明运营商可能无法同时实现利润最大化与风险最
小化的目标，但其可以通过调整约束条件和决策规则中的参数来控制风险-盈利均衡
点。 
 
本文同时将研究由企业拓展至由社区提供的个性化业务和资费。研究重点在于为社
区提供一个可行的商业模式。在本研究中，社区与企业的区别在于社区成员可能会
取代企业（如运营商）成为内容和业务的提供者。我们通过两个实际案例对所设计
的商业模式进行评估：一是无线游戏社区，二是农业合作化社区。这两个案例都具
有社区个性化业务和资费的雏型。案例研究表明，基于社区的个性化业务的开发、
提供和资费能很好地满足社区成员的需求，同时也能很好的解决可持续发展问题。 
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本文还通过调查问卷，从整体上对用户的个性化业务和资费需求进行了分析。问卷
包括 13 个问题，每一个问题的设计都针对不同的目的，并且从问题的相互嵌套中可
以估算出一些隐含的关键指标。我们通过与国际电信用户协会（INTUG）合作来分发
调查问卷，调研的对象来自全球的终端用户。调研的结果表明：选择个性化业务及
资费的用户数与选择单一业务费率的用户数基本相同；追求低成本和简洁的业务是
用户选择个性化业务的出发点；用户的行为会由于使用个性化业务及资费而改变并
带动网络流量。对调研数据的分析表明：个性化业务对用户的主要影响是每比特的
价格下降了近一半；对运营商的主要影响包括网络流量增加（+31％）和用户离网率
降低。另外，运营商可以从提供业务配置和费率协商的服务中获得增加收入和减少
成本的机会。 
 
最后，本文建议了如何在工程上实现上述量化设计工具，并提出了如何利用现有的
技术，将这种工具系统地集成到通信网络基础设施中去。此外，我们推荐了不同的
用户与运营商之间的协商方式，包括离线或者在线协商，从而满足不同用户的需
求，适应不同运营商的客户关系管理策略；同时运营商之间也能进行业务互动。 
 
综上，本研究的理论贡献在于建立了基于行为模型的个性化业务和资费概念框架。
此外，本研究通过整合不同学科领域的研究方法，提供了一套新颖的方式来量化设
计个性化的移动通讯业务和资费。 
 
从实践上说，本文提供的设计工具有广泛的应用空间：移动通信运营商可以在现有
基础设施上集成该设计工具，以用于基本移动业务套餐和复杂的增值业务的协商。
前者是当前移动通信的核心业务，而后者则代表了未来的发展趋势。此外，有意提
供个性化业务和资费的社区也可以很容易地实施本文提出的商业模式。 
 
下一步的研究包括：定量分析在个性化业务和资费情况下的用户离网率；建立社区
行为模式和计算模型；在用户行为模式和计算模型中考虑情感因素的影响；采用多
元极值理论描述和模拟用户需求；以及分析个性化业务和资费对监管和社会的影
响。 
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l)INDIVIDUAL MOBILE COMMUNICATION SERVICES AND TARIFFS
Individual services and tariffs existed briefly in the beginning of telecommunications
history 150 years ago but have faded away over time. Service provisioning evolved into
the current supplier-centric situation which has many limitations and disadvantages. This
thesis re-embraces the user-centric service provisioning and tariffing philosophy and
applies it to the current mobile communication services setting, which differs significantly
in scale and scope from the historical practices. A design methodology and tool for the
determination of individualized mobile services and tariffs is provided, and its benefits to
both the user and the supplier are evaluated. 
The design has three aspects. The first involves the construction of a conceptual
framework consisting of the behavioral models of the user and the supplier (firm) and a
game theoretical negotiation mechanism to determine individual services and tariffs.
Second is the operationalization of the conceptual framework in a computational design
with methods, computational models, negotiation algorithms, risk metrics and a prototype
implementation. Third is the extension of the individual services and tariffs concept to a
community setting via a proposed community business model.
Two evaluations are performed. In the first evaluation, for the firm-based design, a
user survey is conducted and computational cases which address value-added mobile
services and generic mobile service bundles are developed. The numerical analyses show
that the users always achieve gains in utility. The benefits to the supplier include
adjustable risk-profit equilibrium points, increased network traffic and reduced churn. In
the second evaluation, for the community-based design, two case studies on communities
are conducted. The results demonstrate that the proposed business model of community-
based individual service provisioning and tariffing can meet the demands of their
members precisely and address both affordability and sustainability issues.
Last, a specific engineering implementation and integration of the individualized
service and tariff design tools into the existing infrastructure of the communication
services suppliers is proposed. Further research issues are pointed out.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder-
zoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are RSM Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics.
ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy
of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by ERIM is focussed on the
management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm relations, and its busi-
ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an
advanced doctoral programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three
hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research
programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating new business
knowledge.
Erim - 08 omslag Hong Chen  12/31/07  10:53 AM  Pagina 1
